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Summary
“Details make perfection, and perfection is not a detail.”
Leonardo da Vinci
This thesis encompasses several applications of evolutionary computation meth-
ods to the cryptology area where those applications are quite diverse. The goal of
such an approach is to show that evolutionary computation can (and should) be
considered as a viable choice when addressing certain difficult problems in cryp-
tology. Colloquially said, genetic algorithms are not only genetic, but also generic.
Naturally, this sentence is true for various evolutionary algorithms not only genetic
algorithms. Key words for this thesis are simplicity, speed and generic approach.
First, we give a short outline of all the topics considered as well as a disclaimer
about the approach we follow and the list of contributions. Next, an overview of
relevant topics from cryptology and evolutionary computation is given, followed by
a short survey of related work. We present multiple examples to support our claim
that evolutionary computation (EC) can be applied to diverse areas.
Chapter GET the Program presents a framework capable of evaluation, genera-
tion and transformation of Boolean functions and S-boxes. This framework serves
not only as a standalone tool, but also as a fundamental part of the experimental
setup when evolving Boolean functions and S-boxes. We present each of the frame-
work’s modules independently wherever we briefly discuss its capabilities. We also
give short examples on the use of the framework.
In Chapter Cryptographic Boolean Functions: One Output, Many Design Cri-
teria, we discuss the evolution of Boolean functions. We concentrate on several ob-
jectives as well as on a set of algorithms in an effort to give a statistically sound
comparison of different Evolutionary Computation (EC) methods. This chapter is
somewhat different from the other ones since we are not interested only in the re-
sults, but also in the comparison of the effectiveness of presented methods. Natu-
rally, since there is a plethora of parameters one can set for each of the problems, this
chapter is not intended as an extensive analysis (although we conduct more than
10 000 experimental runs for each objective), but as a field guide.
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In Chapter S-boxes: Phantom Menace, we discuss the evolution of S-boxes that
have a better Differential Power Analysis (DPA) resistivity. From an evolutionary
standpoint, this topic represents a natural extension of the evolution of Boolean func-
tions, but from the implementation perspective it is completely independent. Fur-
thermore, the complexity of an S-box evolution is much higher than in the Boolean
function case. The end goal in this chapter is to find S-boxes that have better resis-
tance against side-channel attacks.
Chapter Need for Speed: Pipelining Combinatorial Circuits presents an appli-
cation of evolutionary algorithms with the goal of increasing the throughput of com-
binatorial circuits. Although we demonstrate this novel approach for cryptographic
application, it is valid in a general circuit design where the goal is the increase of
the circuit’s throughput. We evolve an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) S-box
tower field implementation where we succeed in obtaining a 50% higher throughput.
In Chapter A Search for the Fault, a new method for finding search space pa-
rameters that cause faults in smart cards is presented where we explain the design
and implementation of a custom-made genetic algorithm. Here we guide an inter-
ested reader from the standard implementation of genetic algorithm, through the
customization process, to obtain, finally, a memetic algorithm that combines the
strengths of three different search methods. The final algorithm is capable of finding
faults, but also of rapidly characterizing the search space.
Lastly, we give a short conclusion where we offer some guidelines for future work
as well as some lessons learned from this research. We also give instructions about
the framework we use as well as several examples of evolved nonlinear elements in
Appendices A and B.
Samenvatting
Deze thesis behandelt verschillende toepassingen van Evolutionary Computation
(EC) methoden in het brede domein van de cryptologie. Het doel van onze aanpak
is om aan te tonen dat Evolutionary Computation beschouwd kan (en moet) worden
als een haalbare oplossing voor een aantal moeilijke problemen in de cryptologie.
Eerst wordt een kort overzicht gegeven van alle behandelde onderwerpen samen
met een “disclaimer” over de aanpak die we volgden en een lijst van onze bij-
dragen. Daarna wordt een overzicht van relevante onderwerpen in cryptologie en
EC gegeven, gevolgd door een korte samenvatting van gerelateerd onderzoek. We
geven verschillende voorbeelden die aantonen dat EC toegepast kan worden in ver-
schillende domeinen.
Een framework voor de evaluatie, generatie en transformatie van Booleaanse
functies en S-boxes wordt ged’ntroduceerd in Hoofdstuk GET the Program.
In Hoofdstuk Cryptographic Boolean Functions: One Output, Many Design Cri-
teria bespreken we evolutie van Booleaanse functies. We richten ons op verschil-
lende doelen alsook op een aantal algoritmen om een statistisch correcte vergelijking
te maken van verschillende EC methoden.
Daarna bespreken we in Hoofdstuk S-boxes: Phantom Menace evolutie van S-
boxen met een verbeterde resistentie tegen “Differential Power Analysis” (DPA). Va-
nuit een evolutionair standpunt is dit onderwerp een natuurlijke uitbreiding van
evolutie van Booleaanse functies, maar vanuit een implementatieperspectief is het
volledig onafhankelijk.
Hoofdstuk Need for Speed: Pipelining Combinatorial Circuits introduceert een
toepassing van Evolutionaire Algoritmen met als doel het verhogen van de doorvo-
ersnelheid van data in combinatorische circuits. Hoewel we deze nieuwe aanpak
demonstreren voor een cryptografische toepassing, is dit tevens bruikbaar voor het
ontwerp van digitale hardware in het algemeen met als doel het verhogen van de
doorvoersnelheid van data.
In Hoofdstuk A Search for the Fault wordt een nieuwe methode voorgesteld
voor het vinden van parameters van de zoekruimte die fouten introduceren in chip-
kaarten. Hiervoor wordt het ontwerp en de implementatie van een handgemaakt
v
genetisch algoritme uitgelegd. Het uiteindelijke algoritme is in staat om fouten te
vinden, maar kan ook een snelle karakterisatie doen van de zoekruimte.
Tenslotte geven we een korte conclusie waarbij we richtlijnen geven voor verder
onderzoek. Tevens bespreken wij de lessen die wij uit dit onderzoek geleerd hebben.
Sažetak
“Non quia difficilia sunt non audemus, sed quia non
audemus difficilia sunt.”
Seneka
S
vijet je postao globalno selo. Ova izjava predstavlja više od fraze. Kada je pred
više od 80 godina Karinthy objavio svoju teoriju o "Šest razina udaljenosti", do-
imala se skoro nevjerojatno. Unatocˇ cˇinjenici da je ljudska populacija u med¯uvre-
menu narasla nekoliko puta, ova teorija danas zvucˇi više istinito nego ikad prije
(mada, strogo govorec´i, nije istinita ako ukljucˇimo slucˇajve kao što su izolirana ama-
zonska plemena). Razne aplikacije za komunikaciju su približile ljude unatocˇ ocˇitoj
razdvojenosti kada se razmatra tradicionalni, direktni kontakt.
Takva povezanost ne bi bila moguc´a bez racˇunala koja su postala sastavni dio
naših života. Štoviše, nije rijecˇ samo o racˇunalima, nego i o raznim igrac´im konzo-
lama, mobilnim ured¯ajima i drugim "gadgetima" koji konstantno bivaju nadograd¯i-
vani i unapred¯ivani.
Velik broj ljudi danas ne može zamisliti svoje živote bez dopisivanja, objavljivanja
statusa na društvenim mrežama i slanja fotografija. Koristimo pametne kartice kako
bismo podigli novac na bankomatima i navigacijske sustave u našim automobilima.
Kupovina preko Interneta je zasigurno jedna od aktivnosti koja je promijenila naš
pogled na svijet. Do pred nekoliko godina morali smo ic´i u trgovinu kako bismo
nešto kupili, a sada nam je sve udaljeno samo nekoliko klikova.
Nadalje, s pojavom "Interneta stvari" uskoro c´e biti moguc´e (u biti, vec´ je moguc´e,
samo nije toliko rasprostranjeno) spojiti razne vrste ured¯aja na Internet te ih kontro-
lirati s udaljenosti. Naravno, sve se to dešava u pokušaju olakšavanja povezanosti
med¯u ljudima kao i da im se životi ucˇine lakšima (jednostavnijima, mada se to može
cˇiniti i kao oksimoron). To se ostvaruje automatizacijom raznih procesa koji nam
samo troše vrijeme u današnjem užurbanom svijetu.
Med¯utim, napredak dolazi sa cijenom. Ljudi su danas sve više i više zabrinuti
oko svoje privatnosti kao i sigurnosti svojih podataka. U zadnjih godinu dana su
objave podataka na stranici Wikileaks pokazale kako je krhka naša privatost i si-
gurnost. Naravno, ovo predstavlja ekstremni primjer jer su razne vladine agencije
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oduvijek imale više moguc´nosti i nacˇina kako nadzirati protok podataka. Naravno,
tu je rijecˇ i više nego o samim agencijama; hakeri takod¯er predstavljaju realnu pri-
jetnju. Potrebno je samo zamisliti scenarij u kojemu dod¯u do podataka o kreditnim
karticama. Šteta tada nije samo financijska, vec´ i u percepciji javnosti, kao i u osjec´aju
nesigurnosti. Cˇesto ljudi ne misle o informacijskoj sigurnosti dok se ne pojave vijesti
da je ta sigurnost narušena. Med¯utim, zadnjih nekoliko godina možemo opaziti po-
jacˇanu svijest javnosti o informacijskoj sigurnosti.
Pitanje je kako zaštititi informacije i komunikacijske kanale? Kako bismo to po-
stigli, koristimo kriptografiju.
Mada može zvucˇati egzoticˇno mnogim ljudima, svi koristimo kriptografiju. Kao
primjer, kada kupujemo preko Interneta ovisimo o sigurnosti web stranica da podaci
o našim kreditnim karticama nec´e biti dostupni trec´oj (zlonamjernoj) strani. Kripto-
grafija nije proizvod modernog doba. Vec´ u staroj Grcˇkoj su ljudi koristili razne
sustave kako bi zaštitili važne poruke (sustave kao skital ili Polibiusov kvadrat).
Ljudska povijest obiluje složenim primjerima kako su ljudi pokušavali ucˇiniti svoje
poruke tajnima. Med¯utim, vec´ina tih metoda spada u klasicˇnu kriptografiju koja ne
osigurava nikakvu prakticˇnu sigurnost danas. U skladu s time, trebamo moderne
metode kao odgovore na izazove modernog doba.
Zašto trebamo snažne metode za zaštitu podataka? Djelomicˇno i zato jer se s
razvojem kriptografije takod¯er razvija i kriptoanaliza. Uz tradicionalnije vrste kri-
ptoanaliticˇkih napada (one koji, neformalno govorec´i, pocˇivaju na matematici iza
algoritama) postoje razlicˇiti napadi koji ciljaju implementacije algoritama, a ne same
algoritme.
Cilj ove disertacije je istražiti ucˇinkovitost heuristicˇkih metoda kada se radi sa
kompleksnim, realnim kriptografskim problemima. U tu svrhu, koristimo evoluci-
jsko racˇunarstvo (engl. Evolutionary Computation - EC) zbog njegove fleksibilnosti
i prethodno ostvarenih rezultata pri rješavanju drugih kompleksnih problema. U
tom postupku kombiniramo dva razlicˇita podrucˇja i pokazujemo da se EC može
uistinu smatrati vrijednim izborom kada se rješavaju neki teški kriptografski pro-
blemi. Kažemo "neki problemi" jer je važno napomenuti da se EC ne smije smatrati
"magicˇnim rješenjem" za svaki problem. Uistinu, postoje mnogi problemi koji se ne
mogu riješiti evolucijskim racˇunarstvom. U tim slucˇajevima, upotreba EC-a može
samo dovesti do narušavanja povjerenja u takve metode. Jedan primjer je faktoriza-
cija cjelobrojnih vrijednosti. Neformalno govorec´i, kako bi se neki problem mogao
riješiti sa EC-om, mora postojati poveznica izmed¯u rješenja tako da ona mogu ko-
nvergirati. Kod problema kao što je faktorizacija cjelobrojnih vrijednosti, gdje je cilj
nac´i dva slucˇajna broja izmed¯u kojih ne postoji neka poveznica, nema informacija
koje mogu usmjeravati pretragu.
Konstatirali smo da se EC ne može koristiti za rješavanje svakog problema. U
skladu s time, važno je ustvrditi kakvi se problemi mogu rješavati. Ako se problem
može prikazati kao optimizacijski problem, te postoji dovoljno informacija o pro-
storu pretrage, tada bi se EC trebao moc´i uspješno koristiti. Naravno, rec´i da se neki
problem može riješiti je malo neprecizna tvrdnja. Može se precizirati da c´e EC dati
neko rješenje. Postoji jasna distinkcija izmed¯u tocˇnog rješenja i optimalnog rješenja.
Nalaženje potonjeg je krajnji cilj. Med¯utim, cˇesto je dovoljno nac´i jedno ili više tocˇnih
rješenja. Nadalje, cˇesto govorimo o dobrim rješenjima. Kako je taj pojam relativan,
sada ga pojašnjavamo. "Dobrim rješenjem" smatramo rješenje koje je tocˇno i uspore-
divo po kvaliteti sa rješenjima iz relevantne literature.
Važno je napomenuti da cilj ne bi smio biti pretjerana upotreba EC-a. Uistinu,
cˇesto nije potrebno koristiti takve metode jer postoje bolji, ciljani pristupi ili sam
problem niije dovoljno težak kako bi se opravdala upotreba EC-a. U skladu s time, u
narednim poglavljima c´emo slijediti smjernice: identifikacija problema te upotreba
slucˇajne pretrage kako bi se provjerila težina problema. Samo kada pokažemo da je
problem dovoljno težak, krec´emo u raspravu kako koristiti evolucijsko racˇunarstvo.
Evolucijsko racˇunarstvo je genericˇko i u toj cˇinjenici leži njegova snaga jer se
može upotrijebiti za razlicˇite probleme. Med¯utim, ta cˇinjenica takod¯er predstavlja i
njegovu slabost jer se specijalizirani algoritmi globalno govorec´i teško mogu nadma-
šiti genericˇkim pristupima. Unatocˇ tome, to se ne smije gledati kao slabost evoluci-
jskog racˇunarstva, jer specijalizirani algoritmi koriste dodatne informacije koje se ne
razmatraju u EC-u. Posljedicˇno, specijalizirani algoritmi nisu tako povoljni za "black
box" scenarije te su naravno i složeniji za osmišljavanje.
Stoga se može postaviti pitanje kada treba koristiti evolucijsko racˇunarstvo. Nu-
dimo slijedec´e smjernice:
• Kada ne postoje drugi, specijalizirani pristupi.
• Za brzinsko provjeravanje ispravnosti nekog koncepta (kao što je npr. formula)
• Za procjenu kvalitete neke druge metode.
• Za stvaranje "dovoljno dobrih" rješenja.
• Za stvaranje novih rješenja koja su usporediva s rješenjima dobivenim nekim
klasicˇnim metodama.
U slijedec´im poglavljima c´emo se uvijek voditi gore navedenim smjernicama
kada raspravljamo o nekom problemu. Kombiniranje evolucijskog racˇunarstva i
kriptologije nije nova tema jer vec´ postoji znacˇajan broj radova u tom podrucˇju.
Med¯utim, mi c´emo ovdje predstaviti nove algoritme i probleme od interesa. Nadalje,
pokušat c´emo sistematicˇno pristupiti problemu iz kriptografske perspektive i pe-
rspektive evolucijskog racˇunarstva. Uistinu, u mnogim projektima se može pri-
mjetiti da ljudi iz EC zajednice rade na kriptografskim problemima. Med¯utim, za
njih, takvi problemi predstavljaju samo nacˇin kako testirati snagu evolucijskog racˇu-
narstva, te oni vrlo rijetko razmatraju problem s kriptografskog stajališta. S druge
strane, kriptografska zajednica ponekada koristi evolucijsko racˇunarstvo i dobiva
loše rezultate. U takvim slucˇajevima pitanje je da li su loši rezultati posljedica loših
algoritama ili loše upotrebe algoritama.
U ovoj disertaciji razmatramo nekoliko kriptoloških problema, ocjenjujemo po-
tencijalne teškoc´e u njihovoj primjeni i rješavamo probleme s evolucijskim racˇu-
narstvom. Nadalje, kada je to moguc´e, tako dobivena rješenja implementiramo i
testiramo u prakticˇnom okruženju.
Može se postaviti pitanje kako znati je li neko rješenje optimalno. Generalno
gledajuc´i, ne možemo biti sigurni, ali nudimo slijedec´e "pravilo palca": ako je rješenje
bolje nego ono trenutno poznato, tada je to "dovoljno dobro" rješenje. Stoga, možemo
neformalno redefinirati naš cilj kao potragu za "dovoljno dobrim" rješenjima. Osta-
vljamo zainteresiranim pojedincima da ocijene što je "dovoljno dobro" jer to ovisi o
samom problemu.
U nastavku navodimo glavne ciljeve ove disertacije.
1. Doprinijeti postojec´em istraživanju o evolucijskom racˇunarstvu i primjenama
u kriptologiji.
2. Primjeniti nove, razlicˇite metode evolucijskog racˇunarstva na nekim vec´ proucˇa-
vanim problemima.
3. Primjeniti metode evolucijskog racˇunarstva na nove, prethodno nerazmatrane
(sa EC stajališta) kriptološke probleme.
4. Odrediti efikasnost evolucijskog racˇunarstva kada se primjenjuje na prakticˇne
kriptološke probleme.
5. Doprinijeti povjerenju u evolucijsko racˇunarstvo.
Mada smo do sada govorili o evolucijskom racˇunarstvu, preciznije govorec´i, vec´i-
nom c´emo koristiti evolucijske algoritme (engl. Evolutionary Algorithms - EA) sa
sporadicˇnim posjetima evolucijskom racˇunarstvu. Pod evolucijskim racˇunarstvom
smatramo sve algoritme koji su bazirani na skupu jedinki/rješenja koja se iterativno
poboljšavaju. Evolucijski algoritmi su podklasa evolucijskog racˇunarstva gdje al-
goritmi crpe inspiraciju iz procesa evolucije u prirodi (selekcija, mutacija, opstanak
najsposobnijih, itd.). Odabrali smo evolucijske algoritme zbog njihove fleksibilnosti
kao i našeg prijašnjeg iskustva u rješavanu teških problema s takvim algoritmima.
Organizacija disertacije
Ova je disertacija podijeljena u 10 poglavlja, ukljucˇujuc´i uvod, zakljucˇak i do-
datke. Temeljni zadatak poglavlja 3, 4 i 5 je dizajn primitiva kriptografije tajnog
kljucˇa, preciznije, Boole-ovih funkcija i supstitucijskih kutija (engl. S-boxes). Kako
bi se sagradio sustav za dizajn takvih primitiva, u poglavlju 3 predstavljamo alat
koji nam služi kao evaluator raznih kriptografskih svojstava spomenutih primitiva.
Neka od svojstava koja se mogu izracˇunati tim alatom koriste se u evolucijskom pro-
cesu.
Nadalje, kao prirodnu ekstenziju u poglavlju 6 evoluiramo AES supstitucijsku
kutiju koja je prikazana kao kombinatoricˇki sklop kako bismo povec´ali propusnost
implementacije. Ova primjena pokazuje kako je moguc´e ne samo stvoriti nove ne-
linearne elemente sa evolucijskim algoritmima, vec´ ih je moguc´e i dodatno optimi-
rati po pitanju propusnosti (ali i brzine i površine). Uz gore navedene aplikacije
koje spadaju u kriptografiju, u poglavlju 7 predstavljamo i aplikaciju koja spada u
implementacijske napade, preciznije, napade umetanjem greške. U ovoj primjeni
dizajniramo i specijaliziranu verziju optimizacijskog algoritma koja može brže pro-
nac´i parametere prostora pretrage koji uzrokuju greške. Na ovaj nacˇin pokušavamo
pokriti širok spektar tema kako bismo pokazali da evolucijski algoritmi imaju široku
primjenu. Naglašavamo da problemi koje istražujemo nisu jedini prikladni problemi
za EC. Izbor problema treba gledati kao pokušaj prikaza raznolikih kriptografskih
problema kao optimizacijskih problema. Takod¯er pokušavamo dati ujednacˇene kri-
ptografske i EC perspektive: naš je primarni cilj nac´i dobra rješenja za probleme koje
proucˇavamo, a sekundarni cilj je dati usporedbu izmed¯u raznih evolucijskih algori-
tama koje koristimo u tom procesu.
Što se nalazi u ovoj disertaciji
Predstavljamo nekoliko primjera kako koristiti EC kako bi se "riješili" teški kripto-
grafski problemi. Svjesno smo u tom procesu napravili neka pojednostavljenja. Ima
tema koje c´e kriptografska zajednica smatrati prejednostavnim ili cˇak trivijalnim, ali
i onih tema koji c´e se cˇiniti nejasnim. Isto vrijedi i za EC zajednicu. Naravno, inte-
rdisciplinarni rad cˇesto pati od ove boljke i nema jednostavnog lijeka. Med¯utim, mi
vjerujemo da je najvažniji doprinos ove disertacije metodicˇki pristup koji se može
slijediti pri rješavanju drugih, povezanih problema. Uistinu, ovdje c´emo prikazati
nekoliko uspješnih primjena gdje se mogu istaknuti koraci koji se mogu slijediti u
buduc´im istraživanjima. Može se diskutirati je li izbor problema istraživanih u ovoj
disertaciji optimalan. Na neki nacˇin, može se doc´i do zakljucˇka i da nije. Naravno,
to ne znacˇi da smo napravili pogrešku pri izboru problema. Mogli smo izabrati pro-
bleme koje je lakše povezati sa EA paradigmom ili probleme koji su teži te na taj
nacˇin bolje opravdati izbor ovakve heuristike. Odlucˇili smo se za rad sa nekoliko ra-
zlicˇitih problema i to uobicˇajeno nosi dozu intuicije i eksperimentiranja kada je rijecˇ
o heuristici. To posebno dolazi do izražaja u poglavlju 7 gdje smo morali napraviti
znacˇajan broj promjena na algoritmu kako bismo riješili problem koji nije pretjerano
težak.
Doprinosi
Ova disertacija nudi slijedec´e originalne znanstvene doprinose, ovdje predsta-
vljene po poglavljima gdje se obrad¯uju:
• Poglavlje 3
1. Razvoj okruženja za stvaranje, evaluiranje i transformiranje Boole-ovih
funkcija i supstitucijskih kutija.
• Poglavlje 4
1. Prve primjene algoritama GP, CGP i ES za evoluciju Boole-ovih funkcija
za kriptografske svrhe.
2. Iscrpna statisticˇka usporedba raznih evolucijskih algoritama pri evoluciji
Boole-ovih funkcija za kriptografiju.
• Poglavlje 5
1. Prva primjena GA za evoluciju supstitucijskih kutija koje imaju poboljšana
DPA svojstva.
2. Eksperimentalni rezultati koji pokazuju da trenutno znana DPA svojstva
nisu afino invarijantna.
3. Prvi prakticˇni eksperimenti za svojstva vezana uz DPA otpornost.
4. Nalaženje gornje i donje granice za modificirani red prozirnosti i koefici-
jent zbunjenosti za 4× 4 supstitucijske kutije.
5. Nalaženje 4×4 supstitucijskih kutija koji imaju optimalne vrijednosti svo-
jstva reda prozirnosti, modificiranog reda prozirnosti i koeficijenta zbu-
njenosti.
• Poglavlje 6
1. Prva primjena evolucijskih algoritama na problem povec´anja propusnosti
kombinatoricˇkih krugova dodavanjem bistabila.
• Poglavlje 7
1. Razvoj i testiranje specijalizirane verzije GA za traženje parametara koji
uzrokuju greške u pametnim karticama.
2. Razvoj evolucijskog okruženja koje je sposobno raditi u stvarnom vre-
menu.
3. Razvoj specijaliziranog memetskog algoritma za traženje parametara koji
uzrokuju greške kao i karakterizaciju prostora rješenja parametara.
Što se ne nalazi u ovoj disertaciji
Teme predstavljene u ovoj disertaciji odabrane su na temelju naših osobnih prefe-
rencija i njihove relevantnosti. U skladu s time radimo sa svega nekoliko evolucijskih
algoritama. Postoje mnogi drugi evolucijski algoritmi koji su u širokoj upotrebi i daju
dobre rezultate. Takvi se algoritmi takod¯er mogu koristiti na problemima opisanim
u ovoj disertaciji. Nadalje, ne dajemo primjere gdje evolucijski algoritmi nisu dali
dobre rezultate. To ne znacˇi da evolucijski algoritmi uvijek daju dobre rezultate.
Uistinu, u svakom poglavlju ove disertacije smo mogli slijediti neki drugi smjer, bilo
da je to drugacˇiji prikaz problema, druga funkcija dobrote ili nešto trec´e. Provodimo
eksperimente sa više opcija i na kraju dajemo rezultate za koje smatramo da su na-
jbolji. Druge opcije ne prikazujemo ovdje u pokušaju da održimo duljinu disertacije
na razumnoj mjeri. To naravno ne znacˇi da nismo naišli na poteškoc´e u eksperime-
ntalnim postavkama. Kako koristimo heuristiku, u vec´ini ispitivanja predstavljenih
ovdje ne možemo biti sigurni da smo uistinu pronašli optimalna rješenja. Stoga se
ova disertacija ne smije smatrati kao djelo koje sadrži iskljucˇivo najbolja moguc´a
rješenja za predstavljene probleme.
Što naucˇiti iz ove disertacije?
Mada se rezultati cˇesto predstavljaju kao cilj, ovdje želimo dati naglasak pri-
stupu i moguc´nostima. U svakom istraživacˇkom radu uvijek postoji ljudski faktor
jer istraživacˇ može provesti dobre ili ne-tako-dobre eksperimente. Uz to, s obzirom
da radimo sa heuristikom, uvijek postoji i element slucˇajnosti, ili cˇak srec´e. Pažljivi
cˇitatelj c´e vjerojatno opaziti da cˇesto pišemo kako su parametri evolucijskih algo-
ritama rezultat faze usklad¯ivanja. Kako radimo na raznim temama, takva "nepre-
ciznost" je nužna. Med¯utim, može se tvrditi da je moguc´e postic´i puno bolje rezu-
ltate ako se provede bolje usklad¯ivanje parametara. To je ispravan argument, ali
kako radimo faze usklad¯ivanja za svako eksperimentalno okruženje, usporedba i
rezultati koje dajemo su relevantni i objektivni. Ostavljamo iscrpnije eksperimente
s fazom usklad¯ivanja za buduc´i rad. Cilj disertacije je naucˇiti koncepte kako ko-
ristiti evolucijsko racˇunarstvo i kada ga koristiti. Dodatno, nastojimo dati uvid u
nacˇin funkcioniranja heuristike kao i smjernice pri razvoju specijalizirane heuristike.
Prirodno, bilo bi preambiciozno obuhvatiti sve relevantne materijale u jednoj dise-
rtaciji. Navodimo najvažnije lekcije koje se treba naucˇiti pri radu s evolucijskim al-
goritmima: potrebno je biti oprezan pri odabiru reprezentacije problema i funkcije
dobrote za problem. Postoje i druga važna pitanja, ali to dolazi sa iskustvom i boljom
dostupnošc´u eksperimentalnih okruženja.
Je li nužno koristiti evolucijsko racˇunarstvo za probleme predstavljene u ovoj di-
sertaciji? Odgovor je apsolutno ne. Cˇak i pregled relevantne literature cˇesto navodi
druge vrste heuristike koja se koristi za neki problem. Naš je prijedlog uvijek probati
raditi s algoritmom za koji vec´ postoji radno iskustvo. Cˇak i algoritam koji nije naj-
moc´niji sam po sebi može predstavljati dobar prvi izbor ako istraživacˇ ima iskustva
u radu s njime. Cˇesto manje moc´ni algoritmi korišteni na ispravan nacˇin daju puno
bolje rezultate nego moc´niji algoritmi koji se koriste bez razumijevanja. Slijedec´e pi-
tanje koje se može postaviti je da li je nužno koristiti heuristiku za probleme predsta-
vljene ovdje? Možda ne, ali ona predstavlja dobru opciju. Heuristika se predstavlja
kao dobra opcija u prilikama kada nemamo boljih opcija na raspolaganju.
Koji su otvoreni problemi?
Na neki nacˇin, svi problemi razmatrani ovdje ostaju otvoreni. Naravno, za svaki
od problema nudimo rješenja koja su u najmanju ruku komparativna s rješenjima iz
literature. Med¯utim, problem s evolucijskim racˇunarstvom je da se rijetko zna da li
je dostignuto najbolje moguc´e rješenje (cˇuveni globalni optimum). Slijedec´e, dajemo
kratak pregled otvorenih problema po poglavljima. Uz to, takod¯er raspravljamo i o
moguc´im buduc´im smjerovima istraživanja.
U poglavlju 3 razmatramo alat za analizu i kreiranje supstitucijskih kutija i Boole-
ovih funkcija. Kako govorimo o programu moramo biti svjesni da isti posjeduje
prirodni razvojni ciklus. Sukladno tome, uvijek postoji potreba za raznim poboljša-
njima i nadogradnjama. Trenutno radimo na razvoju nove verzije programa koja je
napisana u programskom jeziku C++ te podržava višedretvenost i heterogeno pro-
gramiranje. Uz to, radimo na daljnjim optimizacijama u pokušaju dodavanja po-
drške za nelinearne elemente vec´ih velicˇina.
U poglavlju 4 radimo na evoluciji Boole-ovih funkcija koje ispunjavaju razlicˇita
kriptografska svojstva. Mada radimo na više kriterija, ona i dalje predstavljaju samo
mali dio onoga što je moguc´e i relevantno. Prirodno, postoje dvije perspektive koje
razmatramo diljem disertacije. Sa stajališta evolucijskog racˇunarstva možemo uvi-
djeti da je sve otvoreno: zanima nas statisticˇka usporedba razlicˇitih algoritama, ra-
zlicˇite velicˇine ulaza za Boole-ove funkcije te razlicˇiti kriteriji pri dizajnu istih. Na-
jlakši (i najprakticˇniji s kriptološke perspektive) je problem istraživanja Boole-ovih
funkcija koje imaju više od 8 ulaza. Moguc´e je procˇitati da kad Boole-ove funkcije
imaju vec´e ulazne velicˇine (npr. n ≥ 9) evolucijski algoritmi ne mogu dati rezu-
ltate koji su usporedivi s nekim kombinacijama algoritama kao što su optimizacijske
metode u sprezi s teorijom. S kriptološke perspektive, problem balansirane Boole-
ove funkcije s 8 ulaza i nelinearnošc´u 118 ostaje otvoren. Nedavno je i pokazano da
Boole-ove funkcije s malom Hammingovom težinom i visokim korelacijskim imu-
nitetom mogu biti upotrijebljene za smanjenje troška implementiranja maskiranja.
Nadalje, u literaturi se mogu susresti problemi koji su bili nerješivi dugi niz godina
te su konacˇno riješeni nekom algebarskom konstrukcijom. Bilo bi zanimljivo vidjeti
može li evolucijsko racˇunarstvo nac´i rješenja usporedive kvalitete.
U poglavlju 5 radimo na evoluciji supstitucijskih kutija koje imaju bolju DPA
otpornost. Za velicˇinu 4×4, pokazujemo koja su najbolja moguc´a rješenja te pokazu-
jemo da je GA sposoban nac´i takva rješenja. Ovo je ujedno i jedino mjesto gdje znamo
da smo našli globalni optimum. Za velicˇinu 8× 8 problem ostaje otvoren. Nedavno
nam je skrenuta pozornost na neka druga svojstva koja karakteriziraju otpornost
supstitucijskih kutija na DPA napade. Zbog potpunosti, provod¯enje istraživanja sa
tim svojstvima bi takod¯er bilo relevantno. Nadalje, postoji ocˇiti procijep izmed¯u
velicˇine 4× 4 gdje se problem cˇini relativno jednostavnim i velicˇine 8× 8 gdje evolu-
cijski algoritmi ne prilaze ni blizu optimalnih vrijednosti. Prirodan slijedec´i razvojni
korak može biti istraživanje svih supstitucijskih kutija koji imaju dimenzije izmed¯u
ta dva ekstrema kako bi se bolje uocˇilo gdje nastaju problemi za evolucijske algo-
ritme.
Poglavlje 6 obrad¯uje temu evolucije kombinatoricˇkih krugova koji imaju vec´u
propusnost. Svjesni smo da se ovo istraživanje može smatrati vrlo "S-box-centricˇno"
i samim time razmatranje na globalnijoj razini može biti korisno. Pod globalnijom
razinom mislimo razmatranje i drugih dijelova AES algoritma, a ne samo supsti-
tucijske kutije. Slijedec´e, ovo predstavlja uzbudljiv istraživacˇki smjer koji ima više
od same kriptografske primjene. Uz povec´anje propusnosti, moguc´e je razmatrati
i energiju, površinu ili snagu. Slijedec´i korak je eksperimentiranje s pristupima
koji dozvoljavaju smanjenje kompleksnosti problema. U ovom trenutku naš algo-
ritam pokazuje najbolje rezultate kada dodajemo samo jedan sloj bistabila. Med¯u-
tim, uvjereni smo da se cˇak i ta rješenja mogu znacˇajno poboljšati. Naravno, to se
mora preslikavati i na rješenja s više slojeva bistabila gdje bi se trebalo moc´i ostva-
riti još bolja rješenja. Zanimljiv smjer eksperimentiranja bi bio korištenje memetskih
algoritama gdje se kombiniraju evolucijski algoritmi sa mehanizmom lokalne pre-
trage. Konacˇno, opazili smo da postoji znacˇajan prostor za napredak kada se ra-
zmatra sama evaluacija sklopa. Mada ovo nije direktno povezano s problemom, i
dalje predstavlja važan korak. To je tako jer napredak u brzini evaluacije donosi i
napredak u brzini evolucije.
Poglavlje 7 se bavi problemom nalaženja parametara prostora rješenja koji dovode
do grešaka. Nakon svih eksperimenata možemo se upitati je li ovaj problem u
ovom obliku dovoljno težak kako bi se opravdala upotreba evolucijskih algoritama.
Odgovor na to pitanje nije jednostavan jer kada iscrpna pretraga prostora rješenja
može završiti relativno brzo (kao što je slucˇaj ovdje) nema puno potrebe za opti-
mizacijskim algoritmima. Med¯utim, u scenarijima gdje je dozvoljeni broj mjerenja
nizak, svaki napredak može biti znacˇajan. Bilo bi zanimljivo vidjeti je li moguc´e isko-
ristiti isti (ili slicˇni) postupak kada se provodi umetanje grešaka u elektromagnetskom
polju. Nadalje, proveli smo eksperimente samo na metama koje nemaju protumjere.
Može se ocˇekivati da je prostor rješenja znacˇajno pod utjecajem protumjera te bi takvi
eksperimenti predstavljali prirodno proširenje ovog rada.
Primjene evolucijskog racˇunarstva u kriptologiji nisu velika domena istraživanja,
te je teško ocˇekivati iznimne rezultate. Med¯utim, to je takod¯er i obec´avajuc´e podrucˇje
koje se tek razvija te je puno toga ostalo za napraviti. Vjerujemo da se dobri rezultati
mogu postic´i samo ako obje zajednice (kriptološka i EC) rade zajedno i kombiniraju
svoje snage. Ovo je uistinu podrucˇje gdje komplementarnost zajednica dolazi do
punog izražaja i gdje je sinergija od iznimne važnosti.
Kljucˇne rijecˇi: Evolucijsko racˇunarstvo; Evolucijski algoritmi; Kriptologija; Kri-
ptografija; Implementacijski napadi; Primjene; Analiza
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end:
then stop.”
Lewis Carroll
“The beginning is the most important part of the work.”
Plato
The world has become a global village [McL62]. This statement represents morethan just a phrase. When Karinthy published his “Six degrees of separation”
theory more than 80 years ago, it sounded almost unbelievable [Bar03]. Despite the
fact that the human population grew several times larger in the meantime, that the-
ory sounds more true today than ever before (although, strictly speaking it is not true
if we consider isolated Amazonian tribes, for example). Various social applications,
messenger and chat programs brought people closer than ever before (disregarding
obvious separation when considering more traditional, direct contact).
Such connectivity would not be possible without computers that became an in-
tegral part of our lives. Moreover, it is not only computers, but also various gam-
ing consoles, mobile phones and gadgets that are constantly being improved and
reinvented. Most of the people cannot imagine their lives without chatting, texting,
posting statuses or sending pictures. We use smartcards to withdraw money from
the ATM machines and navigation systems in our cars to guide us. Shopping online
is also an activity that changed our view of the world. Just a few years ago we would
need to go to the department store to buy something, but now everything is only a
few clicks away.
Furthermore, with the emergence of the Internet of Things, soon it will be pos-
sible to connect every kind of embedded computing-like device to the Internet and
to control it remotely. Naturally, all that is done in an effort to try to ease the con-
nectivity of people as well as to make our lives easier (simpler, although this could
be regarded as an oxymoron). We try to automate many processes that just seem to
waste our time in today’s rushed world.
However, progress comes with a price. People are more and more concerned
about privacy issues as well as the security of their data. In the last year, Edward
Snowden’s revelations showed how fragile our security and privacy is [Lan13]. Of
course, this represents an extreme example since governmental agencies have always
1
had more resources and ways of monitoring data. Nevertheless, there is more than
just the agencies; hackers also pose a real threat. Just imagine a scenario where they
access credit card data. The damage is then not only financial, but also influences
the public perception and the feeling of security. Usually, people do not think about
information security until there is news about that security being breached. How-
ever, in the last few years, we can observe an increase in public awareness regarding
information security.
The question remains: How to protect our information and communication chan-
nels so they remain secure and private? In order to do that, we use cryptography.
Although it may sound exotic to many people, we all use cryptography, e.g.
when buying something over the Internet, we rely on the security of web sites that
our credit card information will not be accessible to some malevolent third party.
Cryptography is not a product of the modern era; for instance, already in the an-
cient Greece people used elaborate systems to protect important messages (e.g. Scy-
tale [PP10] or Polybius square [Pol]). Human history is abundant with intricate ex-
amples on how people tried to make their messages secret. However, most of these
methods belong to the classical cryptography area and do not ensure any practical
security today. Therefore, we need modern methods to answer the challenges of
these modern times.
Why do we need strong methods to protect our data? Partly because in paral-
lel with the development of cryptography, cryptanalysis is also developing. Besides
more traditional types of cryptanalysis (those that, informally speaking, rely on the
mathematics behind the algorithms) there are different attacks that aim at the imple-
mentation of the algorithms, and not the algorithms themselves.
We started this chapter with a claim about the importance of computers in our
lives. We conclude this discussion with the importance of cryptography in our lives
even though we are not always aware of that fact. Although, that unawareness can
serve as an indicator that cryptography is fulfilling its purpose.
This chapter continues with a short explanation about the motivation for this line
of research in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 offers a succinct outline of the thesis. Following
that, we give a critical outlook of this research in Section 1.3. Finally, we conclude
this chapter with clearly stated contributions in Section 1.4.
1.1 Motivation
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the efficiency of heuristic methods when deal-
ing with some complex, real-world cryptographic problems. To this end, we use
Evolutionary Computation (EC) methods due to their flexibility and successful per-
formance they showed in the past when applied to other highly complex optimiza-
tion problems. By doing so, we combine those two areas and show that EC can
be truly regarded as a viable choice when solving some difficult cryptology-related
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problems. We say “some problems” since it is important not to think that the EC
methods are “magic solvers”.
Indeed, there exist many problems that cannot be solved with EC methods and
using such methods can ultimately lead only to a decline of confidence in EC. One
example of such a problem is integer factorization. Informally speaking, for a certain
problem to be solvable with an EC method, there should be a connection between
solutions so they can converge. With problems like integer factorization, where the
task is to find two random numbers for which there exists no relationship, there is
no information that can lead the search.
We stated that EC methods could not be used to solve every problem. Therefore,
we start with assessing which problems can be tackled. If the problem can be rep-
resented as an optimization problem, and there is enough search space information
to drive the search, it should be possible to use EC methods successfully. Natu-
rally, saying something can be solved is a relative statement while stating that it will
output some solution is more precise. There is a clear difference between a correct
solution and the best solution. While to find the latter can be the ultimate goal, it is
often sufficient to find one (or more) of the former. More precisely, throughout the
thesis, we often speak about good solutions. However, since that notion is somewhat
vague, we clarify it here. By a “good solution”, we only imply that the solution is
correct and comparable with the solutions from related work.
One should also be careful and not overuse EC methods. Indeed, often it is not
necessary to use such methods since there are other, more tailored approaches, or
the problem is too easy to solve and therefore does not require the usage of EC algo-
rithms. In accordance to that, in each chapter we try to follow the same guidelines:
identify the problem and use a random search method to check the problem hard-
ness. Only when we show that the problem is difficult enough, we start discussing
how to use a certain EC method.
EC methods are generic and in that fact lies their strength since they can be used
for numerous problems. However, this is also their drawback because specialized al-
gorithms in general give better results. Nevertheless, this should not be considered
as a weakness of the EC approach, since specialized algorithms use extra knowl-
edge not considered in EC. Therefore, such specialized algorithms are not so general
(black-box scenario) as evolutionary methods (or other heuristics) and they require
much ingenuity to devise.
Based on the aforementioned, one can ask when to use EC methods. We offer the
following rationales:
• When there exist no other, specialized approaches.
• To rapidly check whether some concept (e.g. formula) is correct.
• To assess the quality of some other method.
• To produce “good-enough” solutions.
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• To produce novel and human-competitive solutions (solutions produced by EC
that can rival the best solutions created by humans).
Combining EC and cryptology is not a new approach since there is a significant
number of papers (and theses) in this area. However, we introduce a novelty in
the choice of algorithms and problems of interest. Furthermore, we also try to sys-
tematically approach the problems from both cryptologic and EC perspective. In-
deed, in many projects we can observe that people from the EC community work
on cryptology-related problems. However, for them, those problems are only bench-
marks to test the strength of the EC methods, and they never truly test (or even
consider) the obtained solutions in practical scenarios. From the other perspective,
people from the cryptology community sometimes use EC approaches and obtain
poor results. In those cases, the question is whether the poor result is a consequence
of a bad algorithm or an inappropriate usage of that algorithm.
In this thesis, we consider several cryptology-related problems, assess possible
difficulties and solve those problems with different EC methods. Afterwards, when
possible, we implement the obtained solutions in practical scenarios and test their
effectiveness.
One can ask how to know whether the obtained solutions are optimal. In general,
we cannot be sure, but we offer a “rule of thumb”: if the solution is better than the
currently known, used solutions, then it should be regarded “good enough”. There-
fore, we can informally restate our goal as a search for “good enough” solutions. We
leave to the interested parties to determine what is “good enough” since this is often
problem-specific.
We list the main objectives of this thesis.
1. To contribute to the ongoing research on the EC methods for usage in cryptol-
ogy.
2. To apply new, different EC approaches to some already studied problems from
the cryptology area.
3. To apply EC methods to new, previously unexplored (from the perspective of
EC) cryptology-related problems.
4. To determine the effectiveness of EC methods when applied to practical cryptology-
related problems.
5. To build some confidence in EC methods.
Although we talk about EC methods up to now, to be more precise, most of the
time we work with Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) with only occasional visits to EC
methods. By EC methods we consider all algorithms that are based on a set of solu-
tion candidates which are iteratively refined [Wei09]. EAs on the other hand belong
to a subclass of EC where algorithms draw inspiration from natural evolution (e.g.
mutation, selection, survival of the fittest) [Wei09]. We select EAs because of their
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the outline of the thesis.
flexibility as well as our previous success in tackling difficult optimization problems
with such algorithms.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
We divide this thesis into 10 chapters, including the introduction, conclusion and
appendices.
The focus of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is on the design of symmetric key primitives,
more precisely, Boolean functions and S-boxes. In order to build the framework
for the design of such primitives, we first present a tool that serves as an evaluator
of various cryptographic properties of the aforementioned primitives in Chapter 3.
Some of the properties that can be evaluated through the tool are used in the evolu-
tion process inside fitness functions.
Next, in Chapter 6, as a natural extension, we use evolutionary algorithms to
evolve the AES S-box when represented in the form of a combinatorial circuit in
order to increase the throughput of the underlying implementation. This application
shows that it is not only possible to create new nonlinear elements with EAs, but also
to further optimize already known elements with regards to throughput.
Besides those applications that belong to the cryptography area, we also present
one application from the implementation attacks area, more precisely Fault Injection
(FI) in Chapter 7. In this application we construct a custom optimization algorithm
that can find search space parameters that cause faults faster (e.g. with a smaller
number of measurements). In this way we try to cover a broad research area to show
EAs are widely applicable.
In Figure 1.1, we display a diagram that connects the chapters of this thesis with
EC and cryptographic topics and their dependencies.
5
We emphasize that the problems we investigate are not the only ones suitable for
EC. Rather, our choice should be regarded as an attempt to present diverse cryp-
tographic problems as optimization problems. We also try to balance between the
EC and cryptology perspectives: our primary goal is to find good solutions to the
problems of interest and as a secondary goal we try to give a comparison between
different EC methods we use. The contribution and structure of this thesis is as fol-
lows.
Chapter 2 introduces basic concepts in cryptology and EC that are used throughout
the thesis. Additionally, in this chapter we discuss related works and different
applications of EC when considering cryptographic problems. This chapter is
a reference point for the necessary information needed to follow the rest of the
thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces a tool for generation, evaluation and transformation of nonlin-
ear elements, more precisely Boolean functions and S-boxes - the GET tool. The
GET tool plays an integral part in the research described in Chapters 4 and 5.
GET can be used to analyze a wide range of properties of Boolean functions
and S-boxes that are relevant for the cryptographic assessment. Naturally, this
set of properties is not complete, as we are working on adding new properties.
This tool is also capable of generating Boolean functions or S-boxes with sev-
eral different methods. As a part of the tool, there is also a module for affine
transformations of S-boxes. Source code of the module for evaluation is avail-
able at https://sidesproject.wordpress.com/publications/.
As far as we are aware, this tool deals with the largest set of cryptographic
properties among publicly available tools. Furthermore, since the code is avail-
able under the GNU General Public License it is easy for other researchers to
extend or change the existing code.
This chapter is partly based on the following paper:
• “S-box, SET, Match: A Toolbox for S-box Analysis” [PBJ+14b] by the author,
Baris¸ Ege, Lejla Batina, Domagoj Jakobovic and Marin Golub.
Contribution
My role in this chapter is the design and development of the GET tool as the main con-
tributor. The implementation aims to provide a straightforward way for researchers
to test or create nonlinear elements in the form of Boolean functions and S-boxes. Be-
sides the module for the evaluation of nonlinear elements, I developed modules for
affine transformations and generation of nonlinear elements. This project is an ongo-
ing work where we are constantly adding new functionalities.
Chapter 4 concentrates on the evolution of Boolean functions that have good cryp-
tographic properties. Specifically, we experiment with several different fit-
ness functions and combinations of cryptographic properties in order to in-
vestigate the effectiveness of EAs. This chapter also has the largest number
6
of optimization algorithms that we consider for one application, namely Ge-
netic Algorithm (GA), Genetic Programming (GP), Cartesian Genetic Program-
ming (CGP) and Evolution Strategy (ES). Furthermore, we experiment with the
random search as well as with the hill-climbing method. We selected this to be
the first problem to investigate since it presents the most researched objective
and is therefore the simplest (in our opinion) application of EAs to crypto-
graphic problems.
The emphasis of this chapter is on a comparison between different EAs rather
than on obtaining some specific solutions. However, for each of the objectives
we investigate, we also present high quality solutions in Appendix B.
This chapter is based on the following papers.
• “Evolving Cryptographically Sound Boolean Functions” [PJG13] by the author,
Domagoj Jakobovic and Marin Golub.
• “Evolving DPA-resistant Boolean Functions” [PBJ14a] by the author, Lejla
Batina and Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “Combining Evolutionary Computation and Algebraic Constructions to find
Cryptography-relevant Boolean Functions” [PMBJ14] by the author, Elena Mar-
chiori, Lejla Batina and Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “Evolutionary Methods for the Construction of Cryptographic Boolean Func-
tions” [PJM+15] by the author, Domagoj Jakobovic, Julian Miller, Elena Mar-
chiori and Lejla Batina.
• “Cryptographic Boolean Functions: One Output, Many Design Criteria”, by the
author, Domagoj Jakobovic, Julian Miller, Elena Marchiori and Lejla Batina.
• “Fighting the Symmetries: The Structure of Cryptographic Boolean Function
Spaces”, by the author, Bob McKay, Roberto Santana and Tom Gedeon.
• “Correlation Immunity of Boolean Functions: An Evolutionary Algorithms Per-
spective”, by the author, Claude Carlet, Domagoj Jakobovic, Julian Miller and
Lejla Batina.
Contribution
My role in this chapter is the design of experiments as well as the choice of the algo-
rithms and fitness functions we use. I implemented some of the algorithms as well
as several of the algorithm operators we use. I have run most of the experiments and
conducted statistical analysis of the results.
Chapter 5 extends the idea of evolving Boolean functions and explores the evolution
of vectorial Boolean functions - Substitution boxes (S-boxes). In this chapter we
explore the possibilities of evolving S-boxes to become more resilient against
DPA attacks. We investigate several measures related with DPA resistance and
generate S-boxes that have better Side-channel Analysis (SCA) resistant prop-
erties.
Such evolved S-boxes we integrate into well-known algorithms and conduct
SCA experiments. Although there are ongoing works on the evolution of S-
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boxes, we are the first to explore the possibilities of evolving S-boxes with
better DPA resistance. Furthermore, we are the first (to our best knowledge)
to investigate the influence of affine transformations to the DPA resistance of
S-boxes.
This chapter is based on the following papers.
• “On Using Genetic Algorithms for Intrinsic Side-channel Resistance: The Case
of AES S-box” by the author, Baris¸ Ege, Lejla Batina, Domagoj Jakobovic, Łukasz
Chmielewski, and Marin Golub.
• “Optimality and Beyond: The Case of 4 × 4 S-boxes” [PEP+14] by the author,
Baris¸ Ege, Lejla Batina, Domagoj Jakobovic and Kostas Papagiannopoulos.
• “Confused by Confusion: Systematic Evaluation of DPA Resistance of various
S-boxes” [PPE+14] by the author, Kostas Papagiannopoulos, Baris¸ Ege, Lejla
Batina and Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “Improving DPA Resistance of S-boxes: How far can we go?”, by Baris¸ Ege,
Kostas Papagiannopoulos, Lejla Batina and the author.
• “Cartesian Genetic Programming Approach for Generating Substitution Boxes
of Different Sizes”, by the author, Julian Miller, Domagoj Jakobovic and Lejla
Batina.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the idea to evolve S-boxes that have better DPA re-
silience. I designed the experimental setup we use and conducted most of the EAs
experiments and statistical analysis. Furthermore, I conjectured that the affine invari-
ance does not hold for DPA related properties as well as the minimal necessary affine
transformations to change some of the DPA-related properties. In addition, I designed
the experiments where the goal is to evolve S-boxes when concentrating on more than
one DPA-related property.
Chapter 6 deals with the possibility of increasing the speed of combinatorial cir-
cuits by pipelining them. In this chapter, we use EAs to evolve combinatorial
circuits that represent S-box implementations using the tower field technique.
A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is used to add Flip Flop (FF) elements to the circuit,
which results in an increase in the throughput. This chapter presents the ap-
plication of EAs to hardware design and as such, it can be regarded as the first
step in the future research of evolvable cryptographic hardware. This applica-
tion of EAs to evolve combinatorial circuits for higher throughput is a novel
one. Besides concentrating on obtaining correct solutions for further imple-
mentation in hardware, we additionally experiment with several different EAs
and present a short statistical comparison.
8
This chapter is partly based on the following paper.
• “S-box pipelining using genetic algorithms for high-throughput AES imple-
mentations: How fast can we go?” [BJM+14] by Lejla Batina, Domagoj
Jakobovic, Nele Mentens, author, Antonio dela Piedra and Dominik Sisejkovic.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the design of the experimental setup we use. Ad-
ditionally, I designed the interface for the communication between frameworks. Fur-
thermore, I worked on the design and implementation of EAs. I also conducted statis-
tical analysis of the EA’s results. I designed the algorithm that combines the existing
solutions to lower the complexity of the search.
Chapter 7 introduces the application of EC methods when searching for faults to
produce successful FI attacks. In this chapter we start with the experiments
with a standard GA, adapt it to become more appropriate for the specific prob-
lem and then finally we modify it into a Memetic Algorithm (MA). Each stage
of the development of the algorithm is thoroughly tested and compared with
other versions. The final version of the algorithm is capable not only of finding
faults, but also of rapidly characterizing the search space region.
This chapter is distinctive not only because it is the first application of EC to
the fault injection area, but also since here we needed to make a specialized
version of GA. Alongside that, we describe a complete evolutionary path of an
EC method. In addition, for this application we needed an interface between
fault injection and evolutionary computation frameworks that is capable of
working in real time.
Additionally, this is the only chapter where we use MAs. As previously im-
plied, this chapter represents a novel application of EC methods to imple-
mentation attacks. We believe this chapter can also serve as a guideline for
researchers when designing more specialized evolutionary computation algo-
rithms for cryptographic applications.
This chapter is partly based on the following papers.
• “Glitch it if You Can: Novel Parameter Search Strategies for Successful Fault In-
jection” [CPB+13] by Rafael Boix Carpi, author, Lejla Batina, Federico Menarini
and Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “Evolving Genetic Algorithms for Fault Injection Attacks” [PBJC14] by the au-
thor, Lejla Batina, Domagoj Jakobovic and Rafael Boix Carpi.
• “Search Strategy for Fault Injection using Memetic Algorithms” [PBBJ15] by the
author, Lejla Batina, Pieter Buzing and Domagoj Jakobovic.
Contribution
My contribution in this chapter is the design and implementation of a custom EC
and MA as well as the design of the interface between frameworks. Additionally, I
conducted most of the experiments and statistical analysis of the results.
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Chapter 8 gives a short conclusion and presents some general guidelines for future
research.
Appendix A gives short instructions on how to install and run Evolutionary Com-
putation Framework (ECF). Furthermore, we give a description of each project
(as presented in the chapters) and offer instructions on how to run specific
projects.
Appendix B presents examples of obtained solutions from Chapters 4 and 5.
We strive to give a comprehensive bibliography with what we believe to be a
cross section of relevant works. In total, we listed 271 entries in the Bibliog-
raphy section. Unfortunately, even this number of references does not give an
exhaustive list of relevant works, but rather only a small portion that we con-
sider to be absolutely necessary. In the last half a century or so, the total body
of work grew so significantly that today it became impossible to list all relevant
literature. Even while writing this thesis (admittedly a not so short process) re-
searchers published a number of relevant works. Those times when one could
write a thesis with only a handful of references have definitely passed (we re-
fer to Dijkstra’s thesis that has only seven references [Dij59]). Furthermore, in
the subject index we persevere to give an abundance of terms to help readers
when exploring this thesis (thus hopefully, avoiding “The Library of Babel”
fate [Bor99]).
Materials from the following papers by the author are used throughout the
thesis. Since these papers deals with EC on a more general level (and are not
directly connected to the application of EC to cryptographic problems) they are
valid for every evolutionary experiments part.
• “Evaluation of Crossover Operator Performance in Genetic Algorithms with
Binary Representation” [PGJ12a] by the author, Marin Golub and Domagoj
Jakobovic.
• “On the analysis of experimental results in evolutionary computation” [PGJ12b]
by the author, Marin Golub and Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “From fitness landscape to crossover operator choice” [PJ14] by the author and
Domagoj Jakobovic.
• “Recombination Operator in Genetic Algorithms” [PJGC14] by the author, Do-
magoj Jakobovic, Marin Golub and Marko Cupic.
1.3 A Critical Outlook of the Thesis
The purpose of this section is to address some possible shortcomings of this thesis
and to point out to the interested readers some necessary constraints we had to make.
When working with optimization algorithms, if the problem is hard enough (i.e.
it is not possible to conduct exhaustive search) then one cannot know whether the
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obtained solution is the best possible one. Furthermore, since the most of the appli-
cations presented here are novel (or significantly different) we must rely primarily
on our experience when conducting experiments.
Therefore, the first step is to decide which are acceptable problems to present. We
concentrate on several problems that do not have obvious links among them from
an implementation perspective and that objectively speaking differ significantly in
the difficulty. However, in each of the chapters, it would be easy to add a num-
ber of different functions that could replace the objectives we set. Indeed, let us
consider Chapter 4 where we evolve Boolean functions with a GA and a bitstring
representation. There we select the truth table form to represent every Boolean func-
tion uniquely. However, we could have just as easily selected an algebraic normal
form when representing Boolean functions, which would result in a change of fitness
functions.
After choosing the problems, the next step is to select the algorithms for solving
the problems. First, we emphasize that we do not claim the chosen EC methods
being the best choice for any of the applications we present here. Furthermore, the
choice of the EC algorithms we use is based on our experience so again we cannot
claim that those algorithms are the best ones for the investigated applications. Even
the implementations of algorithms can differ which can result in a different speed
of algorithm for instance. In accordance to that, we do not imply that the given
solutions are the best possible ones (when they are indeed the best possible solutions,
we emphasize that).
Indeed, as stated in Chapter 2, there exists no single best optimization algorithm.
Since we use only a handful of algorithms there is a reasonable chance that those
algorithms are not the best choice for any of the investigated problems. There exists
a plethora of EC methods of which we concentrate on only a few. Therefore, this
thesis should not be regarded as a complete analysis from the EC side since we do
not compare enough EC methods nor we offer a comprehensive analysis with non-
EC methods.
As it is best shown in Chapter 4, every EC algorithm has a number of parameters
to be selected. The choice of parameters such as selection procedure, crossover and
mutation operator and their probabilities, stopping criterion is extremely important
when looking for the best solutions. However, to check exhaustively all those com-
binations, one would need to conduct the number of experiments corresponding to
the Cartesian product of parameter combinations, which is practically impossible.
In accordance to all stated in this section, we give a short conclusion. Interested
readers should not consider this thesis as a tutorial that needs to be followed blindly
in order to reach the same results. Rather, it should serve as a field guide that of-
fers guidelines on how to conduct some optimization experiments when considering
cryptologic applications.
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1.4 Contributions
This thesis offers the following original contributions, given here in different chap-
ters as we present them:
• Chapter 3
1. Development of a framework for generation, evaluation and affine trans-
formation of Boolean functions and S-boxes.
• Chapter 4
1. First applications of GP, CGP and ES when evolving Boolean functions
for cryptographic usage.
2. Extensive statistical comparison between different EAs when evolving
cryptographically suitable Boolean functions.
• Chapter 5
1. First application of GA when evolving S-boxes that have DPA-improved
properties.
2. Experimental results that show DPA-related properties are not affine in-
variant.
3. First practical results for the modified transparency order and the confu-
sion coefficient properties.
4. Finding upper and lower bounds for the modified transparency order and
the confusion coefficient properties for a 4× 4 S-box size.
5. Finding S-boxes of size 4× 4 with the optimal values of the transparency
order, the modified transparency order and the confusion coefficient prop-
erties.
• Chapter 6
1. First application of EAs to the problem of increasing throughput of com-
binatorial circuits by adding a number of FFs.
• Chapter 7
1. Development and deployment of a custom GA for finding search space
parameters that cause faults in smart cards.
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2. Development of an evolutionary framework that is capable of working in
real-time.
3. Development of a custom MA for finding search space parameters that
cause faults in smart cards and rapid characterization of the search space.
For each of the problems presented in the antecedent chapters we develop an
experimental setup to test different evolutionary methods in order to find good so-
lutions. All experiments are conducted in the Evolutionary Computation Frame-
work (ECF) and the projects are available online for interested researchers at
http://gp.zemris.fer.hr/crypto/. Furthermore, most of the materials pre-
sented in this thesis are available online at www.evocrypt.com
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
“Repetitio est mater studiorum.”
Latin Phrase
“If you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well
enough.”
Albert Einstein
I
n this chapter we give a short introduction to the topics investigated throughout
the thesis. We concentrate only on the parts of cryptology and EC that are of im-
mediate interest. Naturally, when working on an interdisciplinary topic it is always
demanding to present enough material to cover all relevant aspects of the research,
but not going into too many details (especially since for each of the separate topics
one could write multiple books).
Why we chose those specific cryptology applications? Why just those evolution-
ary methods and not some others? There are no good answers to these questions. We
try to give an intersection of several interesting cryptology-related problems for both
software and hardware design, cryptography and implementation attacks. There
are many other possible applications of EC to the cryptology. Indeed, if EC would
be applicable to only a few problems, it would not be such a popular optimization
methodology. The choice of EC methods is based on our experience while trying to
give a coherent approach. Moreover, we concentrate mainly on EAs with an occa-
sional usage of the MA.
We are witnessing an explosion of different EC methods in the last couple of
decades. EC started slowly, with only a handful of methods, but now there are for
instance bees, wasps, hornets, ants, worms, glowworms, fireflies - a whole zoo of al-
gorithms (and animals to mimic their behavior). Therefore, it would be impossible to
investigate all the methods on a single problem, let alone on several problems. In ac-
cordance to that, we select only a few methods for which a strong research record and
good results on different real-world problems (not necessarily cryptology-related
problems) exist.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we present basic
background from cryptology. Furthermore, we give a division of cryptographic al-
gorithms that we follow in the rest of this thesis. In the same section, we present
symmetric-key cryptography and algorithms that were used in our experiments. In
Section 2.2, we present the EC paradigms. First, we give the classification of EC that
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we follow and then we present algorithms we use in the rest of the thesis. We of-
fer a short overview of different EC applications to cryptology-related problems in
Section 2.3. It is important to state that none of the following sections serve as an
in-depth coverage of the topic. We rather concentrate only on the important parts
for the rest of this thesis.
2.1 Cryptology
Cryptology (from Greek words kryptos which means hidden and logos which means
word) is the scientific study of cryptography and cryptanalysis [Mer09].
We can trace the origins of cryptology in an art form to the ancient Egypt where
non-standard secret hieroglyphs were used around 2000 BC [PP10]. We could say
that at its beginnings cryptology was mostly concerned with the making and break-
ing of secret codes. A non-technical cryptology history can be found in [Kah96]. We
also recommend the historical fiction “Cryptonomicon” that follows the World War
II codebreakers [Ste00].
Cryptography is a science (and art) of secret writing with the goal of hiding the
meaning of a message [PP10]. In modern cryptography, it is not only important to
achieve confidentiality, but also authentication, non-repudiation and data integrity
among other goals [KL15].
As mentioned before, already in the ancient Egypt people used non-standard hi-
eroglyphs to encrypt messages needed to be kept secret. However, this is not an
isolated example; for instance, in ancient Sparta people use Scytale to encrypt mes-
sages. Scytale comprises of a piece of leather or cloth that is wrapped around a baton
of a certain diameter. Then, a message is written on the leather and carried to the re-
cipient. Only if that person has a baton of the same diameter, was he able to decipher
the message. Another example is Caesar’s cipher, which is said to be used by Julius
Caesar to communicate with his troops. In that cipher each letter in the alphabet is
shifted by a constant number of steps. This cipher is an example of a substitution
cipher.
Such ciphers belong to a family of ciphers today known as the classical ciphers.
It is possible to divide classical ciphers into transposition and substitution ciphers.
Transposition ciphers are such ciphers where the order of characters is shuffled
around [Sch95]. Substitution ciphers are ciphers where each character in the alpha-
bet is substituted with another character in the alphabet [Sch95]. Naturally, some
elements of these classical ciphers are also kept in modern ciphers.
Now, let us fast-forward to the 1940s. It is World War II and the German side
is using the Enigma machine to encrypt their secret messages. Enigma machine is
a mechanical rotor device that is comprised from several rotors that dynamically
substitute the plaintext in accordance to the rotor position.
In the same decade (more precisely, in 1949) Shannon published his seminal pa-
per where he describes design principles of block ciphers [Sha49].
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One more fast-forward and now we are in the 1970s. This is an important decade
for the development of cryptography (and consequently cryptanalysis) as real sci-
entific disciplines. The first important milestone is the design of Data Encryption
Standard (DES) algorithm published in 1977 as a standard for protecting sensitive,
but unclassified data [FIP99]. A second milestone is the introduction of Public-key
Cryptography (PKC) in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].
Informally speaking, from that time on, we can talk about modern cryptography
and consequently we restrict our interest in the following chapters solely on modern
cryptography. It is hard to draw a line when dividing the classical from the modern
cryptography since that also depends on the area of cryptography one studies. For
a person working in a provable security area, modern cryptography can be distin-
guished from the classical one by its emphasis on definitions, precise assumptions
and rigorous proofs of security [KL15]. However, when considering it from the ap-
plied cryptography perspective, still most of the primitives used today do not have
rigorous proofs of security. Therefore, we can distinguish classical cryptography
from modern cryptography on the basis that modern cryptography has a more sci-
entific approach (a vague definition, but one that suffices our needs). However, we
emphasize that cryptography is (and always was) engineering with elements of art
and science. The only thing that changes is the ratio between art and science one
uses [Dae15].
2.1.1 Basic Cryptology Notions
First, we give definitions of some basic cryptology notions needed for the full under-
standing of the topic.
Algorithm is a set of rules that takes a set of values as input and produces set of
values as output [CSRL01]. Another definition is that the algorithm is what a Turing
machine implements [Tur36].
Sender is a person who is sending a message. The most famous sender in cryp-
tography is Alice.
Receiver is a person who is receiving a message. The most famous message re-
ceiver in cryptography is Bob.
Adversary is a malicious entity whose aim is to prevent the users of a cryptosys-
tem from achieving their goals. Popular names are Eve in the case of passive adver-
saries and Mallory when talking about active adversaries.
Cryptographic primitive is a part of a cryptographic tool used to provide in-
formation security, i.e. low-level cryptographic algorithm that is frequently used to
build cryptographic protocols [MVO96].
Plaintext P or Message is the information that the sender wishes to transmit to
the receiver [Sch95].
Ciphertext C is the result of an encryption performed on plaintext using a cryp-
tographic algorithm [Sch95].
Encryption is a process of applying a transformation E to the plaintext P
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[MVO96]. After that transformation, only an authorized party should be able to read
the message, i.e. E(P ) = C.
Decryption is a process of applying a transformation D to the ciphertext C, i.e.
D(C) = P [MVO96].
Cryptographic algorithm is a mathematical function used for encryption, de-
cryption, key establishment, authentication, signature, etc. Cryptographic algorithms
are also called ciphers [Sch95].
Next, we shorty discuss some of the more important cryptographic objectives.
These goals are not the only ones, but they constitute the most well-known and re-
ferred ones. Other goals can be derived from those ones [PP10, MVO96].
Confidentiality is ensuring that the content of the information is kept secret from
all but authorized parties [PP10].
Entity authentication is ensuring the identity of an entity [PP10].
Message origin authentication is ensuring that the sender of a message is au-
thentic [PP10]. Data integrity is ensuring the message have not been modified
in transfer [PP10, KR11]. Message origin authentication directly implies data in-
tegrity [KR11].
Non-repudiation is ensuring that the party cannot deny the creation of the mes-
sage [PP10, MVO96].
After briefly discussing basic concepts and objectives of cryptography, next we
give a classification of cryptographic algorithms. One usual classification of crypto-
graphic algorithms is according how the key material is used [KR11].
In the case when the algorithms do not use any key, we call such algorithms key-
less. One example of such algorithms is a hash function. When the algorithms use
keys, we can divide them on the basis whether all communicating entities use the
same key or not. If all parties use the same key then we talk about symmetric-key
cryptography or secret-key cryptography. When further dividing symmetric-key
cryptography we can follow a few directions. One classical division is on block ci-
phers, Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and stream ciphers [KR11]. Block
ciphers and stream ciphers are encryption primitives while MACs are used for data
authentication and data origin authentication [KR11]. Therefore, block ciphers and
stream ciphers can be regarded independently, but also as parts of other crypto-
graphic mechanisms. From that perspective, we divide symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy to primitives and modes. Modes of operation provide a way to encrypt mes-
sages of arbitrary length using block or stream ciphers [KL15]. Actually, modes of
operation provide more than just a way to encrypt long messages. Different modes
have varying security properties and they enable that block cipher can be used in
various environments [KR11]. With an appropriate mode of operation, a block ci-
pher can also behave as a stream cipher, a one-way compression function or a MAC.
Modes of operation can be divided into confidentiality modes, authenticity modes
and authenticated-encryption modes [Rog12].
The simplest mode (and one that is almost never used in practice) is Electronic
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Codebook (ECB) mode. This is the native mode where one message block is en-
crypted independently of the encryption of other blocks. This mode should never
be used in practice [KL15]. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) is a mode of operation
where the encryption of each block also depends on the encryption of previous
blocks [KR11]. To encrypt the initial block, Initialization Vector (IV) is used. When
turning the block cipher into a stream cipher one usually uses Cipher Feedback
(CFB), Output Feedback (OFB) and Counter (CTR) modes of encryption. All those
modes also require the use of IV. The five previously mentioned modes of operation
are classified as confidentiality modes [Rog12]. When a block cipher is to be used
as a MAC, some well-known modes are Cipher Block Chaining MAC (CBC-MAC),
One-key MAC (OMAC) and Cipher-based MAC (CMAC). These modes belong to
the authenticity modes class [Rog12]. An example of a mode of operation that adds
the authentication feature to a block algorithm is the Galois Countermode (GCM).
This mode belongs to the class of authenticated-encryption modes. For more in-
formation about different modes of operation, we refer readers to [Rog12]. In the
case when block function is used as the primitive for the construction of one-way
compression functions (and subsequently hash functions) there are three promi-
nent constructions. Those constructions are Davies-Meyer [MVO96], Matyas-Meyer-
Oseas [MMO85] and Miyaguchi-Preneel [Pre93]. For more information about the
construction of compression functions from block ciphers, we refer interested read-
ers to [KR11].
When the sender and receiver keys are not the same, we talk about asymmetric-
key cryptography or public-key cryptography. We skip public-key cryptography
topics [HMV03, Sch95] as well as cryptanalysis [Jou09, Hey02] since we do not ex-
amine those topics in this thesis. Rather, we point interested readers to the relevant
literature.
2.1.2 Symmetric-key Cryptography
The basic characteristic of symmetric-key cryptography is that it uses the same key
to encrypt/decrypt the data or to compute/verify MACs. Assume that Alice and
Bob want to exchange some message and they want it to remain secret, i.e. that
no one else can read it (Eve, for instance). They have only an insecure channel to
communicate through. Alice could encrypt her message and send it encrypted over
an insecure channel to Bob. If Bob has the same key as Alice, he can then decrypt
and read the message. Eve cannot decrypt the message if she does not know the key.
Therefore, if Alice and Bob want to keep their communication private they need
either to keep the key secret or the algorithm secret. However, in 19th century Ker-
choff stated that a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the sys-
tem, except the key, is publicly known [Ker83]. This principle stems from one even
older manuscript where du Carlet in 17th century stated that only the secret keys
must be kept secret - “ars ipsi secreta magistro” (An art secret even for the mas-
ter) [DC44].
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Figure 2.1: Secure two-party communication.
If we need to keep the key secret, how do we reach an agreement about that key?
We have the situation that we need to communicate securely before we can com-
municate securely. In this situation, public-key cryptography helps. There, users
have public-keys to encrypt the messages and private keys to decrypt the mes-
sages. A natural question is: why do we need symmetric-key cryptography if we
still use public-key cryptography to exchange the key? Why do not we use only
public-key cryptography? One answer is speed, since symmetric-key cryptography
is much faster than the public-key cryptography. Other answers include the facts
that public-key cryptography requires longer keys for the same levels of security as
symmetric-key cryptography and public-key cryptography requires more process-
ing power than symmetric-key cryptography. Therefore, most modern cryptosys-
tems are hybrid systems where public-key cryptography is used to exchange the
keys and symmetric-key cryptography is used to encrypt and decrypt the messages.
More formally, a symmetric-key scheme can be defined as follows. Consider a
symmetric encryption scheme SE consisting of three algorithms: encryption E , de-
cryption D and key generation K. The key generation algorithm is a randomized
algorithm that returns a key K, i.e. K ← K. The encryption algorithm E takes a key
K and a plaintext M and produces a ciphertext C; C ← EK(M). The deterministic
decryption algorithmD takes the same keyK and the ciphertext C and produces the
plaintext M ; M ← DK(C). In Figure 2.1, we give a depiction of two-party commu-
nication assuming key exchange over a secure channel and message exchange over
an insecure channel.
Next, we give a short introduction into block and stream ciphers.
First, we immediately give the main distinction between block and stream ci-
phers: given some message M and ciphertext C when working with block ciphers
it is hard to reconstruct the encryption transformation. When working with stream
ciphers, the encryption transformation is easy and the security relies on the changing
of that transformation for every symbol [Dae95].
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Block Ciphers
Block ciphers operate on blocks of fixed length of data with an unvarying trans-
formation that is specified by the key. For a computationally secure cryptosystem
already Claude Shannon deduced that it should follow confusion and diffusion prin-
ciples [Sha49]. Massey defines these two principles as follows [KR11].
Confusion. The ciphertext statistics should depend on the plaintext statistics in
a manner too complicated to be exploited by the cryptanalyst.
Diffusion. Each digit of the plaintext and each digit of the secret key should
influence many digits of the ciphertext.
A block cipher should behave as a set of independent random permutations, one
for each key. This defines block cipher in the so-called ideal cipher model (also
known as Shannon’s model) [Sha49]. However, since that is not attainable, there
exists another security definition, which is more relaxed. A block cipher with a
given key should be indistinguishable from a random permutation by an adversary
not knowing the key. This is called the Pseudo-random Permutation (PRP) secu-
rity [GGM86]. For further information about PRPs, we refer readers to [KL15]. In
most of the block ciphers, the ciphertext is produced by successively applying round
functions [KR11, MVO96]. A round is every application of a round transformation
(Boolean transformation) [DR01].
Next, we discuss some features that can be used to distinguish block ciphers from
each other [Dae15]. We note that here we include several stream ciphers and hash
functions examples and not only block ciphers.
Round structures.
• Feistel structure. Feistel ciphers divide message blocks in partitions. This can
be two halves as in the case of the DES algorithm [FIP99], or n partitions as is
the case of Message Digest 5 (MD5) [Riv92] or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1
compression function [EJ01].
• Non-Feistel or parallel structure. In such ciphers, every message block is pro-
cessed as one entity. Well-known design example of a parallel round structure
is Substitution Permutation Network (SPN). Parallel round structure cipher
examples are AES [FIP01] and Serpent [BAK98]. The round structure has an
impact when calculating the inverse, i.e. running the decryption. In Feistel
ciphers inverse is the same. However, we emphasize that there are also algo-
rithms that are not Feistel but have the same inverse like NOEKEON [DPAR00]
and PRINCE [BCG+12]. In Figures 2.2a and 2.2b, we show examples of Feistel
and SPN round structures, respectively.
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(a) Feistel round structure. (b) SPN round structure.
Figure 2.2: Round structures.
Application of keys.
• Key-alternating. An iterated cipher that consists of an alternating sequence of
unkeyed rounds and XOR bitwise addition [DR01, DR07]. Examples of such
ciphers are AES [FIP01] and Serpent [BAK98].
• Not key-alternating. In not key-alternating ciphers, the round function also
depends on the value of the round key [BV14]. Examples of such ciphers are
Blowfish [Sch94] and DES [FIP99]. Note there are Feistel ciphers that are key-
alternating. Such ciphers are possible when the F function (Feistel function)
can be presented as the sequence of a round key addition and an unkeyed
function [DR07].
Properties of the key schedule.
• Simple linear or near-linear key schedule. Examples are Tiny Encryption Algo-
rithm (TEA) [WN94] where four same subkeys are always used and PRESENT
[BKL+07] where each round key is derived through the rotation, substitution
(S-box) and bitwise XOR. Next, DES uses rotation and permutation of bits to
derive round keys [FIP99]. Finally, AES also has mainly linear key schedule
(Rijndael key schedule) that uses rotation, exponentiation of two to a user-
specified value and substitution (S-box) [DR02].
• (Highly) Nonlinear key schedule. Examples of ciphers that use nonlinear key
schedule are KHAZAD, where the key schedule uses the cipher round function
itself [BR00] and SHARK cipher that uses the cipher itself for the key sched-
ule [RDP+96].
22
The source of nonlinearity.
• S-boxes. S-boxes take as an input n bits and transform them intom output bits.
S-boxes are used to provide confusion in a cipher. Examples of such ciphers
are AES [FIP01], DES [FIP99], Serpent [BAK98] and Keccak-f [BDPA11].
• Add-Rotate-Xor (ARX). ARX ciphers use only three operations in round func-
tions; modular addition, rotation with fixed rotation amounts and bitwise XOR.
The source of nonlinearity is the modular addition. Examples of such ciphers
are Salsa20 [Ber08] and Speck [BSS+13].
• Other. In this context there are hybrid constructions such as the SHA-x [EJ01]
(excluding SHA-3) and MD5 [Riv92] compression functions. They use the
modular addition and a nonlinear function F . Next, we mention International
Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) cipher where the round function consists of
modular addition and multiplication and bitwise XOR [LMM91]. RC6 cipher
uses bitwise XOR, modular addition and data-dependent rotations [RRSY].
Presence of a mixing layer.
• Present. Examples are AES [FIP01], Keccak-f [BDPA11], NOEKEON [DPAR00]
and Serpent [BAK98].
• Absent. Examples are PRESENT [BKL+07] and DES [FIP99].
Alignment.
• Weak alignment. Weak alignment indicates that the propagation of truncated
differences is hard to predict, i.e. there is high uncertainty in propagation along
block boundaries. Examples are DES [FIP99], PRESENT [BKL+07] and Keccak-
f [BDPA11].
• Strong alignment. Differing from the previous case, here is low uncertainty in
propagation along block boundaries. Examples are AES [FIP01] and JH [Wu11].
It can be observed that several algorithms belong to more than one class. There-
fore, as already stated, this division should be regarded as a way to distinguish cer-
tain properties of block ciphers and not as a strict division. For further information
about block ciphers, we refer interested readers to [KR11].
AES Algorithm
AES is a cipher based on the Rijndael algorithm designed by Joan Daemen and
Vincent Rijmen [DR02]. AES has three possible key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits and 256
bits and block length of 128 bits. Although often called an SPN cipher, that is not
completely true because it has an additional mixing layer. Therefore, we informally
classify it as Substitution Permutation Mixing Network (SPMN) cipher. AES has
a predefined number of rounds. More precisely, it consists of 10 rounds for key
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length of 128 bits, 12 rounds for 192 key length and 14 rounds for 256 bits key length.
Operations in the AES cipher are on a 4 × 4 column-ordered matrix of bytes, called
the state. A top-level description of the AES algorithm is:
1. Key expansion - round keys are derived from the cipher key
2. Initial round
(a) AddRoundKey - combines bytes of the state with a round key
3. Rounds
(a) SubBytes - nonlinear substitution step where each byte is substituted with
another one on a basis of lookup table values
(b) ShiftRows - transposition step where last three rows of the state are shifted
cyclically
(c) MixColumns - step that combines four bytes in each column
(d) AddRoundKey
4. Final Round
(a) SubBytes
(b) ShiftRows
(c) AddRoundKey
PRESENT Algorithm
PRESENT is a lightweight block cipher developed by Orange Labs, Ruhr Uni-
versity Bochum and Technical University of Denmark [BKL+07]. Block size in the
PRESENT algorithm is 64 bits and the key size can be either 80 bits or 128 bits.
PRESENT is an SPN cipher that consists of 31 rounds. A top-level description of
the PRESENT algorithm is:
1. GenerateRoundKeys
2. Rounds
(a) AddRoundKey
(b) sBoxlayer
(c) pLayer
3. AddRoundKey
Here, the sBoxLayer is made of 4×4 S-box to provide nonlinearity, and the pLayer
is a bit permutation that ensures diffusion.
We work with block ciphers in Chapters 5 and 6 where we evolve S-boxes that
have better DPA-related properties and generate combinatorial circuits for higher
throughput, respectively.
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(a) Synchronous stream cipher.
(b) Self-synchronizing stream cipher.
Figure 2.3: Stream ciphers.
Stream Ciphers
It is sometimes said that G. Vernam invented stream ciphers in 1917 although they
were not called stream ciphers at that time [PP10]. In that year, Vernam invented
a cipher today known as the Vernam cipher. It uses a random sequence as the
key stream, which is added modulo two with the plaintext in order to produce
the ciphertext. In order for the Vernam cipher to be secure, the key should be at
least as long as the message and the key should never be repeated [KL15]. In that
form the Vernam cipher is a one-time pad which was first described by F. Miller in
1882 [Bel11].
Most of the stream encryption schemes encrypt message bits by adding encryp-
tion bits modulo two. When more than one bit is encrypted in every time step, we
still consider it a stream encryption since the encryption mechanism works on the
individual bits of the block [Dae95]. The main requirement for stream ciphers is that
they should behave like a Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG) [KL15].
Stream ciphers can be divided into synchronous ciphers when the key stream
depends only on the key and self-synchronizing (asynchronous) ciphers when the
key stream also depends on the ciphertext [PP10]. We display synchronous and self-
synchronizing stream ciphers in Figures 2.3a and 2.3b, respectively.
Historically looking, Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) were used exten-
sively, in order to produce pseudorandom numbers. An LFSR is a shift register
whose input bit is a linear function of its previous state. Those bit positions that
affect the next state are called taps. An LFSR on its own cannot be used as a cryp-
tographically strong PRNG [KL15]. To add the nonlinearity (and therefore improve
the security) one option is to add some nonlinear element, where a Boolean func-
tion represents a common one. Such model is called filter generator where output is
obtained by a nonlinear function of some taps of one LFSR [Car10a].
Next, it is possible to add the nonlinearity by modifying LFSR into a Nonlinear
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Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR). In NLFSR, the input bit is a nonlinear function of
its previous state. Another approach is to combine several LFSRs (in the simplest
case) in parallel and then combine their output in a nonlinear way. Such model is
called a combiner generator. Furthermore, it is also possible to combine an LFSR
with an NLFSR and a nonlinear (Boolean) output function as is the case in the Grain
algorithm [HJM07, AHJM11]. We depict filter generator and combiner generator in
Figures 2.4a and 2.4b, respectively. For further information about stream ciphers, we
refer readers to [Kle13, PP10, RB08].
(a) Filter generator. (b) Combiner generator.
Figure 2.4: Principles of filter and combiner generators.
2.1.3 Implementation Attacks
We refer to all attacks that do not aim at the weaknesses of the algorithm itself, but
on the actual implementations on cryptographic devices, as implementation attacks.
When considering usability, strength or cost, implementation attacks are among the
most powerful known attacks against cryptographic devices. Implementation at-
tacks can be categorized on active and passive attacks. In passive attacks, the device
operates within its specification and the attacker just reads hidden signals. In active
attacks one or more parameters of device is working outside the nominal operation
range. Another division is based on the degree on invasiveness on the device under
attack. In non-invasive attack, there is no mechanical manipulation with the cryp-
tographic device. In the semi-invasive attack attacker removes only the outer layers
of the cryptographic device. Finally, in invasive attack the attacker modifies the
electronic circuit of cryptographic device. Common types of implementation attacks
are:
• Side-channel attacks
• Fault attacks
• Probing attacks
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Figure 2.5: Sources of side-channel information.
Side-channel Attacks
Based on the division above, side-channel attacks belong into passive, non-invasive
attacks. In such attacks, physical values such as power consumption [KJJ99], EM
emissions [QS01], timing [Koc96] or sound [GST13] are exploited to determine the
secret key of a cryptographic device. Such physical values are called side-channels.
We display several side-channels in Figure 2.5.
The simplest form of side-channel attacks is an attack where the attacker visu-
ally inspects on an oscilloscope physical values such as power consumption and EM
emanation, while the device executes cryptographic instructions. By doing so, the
attacker can determine the secret key. In case of attack using side-channel like power
consumption or EM, the attacker analyses actual signals that we call traces.
When the attacker possesses an identical experimental device as the one he wants
to attack, a single trace may be enough to determine the correct key. Namely, in this
case the attacker is assumed to use the device for profiling phase during which he
creates a database of all key fingerprints. Afterwards, one real trace is used to deduce
the actual key. This kind of attack is called template attack [CRR03]. In this attack,
iterative classification is used to unroll one more segment of the sample which uses
more bits of the secret key [CRR03].
In the case that the attacker has at his disposal many different traces, he can
mount DPA [KJJ99] or Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks [BCO04]. The
difference between those attacks is that CPA looks at correlation between all key
guesses and is faster, more accurate than other DPA only when the leakage model is
linear. Both versions of the attack use the relationship between the power and data.
Next, we give a short description of DPA. First, one records the side-channel
values of the attacked cryptographic device while it processes many known, differ-
ent data values where those side-channel values depend partly on the secret key.
With all known data values and all possible guesses for a part of the secret key (di-
vide and conquer strategy) we calculate the hypothetical values of the influenced
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side-channel. Those hypothetical values are for different guesses of the secret key.
In order to characterize the information leakage through the power consumption,
we need to use a power leakage model. Two well-known models are Hamming
Weight (HW) and Hamming Distance (HD). In the simpler, HW model one assumes
that the power consumption varies in accordance to the HW of the manipulated data.
In the HD model, one considers the number of bit transitions from the previous state
to the current state. As the final step, we compare the measured and hypothetical
side-channel values. Those hypothetical values that match the measured values best
should yield the part of the actual secret key used in the cryptographic device. This
procedure is simply repeated for other parts of the secret key.
Countermeasures against side-channel attacks can be divided into various hid-
ing and masking schemes. The goal of countermeasures is to reduce (or ideally,
avoid) the dependencies between the power consumption of a cryptographic device
and intermediate values of the executed cryptographic algorithm. When using hid-
ing schemes, this is done by breaking the link between the power consumption and
the processed data values [MOP07]. On the other hand, in the masking schemes
this is done by randomizing the intermediate values that are processed by crypto-
graphic device [MOP07]. For further information about side-channel attacks, we
refer to [MOP07].
Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attacks can be characterized as active implementation attacks. In
contrast to side-channel attacks, fault injection attacks change the behavior of a cryp-
tographic device, i.e. the device is influenced in order to produce erroneous results
(faults).
In non-invasive attacks, the packaging of the device is not modified, but only
the working conditions are changed. An example of such an attack is the short-
term change of the clock signal voltage levels. However, such a change affects the
behavior of the whole device and belongs to global attack category. Semi-invasive
attacks inject faults without electrical contact to the chip surface. Conventional semi-
invasive attacks use light to cause transient faults or EM fields to cause transient or
permanent faults. Optical fault injection is an example of a semi-invasive attack that
is also a local attack since it targets only a limited area of chip. Both semi-invasive
and invasive attacks require direct access to the chip so mostly a decapsulation pro-
cedure needs to be done. These attacks can be transient and permanent. Transient
fault affects the chip until it restarts and afterwards it operates correct. Permanent
faults modify the chip in a permanent way. An example of permanent attack is the
attack with focused ion beam.
Invasive attacks modify the chip structure by cutting or connecting wires. In
these attacks, there is a direct electrical contact to the surface of the chip [MOP07].
For further information about fault injection attacks, we refer readers to [JT12].
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Probing Attacks
Probing attacks belongs to the invasive attacks category. They are used to find out
the inner values of the chip by placing a probe on it.
2.2 Evolutionary Computation
What is an optimization? Informally speaking, it is a process of finding new, better
solutions to various problems. Natural evolution can be regarded as an optimiza-
tion process, where over the time life evolves from simple, single cell organisms to
humans, for instance.
People use optimization methods in every aspect of their lives. When we think
of a shorter way to walk to the supermarket, we actually optimize our route. When
we think what products to buy in a shop, we are considering optimization with
regards to the money and quality. When we run a computer program, although
we are maybe not aware of that, that program runs different algorithms to make
some task easier and faster. Indeed, often it is possible to hear that something is
implemented in a naive way, e.g. by using a schoolbook method. That means, there
are some better, optimized methods for the same task.
2.2.1 Taxonomy of Algorithms
Before going into details about EC, we give some insight about algorithms division
and important notions. Note that we do not give an exhaustive taxonomy of algo-
rithms, but rather we concentrate on only those of relevance for this thesis. Further-
more, there are several possible divisions of algorithms, but we do not consider all
of them here.
Regarding the implementation, algorithms can be divided into deterministic and
non-deterministic algorithms. Deterministic algorithms are those that given cer-
tain input, will always produce the same output. Non-deterministic algorithms are
those that given a certain input can produce various outputs. Non-deterministic
algorithms are often used to obtain an approximation of a solution where obtain-
ing an exact solution would be too costly. Probabilistic (randomized) algorithms
are non-deterministic algorithms whose behavior depends on a random process (i.e.
random number generator). Probabilistic algorithms that always terminate with a
correct result with the only variation from one run to another being its running time
are known as the Las Vegas algorithms. Probabilistic algorithms that depending on
an input may produce incorrect results or fail to produce a result are known as the
Monte Carlo algorithms. We show one taxonomy of Monte Carlo algorithms that
we follow in Figure 2.6. Notice that we display only a small number of algorithms
that are related to this thesis.
When talking about optimization algorithms, we give additional taxonomy that
is of relevance for this thesis. Optimization algorithms can be divided to exact and
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Figure 2.6: Taxonomy of Monte Carlo algorithms.
approximate methods. Exact algorithms are those that obtain optimal solutions and
guarantee their optimality [Tal09]. Approximate algorithms are those that gener-
ate high quality solutions in a reasonable amount of time, but without a guarantee
that those solutions are global optimal solutions [Tal09]. In the approximate algo-
rithms class, we can divide those algorithms into approximation algorithms and
heuristic algorithms. Approximation algorithms are those that provide a provable
solution quality and provable run-time bounds [Tal09]. Heuristics are algorithms
that find good solutions on a large-size problem instance. In general, they do not
have an approximation guarantee on the obtained solutions [Tal09]. Alternatively,
heuristics can be defined as parts of an optimization algorithm. There, heuristics use
the information currently gathered by the algorithm to help decide which solution
candidate should be tested next or how the next solution can be produced [Wei09].
Heuristic algorithms can be further divided into specific heuristics and metaheuris-
tics. Specific heuristics are methods that are tailor-made to solve a specific problem.
Metaheuristics, in its original definition represent solution methods that orchestrate
an interaction between local improvement procedures and higher level strategies
to create a process capable of escaping from local optima and performing a robust
search of a solution space [GK03]. Alternatively, metaheuristics are general-purpose
algorithms that can be applied to solve almost any optimization problem [Tal09].
Another definition states that metaheuristics are general purpose methods aimed
to guide an underlying heuristic [GK03]. To classify metaheuristics, one can follow
many criteria, but we divide it into single-solution based metaheuristics and popula-
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Figure 2.7: Taxonomy of optimization algorithms.
tion based heuristics [Tal09]. Single-solution based metaheuristics manipulate and
transform a single solution during the search as in the case of algorithms like local
search or simulated annealing. Population based metaheuristics work on a popu-
lation of solutions (e.g. EA, Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), Ant Colony Opti-
mization (ACO)). We present a taxonomy of optimization algorithms in Figure 2.7.
Similarly to the case of Monte Carlo taxonomy, we display only those algorithm
classes that are of relevance for this thesis.
Based on the preceding taxonomies, we see that we are primarily interested in
Population based metaheuristics and EC, in order to conduct the optimization of
difficult crypto-related problems.
2.2.2 Origins of EC
Evolutionary Computation (EC) is a research area within computer science that
draws inspiration from the process of natural evolution [ES03]. EC is a part of ar-
tificial intelligence and more particularly computational intelligence that involves
continuous and combinatorial optimization.
Although beginnings of EC can be traced back to 1930s and work of Sewell
Wright, only by the emergence of relatively inexpensive computers in 1960s the area
started to grow [Jon06]. For a survey of older works, we refer readers to [Fog98].
In 1960s, Rechenberg ans Schwefel started to formulate how evolutionary process
can be used to solve difficult optimization processes. From these ideas, they devel-
oped ES, a family of algorithms still used today [Rec73,BS02] In that same time, Fogel
developed a framework called “Evolutionary Programming (EP)” that was used to
evolve better finite state machines [FOW66].
Holland’s work in the early 1960s on a robust self-adaptive systems lead to the
development of simple genetic algorithms [Hol92]. In contrast to ES and EP, GA
focuses on more application independent algorithms [Jon06].
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In 1990s, researchers explored similarities and differences between various algo-
rithms which led to Evolutionary Computation (EC) notion that encompasses all
those methods [Jon06]. Already these few examples show that in this thesis we
will use some methods (granted, in a more advanced form) that were developed
more than 40 years ago. This should be also regarded as a proof of the effectiveness
of such methods. For more details about the development of EC, we refer readers
to [BFM00].
2.2.3 Basic EC Notions
Before going into details about specific EAs, we present several notions that we use
throughout the thesis.
Evolution is a set of genetic changes in which individuals acquire the character-
istics that distinguish them from other individuals [HH98].
Genotype are elements of the search space of a given optimization problem [Wei09].
An alternative definition is that it is the encoding of an object [ES03].
Phenotype is a solution candidate [Wei09], or, the behavioral expression of the
genotype in a specific environment [BFM00].
Representation is a way of encoding the genotype.
Allele is a possible value that can occur at the each place in a chromosome [Mit98].
Locus is a position in the chromosome [Mit98].
Chromosome is a candidate solution to a problem [Mit98].
Genes are building blocks of chromosomes [Mit98].
Individual is a data structure that corresponds to an element in the search space,
i.e. a single member of population of solutions. Individual consists of chromosome
and some additional information like its fitness function [BFM00, HH98].
Fitness function is a function that assigns a score to the each potential solu-
tion [Mit98]. The fitness function represents the definition of the problem to be
solved with EC. Throughout the thesis, we use the notions of fitness function and
objective function interchangeably.
Population is a set of individuals used during an optimization process [Wei09].
Generation represents individuals in one iteration on an EC. To state it differ-
ently, evolution is an iterative process, where the population in each iteration is
called generation.
Local optimum is an optimum of a subset of domain. It can be a local maximum
or a local minimum [Wei09].
Global optimum is an optimum of a whole domain that can be a global maxi-
mum or a global minimum [Wei09].
Elitism ensures that the individual with the best fitness is kept from generation
to generation [HH98].
Darwinism is a theory by Charles Darwin stating that evolution occurs through
random variation of heritable characteristics, coupled with natural selection [HH98].
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Baldwin effect describes the effect of learned behavior on evolution. To state
it differently, if learning helps survival then the organisms best able to learn will
have the most offspring, thus increasing the frequency of the genes responsible for
learning [Mit98].
Variation operators is the name for all recombination and mutation operators.
Variation operators are used to create new individuals from the existing ones. They
create the necessary diversity in the population [ES03].
Recombination is a process where a new individual is created from the informa-
tion contained within two or more parent solutions [ES03].
Mutation operators are those that use only one parent and create one child by ap-
plying a randomized change to its genotype [ES03]. Parameter mutation probability
Pc defines the rate of mutation.
Selection method is used to make a distinction between individuals based on
their quality (fitness). It is a force that pushes quality [ES03].
In the context of optimization, exploration (diversification) means finding new
points in previously unexplored areas of search space while exploitation (intensifi-
cation) represents the process of improving and combining the traits of known solu-
tions [Wei09, Tal09]. For an optimization algorithm to be successful, it needs to have
a good balance between those two notions to avoid too fast convergence to a local
optimum from one side, but also too long operation time from the other side.
2.2.4 Evolutionary Algorithms
Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) are population based metaheuristic optimization meth-
ods that use biology inspired mechanisms like selection, crossover or survival of the
fittest [Wei09]. One of the biggest advantages of EAs is their black box character, i.e.
it is not necessary to have a lot of insight into the objective function.
The biggest milestone for the development of this area we can trace to the 19th
century and Charles Darwin. In 1859, he published a book “On the Origin of Species”,
where he identified the principles of natural evolution [Dar59]. His theory can be
stated through the following observations [Wei09].
1. The individuals of a species possess great fertility and can produce more off-
spring than can grow into adulthood.
2. Under the absence of external influences (like natural disasters), the population
size of a species roughly remains constant.
3. Again, if no external influences occur, the food resources are limited, but stable
over time.
4. Since the individuals compete for these limited resources, a struggle for sur-
vival ensues.
5. Especially in sexual reproducing species, no two individuals are equal.
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6. Some of the variations between the individuals will affect their fitness and
hence, their ability to survive.
7. A good fraction of these variations are inheritable.
8. Individuals less fit are less likely to reproduce, whereas the fittest individuals
will survive and produce offspring more probably.
9. Individuals that survive and reproduce will likely pass on their traits to their
offspring.
10. A species will slowly change and adapt more and more to a given environment
during this process which may finally even result in new species.
Although some of these principles should be regarded somewhat abstractly, the
similarity with the pseudocode for EAs as given in Algorithm 1 is evident.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for EAs.
Input : Parameters of the algorithm
Output : Optimal solution set
t← 0
P (0)← CreateInitialPopulation
while TerminationCriterion do
t← t+ 1
P ′(t)← SelectMechanism (P (t− 1))
P (t)← V ariationOperators(P ′(t))
end while
Return OptimalSolutionSet(P )
When describing a prototype for an EA, the common properties are [BFM00]:
• EAs utilize the collective learning process of a population of individuals.
• Offspring are generated by randomized process like mutation and recombina-
tion.
• A measure of quality (fitness value) is assigned to individuals.
In order to define a particular EA, there is a number of operators and procedures
that need to be specified. All those terms will be used throughout the thesis when
describing specific EAs [ES03]:
• Initialization - represents the way of obtaining the initial population. In most
cases this is done by generating random individuals.
• Representation - represents the definition of individuals, i.e. how will the
phenotype-genotype mapping work.
• Fitness function - represents the definition of the problem to be solved
34
• Population - a set of individuals.
• Parent selection mechanism - represents a way to distinguish between the in-
dividuals based on their quality.
• Variation operators - represents mechanisms that are in charge of producing
new individuals.
• Survivor selection mechanism - similar to parent selection mechanism, but
used after the offspring are created.
• Termination procedure - represents the condition when the evolution process
ends.
Selection Mechanism
Here, we present some details about selection mechanisms we use throughout the
thesis. Selection mechanisms are different from the variation operators since they
do not depend on the representation of the individuals. When discussing selection
mechanisms, we first mention two population models; generational and steady-state
model. In the generational model, after each generation the whole population is re-
placed by its offspring. In theTable steady-state model, only a part of the population
is replaced after each generation. In order to select individuals that will progress to
the new generation (or those that will be eliminated from the current one) there are
several selection mechanisms. Here we mention roulette-wheel and steady-state
tournament selection mechanism as two mechanisms we use throughout the the-
sis. Out of those two selection mechanisms, we use mostly steady-state tournament
mechanism.
In the Steady State Tournament (SST) selection, k individuals are selected for
recombination and k − µ worst individuals are replaced with the offspring. Here,
k is the size of the tournament and µ is the number of survivors. Parents for the
offspring are selected randomly from the tournament survivors. We consider only a
two-parent scenario in this thesis. We give a pseudocode for SST selection where µ
equals k − 1 in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode for SST selection.
repeat
randomly select k individuals to the tournament
select the worst one in the tournament
randomly select two parents from remaining individuals in the tournament
replace the worst with crossover child
apply mutation to the new individual with given probability
until population_size times
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The Roulette-wheel (RW) selection is fitness proportionate selection where each
individual gets a “slice” of roulette-wheel proportional to its fitness. Better indi-
viduals have bigger “slices” of the roulette-wheel and are therefore more likely to
be selected [Mit98]. For an in-depth analysis of notions introduced above, we refer
interested readers to [ES03, RBK11].
Genetic Algorithm
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are probabilistic algorithms whose search methods model
some natural phenomena: genetic inheritance and survival of the fittest [Mic96].
GAs are a subclass of EAs where the elements of the search space are arrays of
elementary types like strings of bits, integers, floating-point values and permuta-
tions [Wei09, ES03]. Usual variation operators in GAs are mutation and crossover.
Crossover is considered by many to be one of the most important features of GAs
[ES03]. We display a genotype and phenotype for bitstring representations of a
Boolean function in Figures 2.8a and 2.8b. Here, phenotype is just an evaluation
of the genotype (nonlinearity value for a Boolean function with four inputs). As ev-
ident, fitness function defines the mapping between genotype and phenotype. For
further information about GAs, we refer to [ES03, HH98]. We use GA in Chapters 4
to 7.
(a) Genotype for bitstring representation. (b) Phenotype for bitstring representation.
Figure 2.8: Phenotype-genotype mapping for bitstring representations.
Here, we give a short example how the evolution process works. In order to
do that, we work with Boolean functions that have three inputs. There are in total
28 different Boolean functions with three inputs (i.e., 22
n
Boolean functions with n
inputs). We use a simple GA where the goal is to evolve Boolean function with the
maximum number of ones in its truth table representation as given in the following
equation:
f(x) = HW (TT ). (2.1)
Here, HW (TT ) represents HW of truth table representation of a Boolean function.
We are aware that this does not represent a realistic fitness function, but our intention
is that it merely serves as an example of GA (or any other EA) working. We give
all the parameters for this experimental setup in Table 2.1. Note that some of the
parameter values are not realistic, but they are suitable for this demonstration.
Evaluation of individuals is in accordance to the fitness function as in Eq. (2.1).
First, an initial population is created uniformly at random as showed in Table 2.2.
Next, new individuals are created after the application of a 3-tournament selection,
a single-point crossover and a one-point mutation.
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Table 2.1: Common parameters for an EA example.
Parameter Parameter value
Boolean function size 3
Tournament size k 3
Population size 6
Number of experiments 1
Mutation probability 10%
Crossover operator Single-point crossover
Mutation operator One-point mutation
Termination criterion 5 generations
Table 2.2: Initial population for an EA example.
Nr Chromosome Fitness value
1 10100101 4
2 10010001 3
3 00100110 3
4 10000000 1
5 11100001 4
6 10110011 5
Individuals 3, 5 and 6 are chosen for the 3-tournament selection where the indi-
vidual 3 is eliminated and the remaining two individuals (parents) create one off-
spring that is then mutated. The population after that change is presented in Ta-
ble 2.3. The offspring is given in boldface. The selection continues until N new
individuals are created (where N is the population size), i.e. until N tournaments
are performed, which amounts to one generation.
This process continues for 5 generations where at the end we have the population
with the best solution having fitness value of eight (the maximum possible value).
That solution consists of all ones and it reaches the global optimum value.
Table 2.3: First iteration for EA example.
Nr Chromosome Fitness value
1 10100101 4
2 10010001 3
3 11110111 7
4 10000000 1
5 11100001 4
6 10110011 5
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Genetic Annealing
Genetic Annealing (GAn) is an evolutionary extension of the Simulated Anneal-
ing (SA) algorithm [Yao91]. The SA operates on a single potential solution, which is
locally changed in each iteration and its new fitness value is recorded. The new so-
lution is accepted if it is an improvement, but a worse solution can also be accepted
provided a certain level of global energy bank, which depletes with worse and in-
creases with better solutions. Cooling factor represents the speed of temperature
decrease, i.e. the rate of probability decrease of worse solution acceptance. The GAn
is a simple extension in which the whole process is performed on a population of
individuals with a common global energy bank and cooling factor.
Although GAn does not have the popularity of other methods presented here, we
decided to use it since it represents the closest EAs paradigm to the SA method that
is successfully applied to various cryptography-related problems [BMDC04, Cla98].
For further information about GAn, we refer readers to [Yao91, EHeHAAQ08]. We
experiment with GAn in Chapter 6 to add FFs to the combinatorial circuits in order
to increase their throughput.
Genetic Programming
Genetic Programming (GP) is EA in which the data structures that undergo evo-
lutionary process are executable computer programs [BFM00]. Although GP has a
history longer than 50 years, its full acceptance is due to the work of Koza at the
beginning of 1990s when he formalized the idea of employing chromosomes on a
basis of tree data structures. Since the aim of GP is to automatically generate new
programs, each individual of a population represents a computer program [BFM00]
where the most common are symbolic expressions representing parse trees. Parse
tree is an ordered, rooted tree that represents the syntactic structure of a string ac-
cording to some context-free grammar. Parse trees are also known as syntax trees. A
tree can represent a mathematical expression, a rule set or a decision tree for instance.
Because it makes fewer assumptions about the structure of possible solutions, GP can
be regarded as a more general form of GAs. However, from the other side, since com-
puter programs (trees) are ultimately represented in bitstring format in computer
memory, GP can be also regarded as a variant of GA [Woo03]. Building elements in a
tree-based GP are functions (inner nodes) and terminals (leaves, problem variables).
Both functions and terminals are known as primitives. Figures 2.9a and 2.9b depict
genotype and phenotype for GP representations. This represents a program with a
maximal depth of six, three functions (&, ^, ~) and four terminals (X1, X2, X3, X4).
For further information about GP, we refer readers to [Koz92,PLM08]. We use GP to
evolve Boolean functions in Chapter 4 and S-boxes in Chapter 5.
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(a) Genotype for tree representation. (b) Phenotype for tree representation.
Figure 2.9: Phenotype-genotype mapping for tree representations.
Cartesian Genetic Programming
Julian Miller introduced a new form of GP in 1999 that represents programs as di-
rected graphs instead of trees [Mil99]. From that time, Cartesian Genetic Program-
ming (CGP) has been shown to be more computationally efficient on a number of
problems [WMC06].
In CGP, a program is represented as an indexed graph. The graph is encoded in
the form of a linear string of integers [MT00]. Terminal set (inputs) and node outputs
are numbered sequentially. Node functions are also numbered separately [MT00].
CGP has three parameters that are chosen by the user; number of rows nr, num-
ber of columns nc and levels-back l [Mil11]. Number of rows and number of columns
make the two-dimensional grid of computational nodes. Their product gives the
maximal number of computational nodes. Levels-back parameter controls the con-
nectivity of the graph, i.e. it determines which columns a node can get its input
from [Mil11].
In CGP, the genotype is a list of integers that represents the program primitives
(functions and terminals) and how they are connected together [MH08]. The geno-
type is mapped to the directed graph that is executed as a program. Genotypes are
of fixed length while phenotypes have variable length in accordance to the number
of unexpressed genes.
Figures 2.10a and 2.10b depict genotype and phenotype for CGP representations.
Here, we represent a program with six inputs, three outputs and three functions (1, 2
and 3). Furthermore, the number of columns nc and number of rows nr equal three.
The function genes are the addresses in a user-defined lookup table of functions,
namely &, ^, ~. For example, genotype part 1 3 1 means that the first and the third
terminal are inputs to a function 1 which is &. Gray squares represent unconnected
nodes. Unconnected nodes are those that are not referenced in the path from inputs
to outputs. A change in those nodes does not change the phenotype. Those nodes
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that constitute the phenotype are called the active nodes.
(a) Genotype for directed graph representa-
tion.
(b) Phenotype for directed graph representation.
Figure 2.10: Phenotype-genotype mapping for directed graph representations.
Maximal length of the genotype is given by the following formula:
max_length = nrnc(nn + l) + no, (2.2)
where nn is the number of node input connections and no is the number of pro-
gram output connections. For more details about CGP, we refer an interested reader
to [Mil99, MT00, MH08, Mil11]. We experiment with CGP in Chapter 4 to evolve
Boolean functions. We use CGP implementation written by Julian Miller where the
source code can be found at the following website http://www.cartesiangp.
co.uk/resources.html.
Evolution Strategy
ESs is an EA developed by Rechenberg and Schwefel in 1960s [Rec73, BS02]. Its
basic features are the distinction between parent population (size µ) and offspring
population (size λ ≥ µ), explicit emphasis on the mutation, incorporation of the
self-adaptation for strategy parameters [BFM00] and usually usage of vectors of real
numbers as solution candidates.
Basic population strategies in ES are of the form (µ, λ)-ES and (µ + λ)-ES. In the
first form µ parents survive for only one generation and in each generation they are
replaced by λ offspring. In the second form, µ parents compete with λ offspring to
progress to the next generation. For further information on ES, we refer interested
readers to [BFM00, Wei09, RBK11, BS02]. We use ES in Chapter 4 on its own and as
a selection mechanism with CGP to evolve Boolean functions. Furthermore, we use
it in its standard form with bitstring genotype to evolve combinatorial circuits in
Chapter 6.
2.2.5 Multi-objective Optimization
Multi-objective optimization problems are those that involve more than one objec-
tive function that needs to be optimized simultaneously. When considering non-
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trivial multi-objective problems, there is no single solution that optimizes all objec-
tives since they are conflicting. In such cases, there exists a number of Pareto optimal
solutions.
Pareto optimal solutions are those where none of the objective functions can be
improved in value without degrading some of the other objective values [CLV06]. It
can be said that the aim of multi-objective optimization is to find good compromise
solutions instead of best solutions as in single-objective optimization [CLV06].
There also exists a plethora of multi-objective optimization algorithms like multi-
objective version of hill climbing [GK03], multi-objective tabu search [GL97] and
multi-objective simulated annealing [Wei09]. Furthermore, there is also a multi-
tude of algorithms from the EAs area that are used to solve multi-objective prob-
lems. However, in the rest of this thesis we will concentrate on only one Multi-
objective Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA), namely, Non-dominated Sorting Genetic
Algorithm-II (NSGA-II). For further information about MOEA, we refer interested
readers to [CLV06].
NSGA-II
Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) represents one of the best-
known and widely used MOEAs, which evolved from the Non-dominated Sorting
Genetic Algorithm (NSGA) [DPAM02].
The NSGA-II is significant in that it successfully introduces elitism in multi-
criteria optimization and thus ensures that the best so far found solutions are not
lost (removed from the population).
The algorithm acts on the population Pt, consisting of N individuals, and creates
a population of children Qt of the same size. The union of those two populations is
called Rt and it contains 2N individuals. The Rt is sorted by the non-dominance cri-
teria and its individuals are divided into q fronts F1, F2, ..., Fq . The new population
Pt+1 is created by copying the fronts (beginning with the first) until the number of
solutions N is reached.
Let the front Fi be the first front that does not fit completely into Pt+1; a subset
of individuals from this front has to be selected to enter the new population. In
this case, the algorithm prefers individuals that are more distant from each other, so
that the front coverage is maximized. Such solutions are found with the process of
sorting according to crowding sort are added to the new population.
Crowding sort uses the measure of crowding distance di for each individual,
which indicates how densely other solutions are inhabited in the area of the observed
solution. The crowding distance is defined as the circumference of the rectangle de-
fined by its left and right neighbors, and infinity if there is no neighbor [GK03]. The
solutions with high crowding distance are considered as better solutions, since they
introduce more diversity in the population. The crowding distance measure is cal-
culated taking into account all the optimization criteria and solution distances in
each objective space. After all the solutions are assigned the crowding distance, any
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sorting algorithm can be used to obtain the required number of individuals having
the largest grouping distance. Since sorting is performed as many times as there
are optimization criteria, it is recommended to use a sorting algorithm of a small
complexity. In the process of creating the children population Qt, a crowded tour-
nament selection is used to select parents (or survivors) from the current population
and the crossing and mutation produce children who are added to the Qt popula-
tion. The crowded tournament selection operator compares two individuals which
are assumed to have two values: ri which represents the number of solutions that
dominate this solution (non-dominated rank), and the crowding distance di. The
crowding tournament is actually a binary tournament selection, where individuals
are ranked in accordance to non-dominance and crowding criteria [GK03]. If two
solutions i and j are competing, than solution i is the winner if either it has a bet-
ter non-dominating rank (ri < rj) or, if the ranks are the same, the solution i has
a larger crowding distance (di > dj). For further information about NSGA-II algo-
rithm, we refer to [DPAM02]. We use NSGA-II in Chapter 5 when evolving S-boxes
under multiple conflicting criteria.
2.2.6 No Free Lunch in Optimization
When trying to optimize some problem, there can be several issues of concern. For
instance, if we optimize with regards to multiple criteria, the question is what is the
optimum. Best value in one criterion can lead to a poor value in some other criteria.
Therefore, it is natural to conclude that there is no algorithm that can outperform
all other algorithms for all optimization problems. This is especially true for generic
methods that are good in many different problems, but often some highly specialized
method will be better for a specific problem. Wolpert and Macready have formalized
this intuition in their No Free Lunch (NFL) theorem [WM97].
Informally speaking, NFL theorem states that when averaged over all problems,
all optimization algorithms behave the same. Therefore, there is no single best algo-
rithm, no “magic solver” that can outperform all the other algorithms.
More formally, the performance of an algorithm A that is iterated M times on
an optimization problem O can be defined as P (dyM |O,M,A) which is a conditional
probability of finding a particular objective value dyM .
If algorithm A1 outperforms algorithm A2 in one optimization problem, then A2
will outperform algorithm A1 in some other optimization problem.∑
∀O
P (dyM |O,M,A1) =
∑
∀O
P (dyM |O,M,A2). (2.3)
However, we note that NFL theorem is applicable only when there is no knowl-
edge about the problem. In this light, it is not surprising there are so many different
optimization algorithms that are constantly developed. It is always possible to find
some specific application where a specialized algorithm will behave better, but in
authors’ opinion, this does not necessary lead to good algorithms. This is especially
42
true for EC methods that are general optimization approaches that have good results
for various problems.
2.2.7 Evolutionary Computation Framework
The Evolutionary Computation Framework (ECF) is a C++ framework intended for
the application of any type of the EC, developed at the University of Zagreb [Jea14].
We give details about installation of the ECF in Appendix A and details about spe-
cific projects in Appendix B.
2.3 Combining Cryptology and Evolutionary Computa-
tion
In each chapter where we use EC methods to solve difficult crypto-related problem,
we also present (when possible) related works to familiarize readers with similar
ways of solving the same (or related) problems. However, we want to stress that
problems presented here are not the only possible cryptology-related problems that
can be solved with EC methods.
A simple online search with keywords such as “cryptography”, “genetic algo-
rithm” and “simulated annealing” reveals a number of papers that combine those
two areas. We mention only two Monte Carlo methods related keywords since an
interesting trend can be observed there. When Monte Carlo algorithms are used to
solve cryptology-related problems, in general one of those two methods seems to be
used. Since we already established there exists a multitude of EC methods, we see
there is a plenty of room for new research. In accordance to that, next we give a short
overview of few cryptology-related problems that are “solved” with optimization al-
gorithms.
Already in early 1990s, there has been a line of research that uses optimization
techniques to solve classical ciphers (transposition and substitution ciphers) [Cla98,
Mat93, SJNK93]. Although such applications do not have a real-world (practical)
value, they are worth mentioning since at that time they represented a completely
new research avenue. It is interesting to note that there is still new research on this
topic [LP11]. Also in early 1990s, Hans Dobbertin used GAs to show there exists
a collision in the Message Digest 4 (MD4) algorithm [Dob97, Dob98, Pre13]. John
Clark in his PhD thesis uses heuristic methods for both cryptanalysis and crypto-
graphic function generation [Cla98]. EC methods are also used in the cryptanalysis
of block ciphers [LMSV05]. Addition chains are used in public-key cryptography
in order to speed-up the time consuming modular exponentiation process. There
has been quite an abundance of research with various optimization techniques for
this application [NdMM02, CCRHJMCC05, NdMM04, CCRHCC08]. EAs paradigm
is also used to evolve pseudo-random number generators [LMHCETR06, SSP+13].
Recently, GAs have been used to solve the subset cover problem [BEJ+14]. In the last
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few years, there has been also a line of research on “evolutionary cryptography” by
Zhang et al. [ZLT11a, ZLT11b]. Despite having some similarities with our research,
there are also important differences, primarily in the treatment of optimization meth-
ods and cryptology-related problems of interest. Semente et al. use a GP paradigm
to evolve cryptographic algorithm optimized for wireless sensor networks [SSO14].
We emphasize that here we present problems that can be solved with EC meth-
ods, but are not directly connected with the problems we consider in this thesis. We
note that in this overview we do not judge the complexity of the cryptology-related
problems or the optimization technique and the approach used. Naturally, the prob-
lems mentioned above are a small portion of those suitable for EC methods.
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Chapter 3
GET the Program
“Cryptography is communication in the presence of an
adversary.”
Ron Rivest
I
n this chapter we present a framework that we use to evaluate and generate Boolean
functions and S-boxes. This tool can provide valuable help whether on its own or
in a conjunction with other related tools.
3.1 Introduction
Recall that one usual division of cryptography is into symmetric-key and public-
key cryptography [KL15]. Next, two most important primitives in symmetric-key
cryptography are stream and block ciphers. All ciphers are (or, at least, they should
be) constructed in accordance to the some design strategy where such a strategy is
composed out of components that should have some mathematical properties. In
order to add nonlinearity to a cipher, in block ciphers one often uses S-boxes as the
only nonlinear elements. Similarly, in stream ciphers it is possible to use Boolean
functions to add nonlinearity. Boolean functions are typically used when the out-
put of a building block is one-dimensional. S-boxes are used in the cases when the
output is multi-dimensional and therefore, they can be considered vectorial Boolean
functions.
Consequently, we conclude that Boolean functions and S-boxes play a fundamen-
tal role in the security of many symmetric algorithms. In order to fulfill their role,
Boolean functions and S-boxes must possess properties that are mandated by the
design strategy. In accordance to that, a multitude of cryptographic properties was
devised over the years.
Each of those properties relates to the resiliency of a specific nonlinear element to
some cryptanalytic attacks. For instance, the nonlinearity property is connected with
the security against linear cryptanalysis in the case of block ciphers [MY93, Mat94]
and fast correlation attacks in the case of stream ciphers [CF08]. Similarly, the δ-
uniformity property is connected with the security against differential cryptanaly-
sis [BS91]. Some properties that came later, like the transparency order [Pro05] or the
This chapter is based on the following paper: [PBJ+14b]“S-box, SET, Match: A Toolbox for S-box
Analysis”, published in WISTP 2014.
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confusion coefficient [FDLZ14] are related with the resistance against side-channel
attacks.
The Problem. A natural question that arises is as follows: how to create and an-
alyze such nonlinear elements? This question can be considered interconnected or
not depending on the setting. One possibility is that a designer already has a non-
linear element and he just wants to check its properties. Another possibility is that a
designer wants to generate a proprietary nonlinear element with specific properties.
To be able to conduct these tasks, one needs to have an appropriate tool. To address
those questions, we develop a tool that is able to generate and evaluate Boolean func-
tions and S-boxes - so called GET tool (Generate, Evaluate, Transform tool). With the
GET tool, one is able to generate Boolean functions and S-boxes in several ways,
evaluate a plethora of their properties and conduct different affine transformations
of S-boxes.
The rest of this chapter is presented as follows. In Section 3.2, we present a com-
mon notation. Various representations and properties of Boolean functions and S-
boxes are given in Section 3.3. We use these notions throughout the thesis. In Sec-
tion 3.4, we give an overview of the GET program. Since we divide the tool into
three modules for each set of functionalities, we also present it here in three sections.
We examine the Evaluation, Generation and Affine transformation modules in Sec-
tions 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. Finally, in Section 3.8 we give a short summary of
this chapter.
3.2 Usual Notation
Let n,m be positive integers, i.e. n,m ∈ Z. The set of all n-tuples of the ele-
ments in the field F2 is denoted as Fn2 where F2 is the Galois field with 2 elements.
The set Fn2 represents all binary vectors of length n and it can be viewed as a F2-
vectorspace [Car10a]. The inner product of two vectors ~a and~b is denoted as ~a ·~b and
equals ~a ·~b = ⊕ni=1aibi. Here, “⊕” represents addition modulo two (bitwise XOR).
The HW of a vector ~a, where ~a ∈ Fn2 , is the number of non-zero positions in the vec-
tor. The support supp of a vector~a, where ~a ∈ Fn2 , is the set containing the non-zero
positions in the vector ~a.
An (n,m)-function is any mapping F from Fn2 to Fm2 . If m equals 1 then the func-
tion f is called a Boolean function. The support supp of a Boolean function f is
a set containing the non-zero positions in the Truth Table (TT) representation, i.e.
suppf (~a) = {i : ai 6= 0} [Car10a, Bra06]. The HW of a Boolean function f is the car-
dinality of its support. The set of all Boolean functions is denoted as BFn [Car10a].
When m > 1, the function F is called an S-box or a vectorial Boolean function.
Boolean functions fi, i ∈ {1, ...,m} are coordinate functions of F = (f1, ..., fm) where
every Boolean function has n variables. The component functions of an (n,m)-
46
function F are all the linear combinations of coordinate functions with non all-zero
coefficients.
3.3 Properties and Representations
Here, we first present representations of Boolean functions and S-boxes that are pos-
sible to calculate with the GET tool. Furthermore, those same representations we use
to calculate various properties of the aforementioned nonlinear elements. For an in-
depth treatment of properties of Boolean functions and S-boxes, we refer interested
readers to [Bra06, Car10a, Car10b, CS09].
3.3.1 Boolean Function Representations
First, we present unique representations of Boolean functions and at the end of
the section we also give two non-unique representations. For further information
about advantages and disadvantages of each unique representation, we refer read-
ers to [CG99].
A Boolean function f on Fn2 can be uniquely represented for instance by a TT,
which is a vector (f(~0), ..., f(~1)) that contains the function values of f , ordered lexi-
cographically, i.e. ~a ≤ ~b [Car10a].
A Polarity Truth Table (PTT) of a Boolean function f is defined as [PVLVL+91,
Bra06]
f(~x) = 1− 2 · f(~x). (3.1)
The Walsh-Hadamard transformWf (some authors also call it Walsh transform or
Hadamard transform) is a second unique representation of a Boolean function that
measures the correlation between f(~x) and the linear function ~a · ~x [Bra06, For90].
The Walsh-Hadamard transform of a Boolean function f equals
Wf (~a) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
(−1)f(~x)⊕~a·~x. (3.2)
A third unique representation of a Boolean function f on Fn2 is a representation
by means of a polynomial in F2 [x0, ..., xn−1] /(x20 − x0, ..., x2n−1 − xn−1). This form
is called Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) [Car10a]. ANF is a multivariate polynomial
defined as [MPC04]:
f(~x) = ⊕~a∈Fn2 h(~a) · ~x~a, (3.3)
where h(~a) is defined by the Möbius inversion principle
h(~a) = ⊕~x~af(~x), for any ~a ∈ Fn2 . (3.4)
An autocorrelation function rf of a Boolean function f on Fn2 is a real-valued
function defined as [PVLVL+91, Bra06]:
rf (~a) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
(−1)f(~x)⊕f(~x⊕~a). (3.5)
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The Wiener-Khintchine theorem gives a relation between the squared Walsh-
Hadamard coefficients and autocorrelation function coefficients of a Boolean func-
tion in Fn2
[PVLVL+91]. An autocorrelation function does not uniquely determine a Boolean
function [Bra06].
A crosscorrelation function between two Boolean functions f1 and f2 on Fn2 is a
real valued function defined for all ~a ∈ Fn2 [CS09, Bra06]:
Cf1,f2(~a) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
(−1)f1(~x)⊕f2(~x⊕~a). (3.6)
3.3.2 S-box Representations
An (n,m)-function F can be represented as a list of values (Lookup Table (LUT))
where each value ranging from 0 to 2m − 1 appears exactly once. Alternatively said,
an (n,m)-function can be implemented as a lookup table with 2m words of n bits
each.
S-box can be represented in the TT form as a matrix of dimension 2n ×m where
each column m represents one Boolean function (i.e. one coordinate function).
Walsh-Hadamard transform of an (n,m)-function F equals [Car10b]:
WF (~a,~v) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
~v ∈ Fm∗2
(−1)~v·F (~x)⊕~a·~x. (3.7)
The notion of ANF of a Boolean function can be extended easily to the vecto-
rial Boolean function [Car10b]. Since each coordinate function of such a function F
is uniquely represented as a polynomial on n variables with coefficients in F2 the
function F itself can be uniquely represented as a polynomial of the same form with
coefficients in Fm2 [Car10b]. Therefore, it is represented as the collection of ANF rep-
resentations of the component functions.
The autocorrelation spectrum rF of (n,m)-function F is defined as the collection
of all autocorrelation spectra of the component functions of F [Bra06]:
rF (~a,~v) =
∑
~x∈Fn2
~v ∈ Fm∗2
(−1)~v·F (~x)⊕F (~x⊕~a). (3.8)
In the next two sections, we give brief information about the cryptographic prop-
erties of Boolean functions and S-boxes one can calculate with the GET. Several of
the properties listed below have more than one definition; however, for the simplic-
ity we offer one definition for each property. The properties are also encoded in the
GET tool in accordance to the definitions presented here. Furthermore, we do not
explain the role of each property in the security of an algorithm, but we refer to the
additional literature where that information is available.
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We decided here to classify properties on a basis of the representation we use
to calculate those properties. Similar approach is also followed in [Bra06]. Walsh-
Hadamard transform gives information about the linearity of the function. Further-
more, autocorrelation function is related with the differential properties of a non-
linear element [Bra06]. Alternatively, one could classify properties based on the
relation to a type of cryptanalysis - properties related to differential cryptanalysis,
linear cryptanalysis, algebraic/cube cryptanalysis or side-channel attacks. Another
classification could be related to the properties that reflect the propagation of dif-
ferences induced by S-boxes and to properties that reflect algebraic structures of S-
boxes [KR11].
3.3.3 Cryptographic Properties of Boolean Functions
Next, we give a short list of cryptographic properties of Boolean functions that one
can evaluate with GET. We aim to constantly add new functionalities and for full list
of functionalities, we refer interested readers to the website of the project.
Related with the Walsh-Hadamard Transform
For a Walsh-Hadamard transform, a Boolean function f is balanced if [PVLVL+91,
Bra06]:
Wf (~0) = 0. (3.9)
The nonlinearity Nf of a Boolean function f can be expressed in terms of the
Walsh-Hadamard coefficients as [Car10a]:
Nf = 2
n−1 − 1
2
max~a∈Fn2 |Wf (~a)|. (3.10)
Function f has a bias of nonlinearity  if it has the same output as its best affine
approximation with probability of 12 +  [Mas95, Bra06]:
 =
max~ω∈Fn2 |Wf (~ω)|
2n+1
. (3.11)
Boolean function f is bent if it has maximum nonlinearity equal to [Rot76, Dil72,
Car10a]:
Nf = 2
n−1 − 2n2−1. (3.12)
Boolean function f is plateaued if its Walsh-Hadamard transform takes only three
values, namely, 0 and ±2λ where λ is a positive integer [ZZ01, CP03]. Semi-bent
functions are one particular case of plateaued functions [CM10].
Boolean function f is correlation immune of order t (in brief, CIf (t)) if the out-
put of the function is statistically independent of the combination of any t of its
inputs [Sie06]. For the Walsh-Hadamard spectrum it holds [GZM88]:
Wf (~a) = 0, for 1 ≤ HW (~a) ≤ t. (3.13)
Boolean function f is t-resilient if it is balanced and with correlation immunity of
degree t [Sie06].
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Related with the Autocorrelation Function
Global Avalanche Criterion (GAC) consists of absolute indicator ∆f and sum-of-
square indicator σf [ZZ95].
Absolute indicator for a Boolean function f equals [ZZ95]
∆f = max~a∈Fm∗2 |rf (~a)|. (3.14)
Sum-of-square indicator equals [ZZ95]
σf =
∑
~a∈Fm2
rf (~a)
2. (3.15)
A Boolean function f satisfies Propagation Characteristic (PC) of degree l, de-
noted by PC(l), if the following equation holds [PVLVL+91]:
rf (~a) = 0, for 1 ≤ HW (~a) ≤ l. (3.16)
If a Boolean function f satisfies propagation characteristics of degree one then it
satisfies Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) [WT86, For90, AT90].
Related with the ANF
The algebraic degree degf of a Boolean function f is defined as the number of vari-
ables in the largest product term of the function’s ANF having a non-zero coeffi-
cient [Car10a, CS09]:
degf = max(HW (~a) : h(~a) = 1). (3.17)
Here, h(~a) is defined by the Möbius inversion principle.
Related with the Structure of TT
The Algebraic Immunity (AI) of a Boolean function f is the lowest degree of the
function g from Fn2 into F2 for which f · g = ~0 or (f ⊕ ~1) · g = ~0 where f and g are
Boolean functions. Here, f · g denotes the function whose support is the intersection
of the supports of f and g (· does not represent the dot product between two vectors).
A function g such that f · g = ~0 is called an annihilator of f [MPC04, Car10a].
3.3.4 Cryptographic Properties of S-boxes
In this section, we present cryptographic properties of S-boxes that are possible to
calculate with the GET.
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Related with the Walsh-Hadamard Transform
Nonlinearity NF of an (n,m)-function F equals minimum nonlinearity of all non-
zero linear combinations ~b · F of its coordinate functions fi, where ~b ∈ Fm∗2 [Nyb93,
Car10b].
NF = min~b∈Fm∗2 N(
~b · F ). (3.18)
Function F is correlation immune of order t (denoted as CIF (t)) if all linear com-
binations of coordinate functions are correlation immune of order t [CP04].
WF (~a,~v) = 0, for 1 ≤ HW (~a) ≤ t. (3.19)
S-box F is t-resilient if all linear combinations of coordinate functions are bal-
anced and correlation immune of order t [CP04].
Related with the Autocorrelation Function
GAC of (n,m)-function F equals maximum value of all non-zero linear combina-
tions of the coordinate functions of F [ZZ95, Bur05]. Absolute indicator equals
∆F = max~b∈Fm∗2 ∆(
~b · F ), (3.20)
and sum-of-square indicator equals
σF = max~b∈Fm∗2 σ(
~b · F ). (3.21)
The S-box F is said to satisfy the propagation characteristics with respect to ~a ∈
Fn2 if and only if F (~x)⊕ F (~a⊕ ~x) is balanced [Bra06, MMS13a].
Related with the ANF
Algebraic degree degF of (n,m)-function F is the maximum algebraic degree of all
non-zero linear combinations of the coordinate functions (i.e. component functions)
of F [Car10b]. It is also equal to the maximum algebraic degree of coordinate func-
tions of F .
degF = max ~b ∈ Fm∗2
HW (~b) = 1
deg(~b · F ). (3.22)
Additionally, Knudsen and Robshaw also mention the nonlinear degree as a
property related to the algebraic degree. It is defined as the minimum algebraic
degree of all non-zero linear combinations of the coordinate functions of F [KR11].
Here, we abbreviate it as ndegF .
ndegF = min~b∈Fm∗2 deg(
~b · F ). (3.23)
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Related with the Structure of TT
An (n,m)-function F is called balanced if it takes every value of Fm2 the same number
2n−m of times. Balanced (n, n)-functions are permutations on Fn2 [Car10b].
The component algebraic immunity of (n,m)-function F is the minimal algebraic
immunity of all component functions of F [Car10b]
AIcomp = min~b∈Fm∗2 AI(
~b · F ). (3.24)
Transparency order TF of an (n,m)-function F is defined as [Pro05]:
TF = max~β∈Fm2 (|m− 2 ·HW (~β)| −
1
22n − 2n
∑
~a∈Fn∗2
|
∑
~v ∈ Fm2
HW (~v) = 1
(−1)~v·~βWDaF (~0, ~v)|).
(3.25)
Here, WDaF represents Walsh-Hadamard transform of the derivative of F with
respect to a vector ~a ∈ Fn2 .
In 2014, Chakraborty et al. presented modified transparency order property in
order to deal with some errors in the original definition [CSM+15]. This new, so
called modified transparency order property equals:
MTF = max~β∈Fm2 (m−
1
22n − 2n
∑
~a∈Fn∗2
m∑
j=1
|AFj (a) +
m∑
i=1,i6=j
(−1)βi⊕βjCFi,Fj (a)|),
(3.26)
where AFj (a) represents autocorrelation function of F and CFi,Fj (a) represents
crosscorrelation function.
DPA Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR (DPA)) is another property that characterizes
resilience of S-boxes to DPA attacks and it equals [GP04]:
SNR(DPA)F = n · 22·m
∑
~k
(
m−1∑
i=0
(̂−1)Fi(~k)
) , (3.27)
where f̂(~k) is
f̂(~k) =
∑
~x
(−1)~x·~kf(~x). (3.28)
Related with the S-box Values
To calculate the following properties it is not needed to transform S-box LUT, but
rather work directly with the values.
Difference Distribution Table (DDT) where rows encode differences between in-
put values and columns encode differences between output values for an (n,m)-
function F equals [Bra06, KR11]:
DDT = #
{
~x : F (~x)⊕ F (~x⊕ ~a) = ~b
}
,∀0 ≤ b ≤ 2m,∀0 ≤ a ≤ 2n. (3.29)
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Autocorrelation function represents the Fourier transform of DDT [ZZI00].
Linear Approximation Table (LAT) for an (n,m)-function F is defined as [Bra06,
KR11]:
LAT = #
{
~x : ~b · F (~x) = ~a · ~x
}
,∀0 ≤ b ≤ 2m,∀0 ≤ a ≤ 2n. (3.30)
There exists a relation between the affine approximation table of the component
functions and Walsh-Hadamard transform. LAT is sometimes also called a correla-
tion matrix [Dae95].
Differential delta uniformity δ represents the largest value in the difference dis-
tribution table without counting the value 2n in the first row [Nyb94, Nyb91].
Function F of dimension (n,m) is R-robust to differential cryptography, where
R equals
R =
(
1− N
2n
)
·
(
1− L
2n
)
. (3.31)
Here, L is the largest value in the DDT andN is the number of non-zero entries in the
first column of the table where value 2n in the first row is not counted [BS91,SZZ93].
Function F has fixed points if [DR02]
S(a)⊕ a = ~0,∀a (3.32)
and opposite fixed points if
S(a)⊕ a = ~1,∀a. (3.33)
Branch number b or differential branch number can be defined as [Dae95, DR02]
bF = mina,b6=a(HW (a⊕ b) +HW (S(a)⊕ S(b))). (3.34)
3.4 GET Tool
GET is a tool capable of generation and evaluation of Boolean functions and S-boxes.
It is written in ANSI C code. In the process of the development of the tool, there
were some challenges that had to be addressed. First and the most important one
was which functionalities to include. We opted to add those functionalities that
cover systematic treatment of nonlinear elements for cryptographic usage. Further-
more, it was necessary to decide on the format of the tool, i.e. using a command
line application, application with a Graphical User Interface (GUI), or a static C
library. Currently, the program comes in two versions: first one is a stand-alone
command line tool with a fixed user interface and the second version is a C library.
However, since the source code is also available, users are able to customize the
program for their needs. The latest version of the source code can be obtained
from https://sidesproject.wordpress.com/publications/. To aid the
researchers when examining the code or adding new functionalities, we add com-
ments for all functionalities. Additionally, as a part of the source code package there
is documentation about all functions, logic behind them and instructions on how to
use them.
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart for the GET tool.
3.4.1 Interface
In the stand-alone tool, the user cannot choose which properties will be calculated,
instead all the available properties are calculated. When the program starts, the user
needs to enter the basic parameters; input and output size of the nonlinear element.
After that, the user chooses which module he wants to run. In Figure 3.1, we display
a basic flowchart of the program.
3.5 Evaluation Module
One can ask if there is a need for an evaluation tool since most of the algorithms use
one or more well-known nonlinear element. Indeed, for example, the AES algorithm
uses an S-box that is based on the finite field inversion construction and it possesses
many properties that are either the best possible or believed to be the best possible.
However, since we are witnessing new properties defined along the years, to know
properties at some point in the past does not give a complete picture today. As
an example, in the last decade several properties have been developed for S-boxes
and Boolean functions that are of importance, but naturally not considered at the
design time. Next, researchers sometimes want to develop proprietary S-boxes, or
S-boxes with similar properties, but of other sizes than those currently used. In such
situations, we envision the need for a reliable evaluation tool. Prior going into the
details about the tool, we give a short overview of other publicly available tools
known to the authors.
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3.5.1 Related Tools
The lack of publicly available tools that can evaluate Boolean functions or S-boxes is
somewhat surprising, but this is not because those tools would be very difficult to
develop. Indeed, most researchers that are interested in the design of such nonlinear
elements use either their own tools or an amalgamation of several available tools.
The main problem is that most of those tools are not publicly available and therefore
they are not accessible to the wider community. Here we mention tools that can be
used to evaluate Boolean functions or S-boxes and that are publicly available.
Boolfun package in R. R is a free software environment for statistical comput-
ing and graphics [R C13]. It works on various UNIX, Windows and Mac Operating
System (OS) platforms. Although the default version of R does not have support for
the evaluation of Boolean functions, it is possible to load a package named boolfun
that provides functionalities related to the cryptographic analysis of Boolean func-
tions [Laf13, LHH11].
Boolean functions in Sage. Sage is a well-known free open-source mathematics
software [S+13]. In Sage there is a module called BooleanFunctions that allows one
to study cryptographic properties of Boolean functions. This tool can evaluate most
of the relevant properties (connected with linear and differential cryptanalysis) of
Boolean functions.
S-boxes in Sage. There is a module called Sbox that allows the algebraic treat-
ment of S-boxes. This module has many options, but when considering crypto-
graphic properties it is only possible to calculate DDT and a LAT.
3.5.2 Interface
When a user chooses to run the Evaluate module, he needs to enter the file name of
the file with the nonlinear element to be analyzed. There is an option to start this
module with the command line arguments (input size, output size, module and file
name) so it can be used within a script.
A file that contains a Boolean function must be defined in the TT representation
in a binary format. For the S-boxes, the text file must contain a LUT of decimal or
hexadecimal values with a tabular delimiter. The program can distinguish those two
formats so the user does not need to provide any additional information about the
format. When the program saves data to the file, the name is a concatenation of word
“stats_” and input file name (for example, for the file name “aes” output file would
have name “stats_aes”). Since various representations of an S-box can grow large
rather fast, the program writes them in separate files - Walsh-Hadamard transform,
autocorrelation function, ANF and TT, as well as for DDT and LAT. Files naming
convention is “walsh_”, “ac_”, “anf_”, “tt_”, “ddt_”, “lat_” + input name of the file,
respectively.
We wrote the code with the first objective being modularity, i.e. that each of the
properties or representations can be calculated separately. Although one can expect
that the performance is the key objective of the tool, in our opinion the possibility
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to calculate a wide set of properties is of even greater importance. Performance
becomes more important in the case when one needs to calculate the properties of
bigger S-boxes (e.g. 16×16) or when one uses the program as a script to go through
a large number of S-boxes. To improve the execution speed, small functions that are
often called are inlined. Furthermore, since HW is often used, instead of calling it
every time we call it at the beginning and store results in the lookup table for a faster
execution.
Since the number of properties that can be evaluated is large, it is to be expected
that some researchers do not necessarily know what values are good and what they
can expect in general. Therefore, there is a function “Comment” that offers a short
description what are desirable values for every property and what are (if known)
trade-offs with other properties.
3.5.3 Program Code Example
We first show the source code example of a small program and after that we display
the output of that program. Here we use static library version of the program.
# include <get . h>
i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗argv [ ] )
{
prepare ( name , argc , argv ) ;
t r u t h _ t a b l e ( t t ) ;
l inear_combinat ions ( t t , l l ) ;
walsh_transform ( l l , wt ) ;
i s_ba lanced ( wt ) ;
p r i n t f ( " Nonl inear i ty i s %d\n " , n o n l i n e a r i t y ( wt ) ) ;
p r i n t f ( " C o r r e l a t i o n immunity i s %d\n " , correlat ion_immunity ( wt ) ) ;
p r i n t f ( " Transparency order i s %f \n " , get_transparency_order ( ) ) ;
p r i n t f ( " Delta uniformity i s %d\n " , ge t_de l ta _uni formi ty ( ) ) ;
f r e e _ a l l ( ) ;
}
When running the program, first it is necessary to call the function
prepare (name, argc, argv) where this function sets the global variables and the val-
ues from the HW function. After that, we simply call functions for the properties
we want to calculate. At the end, function free_all() is called to free dynamically
allocated arrays and matrices. If we call this program with the AES S-box input and
output sizes (8× 8) and the name of the file where the LUT is stored, i.e.:
GET.exe 8 8 c:/AES.txt
as the output we obtain:
SET - S-box Evaluation Toolbox
Name of the file: c:/AES.txt
Input size is 8.
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Output size is 8.
S-box is balanced.
Nonlinearity is 112.
Correlation immunity is 0.
Transparency order is 7.86.
Delta uniformity is 4.
3.5.4 Time and Memory Complexity
Once the input file is loaded and transformed in the TT form, the evaluation process
starts. Significant parts of the properties are calculated through the coefficients of
the Walsh-Hadamard spectrum, autocorrelation function and algebraic normal form.
Since the formulas are the same for Boolean functions and S-boxes (only difference
being that the calculation is repeated for every linear combination of the coordinate
Boolean functions in the case of S-boxes) we write here only computational complex-
ities for Boolean function case. Computational complexity when calculating the ANF
and Walsh-Hadamard spectrum is of order O
(
n · 2n). We use Fast Walsh-Hadamard
transform when calculating Walsh-Hadamard spectrum. Autocorrelation function
has a computational complexity O
(
22·n
)
.
3.5.5 Speed of the Execution
In Table 3.1, we give execution times for a small number of the functions when cal-
culated in GET tool and with some other tools mentioned in Section 3.5.1. We con-
ducted the calculations on a system with Intel i5 3230M processor, 4 GB of RAM
and operating system Debian 3.13. The times are given for the 8-bit Boolean func-
tion (as used in Rakaposhi algorithm [CKK09]) and for 8 × 8 S-box (as in the AES
cipher [DR02]).
We emphasize that this comparison should not be regarded as an in-depth anal-
ysis of the performances of any of the tools, but rather as an indication of their re-
spective execution times. In the analysis we do not take into account specificities of
each tool, e.g. precomputed values stored in memory, but rather we are interested
only in total time from the call of each function to the display of the corresponding
result. In accordance to that, presented times should serve only as a guideline.
For tool realized in R, we use rbenchmark library and function benchmark [Kus12].
In the case of Sage, we use timeit function and in our module, we use C function
clock_gettime.
Execution times represent average times over 100 runs in microseconds (µs). Ad-
ditionally, we give required input arguments for functions when using evaluation
module. Therefore, the following table can be also regarded as a dependency table
between different representations and functions.
With N/A we mark those properties that are not possible to calculate and with
“X” those properties that are not defined for a certain type of a nonlinear element. As
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Table 3.1: GET evaluation module, average execution times, (µs).
Name Input arg. R Sage GET
Boolean S-box Boolean S-box
walsh_transform TT 50 0.69 N/A 1.17 2 720
autocorrelation TT N/A 0.8 N/A 1.3 2 980
algebraic_normal TT 50 3 160 N/A 10.02 4 501
LAT LUT X X 75.6E3 X 1.1E5
DDT LUT X X 434E3 X 441
nonlinearity Walsh 70 3.31 N/A 0.66 199
correlation_immunity Walsh 40 2.5 N/A 6.6 1 768
absolute_indicator autocorr. N/A 27.4 N/A 0.64 192
sum_of_square_indicator autocorr. N/A 2.6 N/A 0.82 259
algebraic_degree ANF 40 N/A N/A 0.62 166
algebraic_immunity TT 40 2E5 N/A 12 5.2E5
num_fixed_points LUT X X N/A X 0.6
snr_dpa TT N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 019
branch_number LUT X X N/A X 277
transparency_order LUT N/A N/A N/A 1 218.7 6 105
one can see from the Table 3.1, our module is not the fastest for all the functions, but
is comparable in speed (naturally, in the limited set of functions possible to compare).
3.6 Generation Module
As already stated, there are several scenarios where researchers need to create new
S-boxes or Boolean functions. When that need arises, natural question is how to
do it. In general, there are three methods how to construct such nonlinear ele-
ments, namely, algebraic constructions, random search and heuristic methods (and
of course, combinations of those three methods) [Goo05].
Algebraic constructions, like finite field inversion [Nyb91] offer a way to generate
nonlinear elements that have several optimal properties. Random search represents
a method that can be used for fast generation of multiple S-boxes or Boolean func-
tions. As far as the authors know, for larger sizes of S-boxes and Boolean functions,
random search cannot reach optimal values (further details in Chapters 4 and 5).
Heuristic methods refer to the experience based methods for problem solving that
give solutions that are not guaranteed to be optimal. As presented in the follow-
ing chapters, heuristic methods (more precisely, we work with EAs) can be used
to generate S-boxes or Boolean functions with highly competitive properties when
compared with algebraic construction or random search methods. We implemented
several methods for generating nonlinear elements that belong to the above classes.
At this moment, we support only the generation of balanced nonlinear elements.
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3.6.1 Random Search
With this method, the Generation module creates random balanced Boolean function
or S-boxes until a certain termination condition is fulfilled. Termination condition
can be either the number of generated nonlinear elements or whether an element
with a certain property is generated. In our opinion, the main purpose of a random
search is to serve as a benchmark since it cannot compete with the quality of obtained
solutions with algebraic construction or heuristic search methods.
3.6.2 Hill Climbing
Hill Climbing (HC) is an optimization technique belonging to the class of local search
methods. It is an iterative algorithm that starts with an arbitrary solution to a prob-
lem, then attempts to find a better solution by incrementally changing a single ele-
ment of the solution. If the change produces a better (or equally good) solution, an
incremental change is made to the new solution, repeating until no further improve-
ments can be found. Our HC algorithm can make only one change for each element
in the encoding. We implemented both hill climbing and strong hill climbing where
the difference is that in hill climbing equally good solution is accepted for a change
while in the strong HC only the better solutions are accepted.
The hill climbing algorithm works both for Boolean functions and S-boxes, but
the implementations are different since for the Boolean functions there is a constraint
to keep the function balanced (i.e. the encoding must contain the same number of
zeros and ones). The algorithm works by iteratively going through every element
i in the encoding and swapping its value with every other element’s j value where
i < j. In the case that the fitness of new solution is better, algorithm continues with
new element i+ 1, otherwise, it reverts the swap and continues to compare element
i with element j + 1. We present the pseudocode for HC algorithm for permutation
encoding in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Hill climbing algorithm for permutation encoding.
fitness = evaluate_fitness
for all element i in permutation encoding do
for all element j in permutation encoding do
swap_elements (i, j)
fitness_new = evaluate_fitness
if fitness_new > fitness then
break
else
swap_elements (i, j)
end if
end for
end for
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3.6.3 Absence of EAs in Generation Module
The Generation module has no evolutionary algorithms implemented, but we still
mention them here since the core of this thesis is their applications to cryptology.
Here, we offer reasoning behind the decision not to implement EAs in the GET
tool. If we decide to implement such methods, first question that arises is what
algorithm to implement. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, for instance, when trying
to evolve Boolean functions GP gives better results than the GA. However, GP is
difficult to use to evolve S-boxes and it gives significantly worse results. Therefore,
if we want to give a fair treatment of both nonlinear elements we need to implement
two algorithms. Even then, many other algorithms are possible to use. A similar
reasoning can be followed for the EAs selection and variation operators. As soon
as we implement several evolutionary algorithms, GET tool would change its focus
from S-box and Boolean functions tool to an evolutionary algorithm framework.
In accordance to that, we implement support for the evaluation of Boolean func-
tions and S-boxes of arbitrary sizes to the evolutionary framework used throughout
the thesis - ECF [Jea14]. We implement minimal working examples, but interested re-
searcher can add all evaluation capabilities of GET tool by simply using it as a static
library for instance. Additional information about installation and running ECF can
be found in Appendices A and B.
3.6.4 Interface
First, a user needs to choose whether to use a random search or a hill climbing algo-
rithm. In the case of Boolean functions, the output is TT in bitstring representation,
and in the case of S-boxes, the output is a lookup table in a hexadecimal format.
Next, the user needs to choose the stopping condition for an algorithm. In the case
that hill climbing is chosen, the user additionally needs to choose the name of the
file that contains the nonlinear element to be improved. In Figure 3.2, we display a
basic flowchart for the Generation module.
3.6.5 Program Code Example
We give a small source code example when a random search is used. Again, this
example is based on static library version of the program. This function generates
100 random S-boxes of input and output size 4 and outputs them to the file “ran-
dom.txt”.
# include <get . h>
i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗argv [ ] )
{
create_random ( 4 , 4 , 100 , " random . t x t " ) ;
}
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart for the Generate module.
3.7 Affine Transformation Module
Two S-boxes S1 and S2 of dimension n × n are Affine Equivalent (AE) only if the
following equation holds [Car10b, BCBP03]:
S2(x) = B(S1(A(x))). (3.35)
Two S-boxes S1 and S2 of dimension n×n are Extended Affine Equivalent (EAE)
only if the following equation holds [LP07, Car10b, BCBP03]:
S2(x) = B(S1(A(x)⊕ a))⊕ b. (3.36)
Here, A and B are invertible n × n matrices (i.e. A,B ∈ GL(n,F2)) and a, b ∈
Fn2 are constant values. Resistance of S-boxes against most of the attacks remains
unchanged when an invertible affine transformation is applied before and after the
S-box [LP07]. However, some of the properties change under affine transformations;
e.g. it is possible to remove fixed or opposite fixed points [DR02] or change some of
the properties related with DPA resistance [PEP+14, PPE+14].
Therefore, it is beneficial to be able to compose an S-box with an affine transfor-
mation. This module supports affine transformations as listed in Table 3.2.
3.7.1 Interface
When the module starts, a user needs to select the file with an S-box to be trans-
formed and the identifier of the transformation. Based on the chosen type, user can
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Table 3.2: GET - Affine transformations.
Number Transformation
1 S(x)⊕ c
2 S(B(x)⊕ c)
3 (A(S(B(x)⊕ c))⊕ d
4 (A(S(B(x)⊕ c)⊕ d)
Figure 3.3: Flowchart for the Transform module.
either manually enter necessary variables or use randomly generated values for ma-
trices and constants. In the case that the program uses randomly chosen values, it
runs until the non affine invariant property of interest reaches a desired level. As a
result, the module produces a file with a new lookup table and log about the used
affine transformation. We display a basic flowchart for the Affine Transformation
module in Figure 3.3.
3.7.2 Program Code Example
Here we give an example for an affine transformation that transforms S-box of 4× 4
size. It runs 100 transformations of type 4 as in Table 3.2 and outputs the result to
file “affine.txt”. To run this example we use a static library version of the GET tool.
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# include <get . h>
i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗argv [ ] )
{
a f f i n e _ t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ( 4 , 4 , 4 , 100 , " a f f i n e . t x t " ) ;
}
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present a tool for the evaluation and generation of Boolean func-
tions and S-boxes. First, we present notation and S-box and Boolean function prop-
erties that will be also considered in the following chapters. For each of the three
modules of the GET tool we give a short overview of its functionalities as well as
examples on how to use them.
This chapter should be considered only as an introduction to the GET tool. There
are many properties not covered in the current version and we consider it an ongoing
project. In the future, we plan to offer regular updates to the tool.
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Chapter 4
Cryptographic Boolean Functions: One
Output, Many Design Criteria
“No matter how correct a mathematical theorem may appear
to be, one ought never to be satisfied that there was not
something imperfect about it until it also gives the
impression of being beautiful.”
George Boole
I
n this chapter we use four different EAs in order to evolve Boolean functions with
various cryptographic properties. We concentrate on three different objectives and
give exhaustive statistical comparison between algorithms.
4.1 Introduction
In the last few decades there has been some significant research on the Boolean func-
tions, for cryptography as well for other uses like algebraic coding and sequence de-
sign [Mil99, Bur05, KM99, Car10a]. In accordance to that, there exist many different
approaches on the construction of Boolean functions as well as numerous rationales
behind the choice of properties relevant for Boolean functions. When discussing
Boolean functions in cryptography, although they do not have a prominent position
as 20 or more years ago, they still represent an important cryptographic primitive.
In this chapter, we concentrate on Boolean functions as building blocks of filter
and combiner generators (see Chapter 2.1.2). Since Boolean functions are often the
only nonlinear element in stream ciphers, without them a cipher would be trivial to
break. Therefore, it is not surprising that there exists a substantial body of works on
the methods of generating Boolean functions.
However, previously mentioned application of Boolean functions in cryptogra-
phy is not the only one. For instance, they can be also used to resist side-channel
This chapter is based on the following papers: “Evolving cryptographically sound Boolean func-
tions”, published in GECCO 2013. “Combining Evolutionary Computation and Algebraic Constructions
to find Cryptography-relevant Boolean Functions”, published in PPSN 2014. “Evolving DPA-resistant
Boolean Functions”, published in PPSN 2014. “Evolutionary Methods for the Construction of Crypto-
graphic Boolean Functions”, published in EuroGP 2015. “Fighting the Symmetries: The Structure of
Cryptographic Boolean Function Spaces”, accepted in GECCO 2015. “Correlation Immunity of Boolean
Functions: An Evolutionary Algorithms Perspective”, accepted in GECCO 2015. “Cryptographic Boolean
Functions: One Output, Many Design Criteria”, submitted to Elsevier Applied Soft Computing.
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attacks. When discussing side-channel countermeasures, one important class con-
tains various masking schemes. In masking schemes, one randomizes the interme-
diate values that are processed by the cryptographic device. One obvious drawback
of such an approach is the masking overhead that can be substantial in embedded
devices or smart cards. However, correlation immune Boolean functions allow re-
ducing that masking overhead in two ways [CG14, CDGM12]. The first way is by
applying leakage squeezing method [CG14, CG13] and the other method is the Ro-
tating S-box masking [CDGM12]. For the second case, the key is to generate Boolean
functions with as high as possible correlation immunity value and minimal HW of
their support. In the first case there is a constraint that f is the indicator of a permu-
tation of F
n
2
2 . Note that most of the algebraic constructions are designed to produce
balanced Boolean functions and therefore are not suitable for this task. Therefore, it
would be beneficial to have some other method of constructing Boolean functions.
We distinguish between three main approaches to generate Boolean functions
for cryptographic usages: algebraic construction, random generation and heuristic
construction (and various combinations between those three approaches) [Goo05].
Algebraic constructions use some mathematical procedure to create a Boolean func-
tion with good cryptographic properties. One example of such construction is the
Maiorana-McFarland construction [Car10a]. Random generation of Boolean func-
tions has its strong points, most prominent ones being easy and fast as a method,
but the resulting Boolean functions usually have suboptimal properties for cryp-
tographic usages [MFD04]. Heuristic methods offer an easy and efficient way of
producing a large number of Boolean functions with very good cryptographic prop-
erties [Bur05]. Among different heuristic approaches, EC and more specifically EAs
offers highly competitive results when generating Boolean functions for cryptogra-
phy [PJG13, PBJ14a]. Note that EAs can be used as primary construction methods
to evolve Boolean functions. A primary construction method is a construction that
leads to new functions without using known ones. Secondary construction method
leads to recursive construction [Car10a].
The Problem. We experiment with several different EAs in order to explore their
efficiency in the evolution of Boolean functions with properties necessary to be used
in cryptography. More precisely, we investigate four EAs, namely, GA, GP, CGP
and ES. Furthermore, instead of concentrating on only one objective to evaluate, we
investigate three different objectives, represented with different fitness functions.
Since we experiment with several methods and fitness functions, it is not feasible
to conduct experiments with all possible parameter combinations. Therefore, we
restrict our attention to combinations which, based on our previous results and usual
settings for those algorithms, provide acceptable results. Indeed, four algorithms
combined with three fitness functions already give twelve combinations. In the case
when we would consider different variation operators, as well as different selection
mechanisms, the total number would easily grow to a huge number of combinations
and required experiments. Any of the four aforementioned algorithms can constitute
a whole chapter when regarding only one objective, so our work should be regarded
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as a practical guide and not as an in-depth analysis. However, it is worth noting
that we perform more than 30 000 independent experimental runs for various EAs
in order to conduct statistical analysis.
In this chapter, we concentrate only on Boolean functions with eight inputs. Eight
inputs is a small size for Boolean functions for stream ciphers (it is commonly consid-
ered that 13 is a strict minimum for resisting algebraic attacks), but we still believe
it is an interesting case. Indeed, for instance ciphers RAKAPOSHI [CKK09] and
Achterbahn [GGK05] use Boolean functions of that size. Boolean functions of larger
sizes are often considered too complicated for EAs [KMY06, SM00a]. However, in
our opinion this is mainly because the evaluation part becomes computationally too
complex. However, we note that does not mean such larger functions cannot be
generated with EAs. Evolving Boolean functions is a challenging task because there
exist 22
n
possible Boolean functions of n inputs (for eight inputs this gives 2256 can-
didate solutions). Indeed, with anything more than five inputs it is impossible to do
an exhaustive search.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present several
applications of stochastic algorithms when generating Boolean functions appropri-
ate for cryptographic usages. Next, in Section 4.3 we give fitness functions used in
our experiments. Since we already present all relevant properties in Chapter 3, in
this Section we only give an insight why those properties are of importance. Fur-
thermore, we give upper bounds on those properties. Section 4.4 deals with the
experimental setup and EAs we use. In Section 4.5, we give results for each of the
objective functions as well as a short discussion on the results. Finally, we end with
a short summary in Section 4.6.
4.2 Related Work
As noted, there have been many applications of heuristic methods to the generation
of Boolean functions for cryptographic usages. Here we describe previous work
directly related to our investigation in a chronological order.
As far as the authors know, the first application of GA to the evolution of cryp-
tographically suitable Boolean functions emerged in 1997. Millan et al. experiment
with GA to evolve Boolean functions with high nonlinearity [MCD97].
In his thesis, Clark presents several applications of optimization techniques in
the field of cryptology [Cla98]. One of the applications is the evolution of Boolean
functions with high nonlinearity when using GA and hill climbing techniques.
Millan et al. use GAs to evolve Boolean functions that have high nonlinear-
ity [MCD98]. In conjunction with the GA they use hill climbing together with a
resetting step in order to find Boolean functions with even higher nonlinearity and
sizes of up to 12 inputs. They find balanced Boolean functions with eight inputs that
have nonlinearity 112 and correlation immunity equal to one. Furthermore, when
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using GA with hill climbing they find eight input balanced Boolean functions with
nonlinearity equal to 116.
Millan et al. use variations of hill climbing method in order to find Boolean func-
tions that have high nonlinearity and low autocorrelation [MCD99].
Clark and Jacob experiment with two-stage optimization to generate Boolean
functions [CJ00]. They use a combination of SA and hill climbing with a cost func-
tion motivated by Parseval theorem in order to find functions with high nonlinearity
and low autocorrelation.
Clark et al. use SA to generate Boolean functions with cryptographically rele-
vant properties [CJS+02]. In their work, they consider balanced function with high
nonlinearity and with the correlation immunity property less and equal to two.
Kavut and Yücel develop improved cost function for a search that combines SA
and hill climbing [KY03]. With that approach, the authors are able to find some
functions of eight and nine inputs that have a combination of nonlinearity and au-
tocorrelation values previously unattained. They also experiment with three-stage
optimization method that combines SA and two hill climbing algorithms with dif-
ferent objectives.
Clark et al. experiment with SA in order to design Boolean functions by spectral
inversion [CJMS03]. They observe that many cryptographic properties of interest
are defined in terms of Walsh transform values. Therefore, they work in the spectral
domain where the cost function punishes those solutions that are not valid Boolean
functions.
Burnett et al. present two heuristic methods where the goal of the first method is
generating balanced Boolean functions with high nonlinearity and low autocorrela-
tion. The second method aims at generating resilient functions with high nonlinear-
ity and algebraic degree that maximizes the Siegenthaler inequality [BMDC04].
Millan et al. propose new adaptive strategy for local search algorithm for gen-
eration of Boolean functions with high nonlinearity [MFD04]. Additionally, they
introduce the notion of the graph of affine equivalence classes of Boolean functions.
Burnett in her thesis uses three heuristic techniques to evolve Boolean functions.
The first method aims at evolving balanced functions with high nonlinearity. The
second method is used to find balanced Boolean functions with high nonlinearity
that are correlation immune. The last method is used to find balanced functions
with high nonlinearity and propagation characteristics different from zero [Bur05].
Furthermore, she experiments with the evolution of S-boxes.
Aguirre et al. use multi-objective random bit climber to search for balanced
Boolean functions of size up to eight inputs that have high nonlinearity [AOF07].
Results indicate that the multi-objective approach is highly efficient when generat-
ing Boolean functions that have high nonlinearity.
Izbenko et al. use a modified hill climbing algorithm to transform bent functions
to balanced Boolean functions with high nonlinearity [IKK08].
McLaughlin and Clark on the other hand use SA to generate Boolean functions
that have optimal values of algebraic immunity, fast algebraic resistance and alge-
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braic degree [MC13]. In their work, they experiment with Boolean functions of size
up to 16 inputs.
Picek et al. experiment with GA and GP to find Boolean functions that possess
several optimal properties [PJG13]. As far as the authors know, this is the first appli-
cation of GP when evolving cryptographically suitable Boolean functions.
Hrbacek and Dvorak use CGP to evolve bent Boolean functions of size up to 16
inputs. However, since bent Boolean functions should not be used in cryptography
(because they are not balanced), this work has a limited applicability from the cryp-
tographic perspective.
Several EAs are used by Picek et al. to evolve Boolean functions that have better
side-channel resistance [PBJ14a]. This paper presents the first application of opti-
mization techniques when looking for Boolean functions that have improved DPA
resistance.
With the goal of finding maximal nonlinearity values of Boolean functions, Picek
et al. experiment with several EAs [PMBJ14]. Furthermore, they combine optimiza-
tion techniques with algebraic constructions in order to improve the search. Al-
though they are unable to find balanced Boolean function with nonlinearity equal
to 118, they present several possible avenues to follow when looking for highly non-
linear balanced Boolean functions.
Picek et al. compare the effectiveness of CGP and GP approach when looking for
highly nonlinear balanced Boolean functions of eight inputs [PJM+15]. This is the
first application of CGP for evolving cryptography suitable Boolean functions where
the authors show that method performs favorably when compared with some other
evolutionary approaches.
It is evident from the list above (we emphasize that this is not even a complete list)
there has been a multitude of works in the application of optimization techniques
to the generation of Boolean functions. Thus, what separates this work from the
others? Firstly, although we experiment with the same (or very similar) objectives
as in the some of the related literature, we use different EAs. Indeed, some of the
algorithms we use were never before applied on such problems. Furthermore, we
conduct an extensive analysis on the influence of certain algorithm parameters in the
effectiveness of the search. Lastly, we give comprehensive comparison of EAs when
evolving cryptographically suitable Boolean functions.
4.3 Fitness Functions
The following properties of Boolean functions play an important role in security of
filter and combiner generators and are considered in our experiments: nonlinear-
ity, correlation immunity, balancedness, bentness, algebraic immunity and algebraic
degree [Car10a, CS09, Bra06]. We give the formulas for those properties in Chap-
ter 3.3. Note that there exist other relevant properties, like the fast algebraic im-
munity [WJ11] for instance, but we do not consider other properties. We follow that
69
approach from two reasons; the first one stems from the fact that those properties are
the most researched ones in related literature. The second reason is that we aim to
experiment with a smaller number of fitness functions, but with more EAs variations
within each objective. Furthermore, we select all fitness functions so that it is clearly
possible to define what is the goal, i.e. what properties Boolean functions need to
possess in order to say they are the best possible (i.e. to find global optimum).
We start with the simplest fitness function and then gradually make fitness func-
tions more complicated. However, already the second function is difficult, but this
is because the underlying cryptographic problem is difficult and not because of the
complexity of fitness function (e.g. having a large number of terms).
4.3.1 The First Objective
As stated, we start with the simplest fitness function in terms of number of parame-
ters. This function has only one parameter and that is the nonlinearity property.
In order to provide confusion, a Boolean function should lie at a large HD from
all affine functions. Nonlinearity Nf of a Boolean function f is the minimum HD
between function f and affine functions [Car10a].
The upper bound for the nonlinearity property is often called the covering radius
bound and is given as follows:
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2n2−1. (4.1)
Furthermore, the maximum nonlinearity of functions in Fn2 coincides with the cov-
ering radius ρ of the first order binary Reed-Muller code, i.e. RM(1, n) [Car10a]. This
bound can be strict only when a Boolean function f has an even number of inputs
and such function with a maximum nonlinearity is called a bent function. However,
bent functions are not balanced, i.e. their values are not uniformly distributed and
are therefore not appropriate for usage in filter and combiner generators [Car10a].
Since we just stated that bent functions are not appropriate as parts of filter and
combiner generators, the question is why we are still interested in methods of gen-
erating them. The first reason is that this problem can be used as a benchmark to test
various EAs. The second reason lies in the fact that from bent functions it is possible
to build highly nonlinear functions that are balanced [Car10a].
How difficult is the problem of evolving bent Boolean functions? The answer to
this question depends on the input size of a Boolean function and the number of bent
Boolean functions.
However, there is no known efficient lower bound for an n-variable Boolean func-
tion. A naive upper bound equals [Car10a]:
upper_bound = 22
n−1+ 12 (
n
n/2). (4.2)
We can observe that there exist a huge number of bent Boolean functions and
therefore we could expect this problem not to be too difficult for the EAs.
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To evolve bent Boolean functions we use the following fitness function where the
goal is maximization:
fitness1 = Nf . (4.3)
From the Eq. (4.1) it is apparent that we look for a Boolean function with the
nonlinearity equal to 120 (i.e. |Wf (~a)| = 2n2 for all ~a ∈ Fn2 ).
We emphasize that in a way, here we chose to work with the most complex fit-
ness functions from the EC perspective. This is apparent already in the first scenario
since we look for the maximal nonlinearity value only on a basis of the worst Walsh-
Hadamard coefficient. In such a way, there is no gradient information that can help
lead the search from one nonlinearity value to the other. For example, when hav-
ing nonlinearity 116, the next better one is 118 and between those two values there
is no information that can help in the search, which means that at that moment we
effectively do a random search. All the fitness functions presented here may be rede-
fined to account for all the Walsh-Hadamard values which in turn gives much more
information about the quality of a certain solution.
4.3.2 The Second Objective
Sarkar and Maitra showed that if a CI(t) (see Eq. (3.13)) Boolean function f has an
even number of inputs n and k ≤ n2 − 1, then its nonlinearity Nf is upper bounded
as follows [SM00b]:
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2n2−1 − 2k, (4.4)
where k equals t+ 1 if f is balanced or has Hamming weight divisible by 2t+1 and k
equals t otherwise.
In the case when k > n2 − 1 then the nonlinearity is upper bounded with:
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2k. (4.5)
There exist bounds that are more precise, but the previously mentioned one is
sufficiently precise to define our search objective [Car10a]. In the second set of ex-
periments we concentrate only on Boolean functions where t + 1 ≤ n2 − 1. This
nontrivial bound is called Sarkar-Maitra divisibility bound [Car10a] and it implies
that the maximum nonlinearity for n = 8 and t = 0 equals 118. Here, t = 0 means
that the function is balanced, but with correlation immunity equal to zero.
In the second experiment, we search for a balanced function with the maximum
possible nonlinearity and correlation immunity equal to zero. In doing so we use the
following fitness function where the objective is maximization:
fitness2 = BAL+Nf . (4.6)
We use the balancedness property (BAL) as a penalty. As evident from the Al-
gorithm 4, when the function is balanced, it receives a value (reward) of one while
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unbalanced functions get penalty proportional to their unbalancedness. We need to
evaluate the balancedness property since when working with representations differ-
ent from bitstring it is difficult to create random initial population comprised from
balanced Boolean functions.
Algorithm 4 Calculate balancedness.
ones = HW (TT )
zeros = 2n - ones
if zeros == ones then
return 1
else
return |ones− zeros| ·X
end if
We experimentally find that X = -5 scales well for Boolean functions with n = 8 in-
puts. We experimented with several algorithms for calculating balancedness penalty
where results show similar performance as long as the penalty is calculated gradu-
ally.
We can restate Eq. (4.6) as a two-stage fitness function. In that design configu-
ration, only the balancedness is tested at first, and nonlinearity value is added only
if the function is balanced. This represents an option commonly used in EAs when
one is trying to optimize one quantity under a strict constraint. However, our pre-
vious results show that when evolving balanced Boolean functions with maximum
nonlinearity, one stage fitness (as in the Eq. (4.6)) performs better [PJM+15] than the
two-stage approach. This also makes our experimental setup somewhat easier since
otherwise we would need to conduct experiments with two stage fitness functions
for all algorithms.
4.3.3 The Third Objective
For a Boolean function to be useful in filter generators, it needs to be balanced, with
high nonlinearity and a high algebraic degree. Furthermore, to be used in a combiner
generator it also needs to have a good correlation immunity value
[MC13, Car10a, Sie06].
Notice that in previous sentence we speak of “high” and “good” values. First we
discuss what good values are and then, what are the upper bounds for the relevant
properties. Next, we give a short overview of the security roles of each property in
the cipher security.
Boolean function needs to be balanced or (for sufficiently large n) it would be
possible to distinguish between its output and some random sequence [Car10a].
Boolean function needs to have high nonlinearity value in order to resist against fast
correlation attacks [MS89]. We already discussed what are the maximum possible
values on nonlinearity for t-resilient Boolean functions with even number of inputs
in Eq. (4.4) and (4.5). In our second objective we search for Boolean function with
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correlation immunity equal to zero and in our third objective we search for Boolean
functions that have correlation immunity larger than zero.
Recall we mention that we look for Boolean functions that have good correlation
immunity values. First, we need to answer what are good values. When a Boolean
function is used in a filter generator, correlation immunity value of one is usually
considered sufficient [CF08]. To obtain this value, often it is possible to replace a
Boolean function that has other good properties with a linearly equivalent one that
has the correlation immunity equal to one [CF08].
However, when using Boolean functions in a combiner generator, high values of
correlation immunity are necessary to resist the Siegenthaler correlation attack [Sie06].
Therefore, in our experiments we look for Boolean functions that have correlation
immunity equal or larger than two which we believe is sufficient for a Boolean func-
tion with eight inputs [Mei14].
Next, a Boolean function needs to have high enough value of algebraic degree
in order to resist against Berlekamp-Massey attack [Mas69] and Rønjom-Helleseth
attack [RH07].
The correlation immunity and the algebraic degree are conflicting properties and
it is not possible to obtain a Boolean function with both properties optimal. For a re-
silient Boolean function where t > 1 and t 6= n−1, it holds the following Siegenthaler
inequality [Sie06]:
t ≤ n− deg − 1. (4.7)
Otherwise, the inequality is as follows:
t ≤ n− deg. (4.8)
Lastly, Boolean functions need to have high values of algebraic immunity in order
to resist against algebraic attacks [CM03]. Algebraic immunity is upper bounded by
the number of input variables, more precisely [Cou03]:
AI ≤ dn
2
e. (4.9)
For additional information about the correlation immunity and its importance we
refer readers to [Tar00,CS02]. Therefore, in the third objective we aim to find Boolean
functions that are suitable for combiner generators. Here, the goal is maximization of
the following fitness function:
fitness3 = BAL+ t+ δt,2(Nf +AI + d). (4.10)
Our previous results show that if both correlation immunity and algebraic degree
properties are present in the fitness function, algebraic degree value dominates over
correlation immunity [PJG13]. Here we use a two stage fitness in which a fitness
bonus equal to the sum of nonlinearity, algebraic immunity AI and algebraic degree
d is awarded only to a genotype that is 2-resilient (i.e when BAL = 0 and t = 2);
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otherwise, the fitness is only the sum of balancedness penalty and the correlation
immunity (Eq. (4.10)). The delta function δt,2 takes the value one when t = 2 and is
zero otherwise.
Based on the previous equations, in the third objective we look for the balanced
Boolean functions that have the nonlinearity 112, correlation immunity 2, algebraic
degree 5 and algebraic immunity 4.
We conclude this section with the quote from [Car10a]: “But designing construc-
tions leading to large numbers of functions achieving good trade-offs between the
nonlinearity, the algebraic degree and the resiliency order (if possible, on any num-
bers of variables) are still necessary for permitting to choose in applications crypto-
graphic functions satisfying specific constraints.”
4.4 Experimental Setup
Since we have already presented the search algorithms in Chapter 2.2.4, here we
give details about experimental setup for each of the algorithms as well as the com-
mon parameters for all algorithms. For each of the algorithms we conduct a two
parameter sweep in order to investigate the best combination of parameters. Since
there are more than two parameters for every algorithm, we try to look only on the
most obvious choices for the tuning. From that reason, wherever possible, we use
k-tournament selection to avoid the need for crossover probability choice. In order
to have a baseline against which all algorithms efficiency can be tested we also ex-
periment with the random search and hill climbing algorithm.
4.4.1 Random Search
In random search, solutions are generated by creating uniformly at random solutions
in a form of a TT. We generate 500 000 random solutions (Boolean functions) and test
their cryptographic properties.
4.4.2 Hill Climbing
We provide the implementation of hill climbing algorithm for the first objective in
Algorithm 5 and for the second and third objective in Algorithm 6. Here we present
one iteration step for a single individual. Both version of algorithms repeat for every
individual until there is no more improvement. HC for bent functions works by
flipping the bit value in position i in TT representation. In the case the function
with flipped bit value has better fitness than the original one, algorithm repeats the
procedure for bit value at position i + 1. Otherwise, the change is reverted and the
algorithm moves to the next position. In the algorithm, the notation biti represents
the bit value at position i in the current individual.
In HC version for balanced Boolean functions, the algorithm is somewhat more
complicated since we need to preserve the balancedness property. In this version,
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Algorithm 5 Hill-climbing algorithm for bent functions.
individual_new = create copy of individual
for each bit i of individual do
if biti of individual = 0 then
change value of individual_new at position i to 1
else
change value of individual_new at position i to 0
end if
evaluate individual_new
if individual_new is better than individual then
copy individual_new to individual
continue with next bit i
else
restore bit in individual_new to state before change
end if
end for
Algorithm 6 Hill-climbing algorithm for balanced functions.
individual_new = create copy of individual
for each bit i of individual do
if bit1 of individual = 0 then
change value of individual_new at position bit1 to 1
changed = 1
else
change value of individual_new at position bit1 to 0
changed = 0
end if
randomly select position2 in individual
for each bit j of individual do
pos2 = (position2 + j) % sizeindividual
if bitpos2! = biti and bitpos2 = changed then
if bitpos2 of individual_new = 0 then
change value of individual_new at position pos2 to 1
else
change value of individual_new at position pos2 to 0
end if
evaluate individual_new
if individual_new is better than individual then
copy individual_new to individual
continue with next bit i
else
restore bits at position pos2 in individual_new to state before change
end if
end if
end for
end for
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in each trial two different bits are changed before evaluating the new fitness. The
algorithm starts with a randomly selected first bit at the position i of the encoding
and flips its value. After that, it randomly selects the second position j until it finds
a position with the same value as of the flipped bit and changes the value at position
j. This procedure preserves balancedness. In the case that the fitness of such new
individual is better than the fitness of the original individual, the change is kept and
the algorithm continues on new first bit position i + 1. If the fitness value is worse
than before, the changes are reverted and the algorithm moves to the new second
position j until all the positions are exhausted. If no improvement is found for any
possible second bit position j, the individual is reverted and search is continued with
the next position for the first bit.
When running HC algorithm we observe that on average each individual needs
50 000 evaluations in order to converge. Therefore, to reach approximately 500 000
evaluations (to make a fair comparison with EAs since they use 500 000 as the stop-
ping criterion) we use a population of ten individuals. As in the case of EAs experi-
ments, we run 50 independent experiments.
4.4.3 Genetic Programming
We use tree-based GP in which a Boolean function is represented by a tree of nodes
[Koz92]. The function set for GP in all the experiments is OR, XOR, AND, XNOR
and AND with one input inverted. Terminals correspond to n Boolean variables.
For the Boolean functions we are interested only in XOR and AND operators, but it
is quite easy to transform it from one notation to other. GP uses tournament selection
with tournament size 3. We conducted a small number of experiments to select the
appropriate operators, and based on that we used a simple tree crossover with 90%
bias for functional nodes and a subtree mutation. We experiment with tree depth
sizes of 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 11 and population sizes of 50, 100, 200, 500, 1 000, 2 000, 5 000
and 10 000.
4.4.4 Cartesian Genetic Programming
Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP) represents computational functions as a di-
rected graph [Mil99, MT00]. The function set nf for the CGP is the same as for the
GP. Setting the number of rows to be one and levels-back parameter to be equal to
the number of columns is regarded as the best and most general choice [Mil11]. This
choice should be used when there is no specialist knowledge about the problem.
However, this still leaves the question what should be the size of the number
of columns parameter open. Furthermore, CGP usually uses small population sizes
and has no crossover operator [Mil11]. Determining the best combination of maxi-
mum number of nodes (gates in this case) and mutation rate is an important step in
hitting the parameter sweet spot for CGP. Indeed, it has been shown that generally
very large genotypes and small mutation rates perform very well [MS06]. For geno-
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type size we experiment with sizes 100, 300, 500, 700, 900, 1 100, 1 300, 1 500, 1 700
and 1 900 and for mutation rates with values of 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.09, 0.11, and
0.13.
The number of input connections nn for each node is two and the number of
program output connections no is one. The population size for CGP equals five in all
our experiments. For CGP individual selection we use a (1 + 4)-ES in which offspring
are favored over parents when they have a fitness better than or equal to the fitness
of the parent. The mutation operator is one-point mutation where the mutation point
is chosen with a fixed probability. The number of genes mutated is defined as fixed
percentage of the total number of genes. Note, the single output gene is not mutated
and is taken from the last node in the genotype. The genes chosen for mutation
might be a node representing an input connection or a function.
4.4.5 Genetic Algorithm
We use a simple GA with tournament selection where its size equals to 3 [ES03]. A
mutation is selected uniformly at random between a simple mutation, where a sin-
gle bit is inverted, and a mixed mutation, which randomly shuffles the bits in a ran-
domly selected subset. The crossover operators are one-point and uniform crossover,
performed at random for each new offspring. For each of the fitness functions we
experiment with population sizes of 50, 100, 200, 500, 1 000, 2 000, 5 000 and 10 000
and mutation probabilities of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9.
4.4.6 Evolution Strategy
When experimenting with ES we use (µ+λ)-ES. In this algorithm, in each generation,
parents compete with offspring and from their joint set mu fittest individuals are
kept. In our experiments offspring population size λ has values of 5, 10, 15, 20, 50
and 100. Parent population size µ has values of 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 and 500.
4.4.7 Representations
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, there are several ways how to represent uniquely
a Boolean function. GA and ES represent the individuals as strings of bits where
values are TT of Boolean functions. GP uses a representation where individuals
are trees of Boolean primitives which are then evaluated according to the TT they
produce. For CGP solutions are directed graphs that are also evaluated in accordance
to the TT they produce.
4.4.8 Common Parameters
The following parameters of the experiments are common for every objective. The
size of Boolean function is eight (the size of the truth table is 256) and the number of
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Table 4.1: Common parameters for EAs for the Boolean functions evolution.
Parameter Parameter value
Boolean function size n 8
Tournament size k 3
Number of experiments 30
Stopping criterion 500 000 evaluations
independent trials M for each experiment is 50. Stopping criterion for all algorithms
is 500 000 evaluations. We also present common parameters in Table 4.1.
4.5 Results
In all experiments, we follow the same guidelines when presenting results. We give
statistics related with the average fitness value for each of the algorithms and ob-
jectives. That average value is calculated as the mean value of the best obtained
values over all independent experimental runs. However, that is not enough due to
a fact that an algorithm can reach a high average fitness value, but still not be able
to find optimal value. Therefore, we give statistics related to the number of times
that the algorithm obtains the best possible value (global optimum). In the cases
where an algorithm could not find any global optimum, we skip such statistics. For
all algorithms, we run a parameter sweep of two parameters we consider to play a
crucial role in their efficiency. Naturally, some other choice of parameter (or param-
eter sizes) could drastically change the results. However, since adding the potential
third parameter of interest would significantly increase the number of combinations,
we choose a fixed setting for the other parameters. Some future work could investi-
gate the influence of other parameters in the algorithm behavior. In Appendix B, we
display examples of evolved Boolean functions for all representations and objectives.
4.5.1 The First Objective
Recall that we set for each objective a fitness function where we a priori know what
the global optimum value is. For the first objective as presented in Eq. (4.3), it is
easy to check that the maximal value is 120 for a function with eight inputs (see
Eq. (4.1)). Furthermore, as already said, the space of bent Boolean functions is still
very large although much smaller than the space of Boolean functions of a certain
input size. Therefore, we could expect this problem to be of moderate difficulty for
EAs. With random search algorithm, the average nonlinearity value equals 103.85
with no solutions that have maximal nonlinearity value. With the hill climbing the
average fitness value equals 112.06 and no optimal solutions are found.
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Cartesian Genetic Programming
We present a heatmap representation of the average fitness values for CGP for all
mutation rates and genotype sizes in Figure 4.1. As evident, a large number of pa-
rameter combinations produce results with high average fitness value. The highest
result (119.4) is achieved for a genotype size of 1 500 and mutation rate of 13%. This
translates to 44 out of 50 runs that finished with nonlinearity of 120. In Figures 4.2a
until 4.2d, we show the influence of genotype size and mutation probability on the
effectiveness of CGP.
Figure 4.1: Heatmap of the average values for CGP, fitness function 1.
(a) Fitness value vs genotype size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs genotype size
(c) Fitness value vs mutation probability (d) Number of optimal solutions vs mutation prob-
ability
Figure 4.2: Mutation probability and genotype size dependency for CGP, function 1.
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From the figures above it can be observed that the genotype size of 1 500 and
mutation probability of 7% give the best results on average. In Figure 4.3, we dis-
play the average number of active nodes for all mutation rates and genotype sizes.
Our results show that the average size goes from 14 nodes to 90 nodes. Parameter
combination that achieved the best results has on average 80 active nodes.
Figure 4.3: Average number of active nodes for all mutation rates, fitness function 1.
Genetic Programming
We present a heatmap representation of the average fitness values for GP in Fig-
ure 4.4. Here we observe somewhat surprising result; smaller tree depths perform
much better than the larger ones. This behavior is especially obvious for tree depths
of 3 and 5 where the average fitness value equals 120. This means that the GP in all 50
independent runs found global optimum. Therefore, the first objective seems to be
very easy problem for GP with small tree depths. However, a more detailed analysis
of the solutions reveals that the situation is less straightforward. With a tree depth of
3, all solutions are extremely short (average tree size is 17.8) and it can be observed
that many of the solutions are repeated. Furthermore, a number of solutions when
translated in a TT form exhibits long runs of same digits (we informally call those
solutions “trivial”). In Appendix B, we display two examples of bent functions, both
in tree representation and TT form. The first example has a tree size of only 17, while
the second one has the tree size of 63.
In Figures 4.5a until 4.5d, we display the influence of the population size and
tree depth on the algorithm effectiveness. From the results, it is apparent that the
population size does not have a large influence while the tree depth influences the
algorithm results dramatically. Even when disregarding the smallest tree depths we
see that for this problem smaller tree depths behave favorably. As an example, we
note that when having tree depth of 11, most of the solutions reach tree size of several
thousand while having relatively low nonlinearity value.
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Figure 4.4: Heatmap of the average values for GP, fitness function 1.
Genetic Algorithm
After the previous two algorithms that perform extremely well on the first objective,
we come to the first algorithm for which this problem can be regarded difficult -
GA. In Figure 4.6 we see that GA reaches average fitness values between 112 and
115. The best average score has the algorithm variation with 0.9 mutation rate and
population size of only 50 where the average value amounts to 114.24. This can
be explained by the fact that the algorithm simply needs more evaluations to reach
good values. Furthermore, since the population size is directly proportional to the
number of evaluations the algorithm does not have enough time to converge.
In Figures 4.7a and 4.7b, we observe the algorithm behavior for different muta-
tion probabilities and population sizes, respectively. We see that the best results on
average are for high mutation probabilities. When examining the influence of the
population size on the algorithm effectiveness, we observe that larger population
sizes have less diversity, which indicates that most of the solutions get stuck in lo-
cal optima. Furthermore, the biggest population sizes perform the worst due to the
lack of time (evaluations) to converge. We emphasize that not any combination of
parameters resulted in reaching the optimal value and therefore we do not present
graphs showing number of optimal solutions found.
Evolution Strategy
As evident from the Figure 4.8, the effectiveness of ES is similar to that of GA. The
best average fitness value of 114 is reached for the two biggest parent population
sizes - 200 and 500 individuals, regardless of the offspring population size. Fig-
ures 4.9a and 4.9b display the influence of offspring and parent population sizes to
the obtained average fitness value. We see from the figures that the offspring popu-
lation size does not have importance while the parent population size influences the
algorithm effectiveness drastically. As with the GA, there are no parameter combina-
tions that result in reaching a global optimum. There could be some doubt whether
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(a) Fitness value vs population size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs population size
(c) Fitness value vs tree depth (d) Number of optimal solutions vs tree depth
Figure 4.5: Population size and tree depth dependency for GP, fitness function 1.
the parameters are chosen smartly (i.e. could we chose better parameter ranges).
However, since this is the first time, as far as the authors know, that the ES is used in
order to evolve bent Boolean functions, these results should be regarded as the basic
guideline for some future work.
Discussion
How hard is to evolve bent Boolean functions? This naturally depends on the size of
Boolean function and the algorithm we use. We see that CGP and GP perform well.
If we consider all parameter options, we can state that GP is better than the CGP.
However, if disregarding smaller tree depths for GP since they result in “trivial” so-
lutions, then CGP performs better on average. GA and ES perform much worse on
average, even not being able to find any optimal solution. One can observe in Fig-
ure 4.7a that the performance of GA improves with the increase of the mutation rate.
Therefore, one can conclude that GA performs poorly since the choice of parameters
is not optimal. We leave for a future work the investigation of the performance of
GAs with higher mutation rates. The results for GP and GA are in accordance with
the results from [PMBJ14]. In this paper, we also experiment with a smaller size of
bent Boolean function (six inputs) where we see that finding a global optimum is
much easier for smaller function sizes. Furthermore, GAn proves to be extremely
successful for finding bent Boolean functions with six inputs. Naturally, again the
question that can be asked concerns the quality (structure) of those solutions.
As a future work, it would be interesting to concentrate on the structure of bent
Boolean functions. In accordance to that, experiments checking whether some of
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Figure 4.6: Heatmap of the average values for GA, fitness function 1.
(a) Fitness value vs mutation probability (b) Fitness value vs population size
Figure 4.7: Population size and mutation probability dependency for GA, fitness
function 1.
those functions are nonnormal or weakly normal would be of high interest. This
would help to determine which EAs find “more random” bent functions. Since until
now no one is able to find nonnormal bent functions of n < 10 [Car15, CDDL06]
and weakly normal bent functions of n < 10 [LM09], this could also potentially
lead to new, undiscovered bent functions. Additionally, there are three classes of
bent functions that can be constructed by a primary construction method, namely
the Maiorana-McFarland classM, the Partial Spread class (PS) and the class N in-
troduced by Dobbertin [Dob95, CDDL06]. It has been proven that most of the bent
functions in those three classes are normal. It could be interesting to check if EA find
more often a particular class.
4.5.2 The Second Objective
In the second objective, we look for balanced Boolean functions with eight inputs
that have 118 nonlinearity. Unfortunately, we are not able to find any function with
such nonlinearity value. Thus, finding such a function is still an open question. We
note that although theory supports the existence of those functions [SM00b], there
also exists an opinion in the cryptographic community that there are no balanced
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Figure 4.8: Heatmap of the average values for ES, fitness function 1.
(a) Fitness value vs offspring population size (b) Fitness value vs parent population size
Figure 4.9: Offspring and parent population sizes dependency for ES, fitness function
1.
functions with 8 inputs and 118 nonlinearity. If that is true, then the upper bound
given in Eq. (4.4) is not strict. In accordance to the fact that we could not find Boolean
functions with 118 nonlinearity, we concentrate on the next best attainable nonlin-
earity - 116. Therefore, in the presented statistics we show the effectiveness of the al-
gorithms when generating balanced Boolean functions with 116 nonlinearity. After
experiments with random search, we observe that the average fitness equals 104.51
with no solutions that have 116 nonlinearity values. With the hill climbing the aver-
age fitness value equals 111.36 and no balanced solutions with the nonlinearity 116
are found.
Cartesian Genetic Programming
In the second objective CGP outperforms all the other algorithms by far. The best
average value is reached for a parameter combination of 1 500 genotype size and
mutation probability of 13% and it amounts to 116.16. Recall that the fitness func-
tion is the sum of balancedness and nonlinearity so the average value is larger than
the targeted nonlinearity value. We present averaged results in Figure 4.10. In Fig-
ures 4.11a until 4.11d, we display the effectiveness of CGP relative to the genotype
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Figure 4.10: Heatmap of the average values for CGP, fitness function 2.
size and mutation probability, respectively. We observe that CGP performs similarly
for all genotype sizes except the smallest one (100). The best genotype size for this
problem seems to be 1 500. Again, when considering mutation probability we see
that the algorithm variations perform similarly (with the exception of smallest mu-
tation probability of 1%). The best mutation probabilities are on average 5% and
13%. Figure 4.12 displays the average number of active nodes for all mutation rates
and genotype sizes. Similar to the first fitness function, we observe a linear increase
in the average number of nodes with the increase in the genotype size. The best
parameter combination has on average 79 active nodes.
Genetic Programming
GP performs significantly worse than the CGP and it obtains the best average fitness
value of 114.12 for a population size of 10 000 and tree depth of seven. In Figure 4.13,
we give average fitness values for GP. This result is also in accordance to the results
presented in [PMBJ14].
We display results for the algorithm performance with respect to different tree
depths and population sizes in Figures 4.14a until 4.14d. For this problem, we can
observe that the larger population sizes behave favorably when compared to the
smaller ones. It can be observed a sublinear increase in the algorithm efficiency with
the increase of population size. When considering tree depths, we see that a value of
seven seems to be the optimal choice out of those tested.
Genetic Algorithm
When considering average fitness value for GA, we observe in Figure 4.15 that the
best average fitness value is 115.08 for a population size of 100 and mutation prob-
ability of 0.9. Furthermore, a combination of population size 50 and mutation prob-
ability 0.9 gives only a slight worse result with an average fitness value of 115. We
note that both of those values are better than the best average values for GP.
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(a) Fitness value vs genotype size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs genotype size
(c) Fitness value vs mutation probability (d) Number of optimal solutions vs mutation prob-
ability
Figure 4.11: Mutation probability and genotype size dependency for CGP, fitness
function 2.
Figures 4.16a and 4.16b display fitness value for different mutation probabili-
ties and population sizes. The two best performing variations also succeed in find-
ing several balanced solutions with nonlinearity 116. Namely, the variation with
the population size 50 found one solution with 116 nonlinearity and the combina-
tion with population 100 found four solutions. Nevertheless, we opted not to show
graphs with the relationship of number of optimal solutions to the algorithm perfor-
mance since there are only a few such solutions. From the figures below, we see that
for this problem the GA favors small population sizes and large mutation probabili-
ties.
Evolution Strategy
Similarly to the first fitness function, ES performs the best for larger parent popula-
tion sizes where offspring population size has a small influence. In Figure 4.17, we
see that the best average fitness value is obtained for the parent size of 500 and off-
spring size of 50 and that value equals 113.28. As is the case with the first objective,
ES is the worst out of the four examined EAs.
Next, we give the algorithm effectiveness for various offspring and parent sizes in
Figures 4.18a and 4.18b, respectively. The graphs show virtually no effect of offspring
sizes and leveled effect of parent sizes except for two smallest parent sizes which
perform significantly worse. From the results, we can also observe that there is little
(or none) diversity in final solutions of independent runs that indicates that ES is
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Figure 4.12: Average number of active nodes for all mutation rates, fitness function 2.
Figure 4.13: Heatmap of the average values for GP, fitness function 2.
stuck in some local optimum value.
Discussion
Finding highly nonlinear balance Boolean functions with eight inputs is at the same
time easy and difficult. It all depends what one considers high nonlinearity. In
the case that 112 or 114 represent sufficiently high nonlinearity value, it seems that
all of the evaluated algorithms could be used (granted, with more or less success).
However, if we want to reach nonlinearity of 116 the situation starts to change. Im-
mediately ES and even GA do not pose a viable choice. GP and especially CGP
shine in this scenario. However, finding nonlinearity value of 118 seems to be im-
possible with algorithms like these (that is, in the case that such a function exists),
especially without any improvements like adding hill climbing or seeding the ini-
tial population. As evident from [PMBJ14], seeding population with good solutions
and running hill climbing (two-stage search) improves drastically the behavior of
GP. It would be interesting to check what happens with CGP when coupled with
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(a) Fitness value vs population size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs population size
(c) Fitness value vs tree depth (d) Number of optimal solutions vs tree depth
Figure 4.14: Population size and tree depth dependency for GP, fitness function 2.
those improvements. When considering CGP we also see that the fitness function as
given in Eq. (4.6) outperforms two-stage fitness function that is often used in CGP.
This is a surprising result since that is often used in CGP, ever since it was first
described [Mil11, KM99]. This implies that more work should be done on a vari-
ety of problems to establish the relative merits of the two approaches. In addition,
in [MS06] it was suggested that optimal mutation rates should decrease as geno-
type length increases. However, the results here confirm the findings from [PJM+15]
that for the cryptographic problem we study this is not the case. Indeed, fairly high
mutation rates produce the best results. This is also surprising and merits further
investigation.
Figure 4.15: Heatmap of the average values for GA, fitness function 2.
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(a) Fitness value vs mutation probability (b) Fitness value vs population size
Figure 4.16: Population size and mutation probability dependency for GA, fitness
function 2.
Figure 4.17: Heatmap of the average values for ES, fitness function 2.
(a) Fitness value vs offspring size (b) Fitness value vs parent size
Figure 4.18: Offspring and parent population sizes dependency for ES, fitness func-
tion 2.
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Looking on a more general level, algorithms with tree and graph representations
outperform algorithms with TT representation significantly. It would be beneficial to
study why TT representation performs worse. One possible explanation is that there
exist value and variable symmetries [SML13, PMSG15]. One interesting research
avenue is to check the fitness landscapes of Boolean functions with different non-
linearities [PJ14]. Aside that, we consider interesting to experiment with Rotation
Symmetric Boolean Functions (RSBFs). It is known that RSBFs possess very good
cryptographic properties [SM08, KMY07] although exhaustive search in that class of
Boolean functions revealed no Boolean function with 118 nonlinearity value [Mai14].
4.5.3 The Third Objective
This is the shortest section due to a fact that ES and GA are not able to find any
balanced function with the correlation immunity equal to two. In fact, only sporadi-
cally those two algorithms are able even to find a balanced Boolean function with the
correlation immunity that equals one. Both random search and hill climbing (simi-
larly to GA and ES) are not able to find any solutions that have correlation immunity
equal to two. Naturally, conclusions from the two previous sentences apply with a
fitness function we chose to use. Therefore, in this section we give results only for
CGP and GP.
Cartesian Genetic Programming
Figure 4.19 gives the heatmap representation where the best average fitness value
equals to 119.26. This is obtained for the genotype size of 1 700 and mutation prob-
ability of 11%. We note that very similar average value of 119.24 is achieved for
genotype size of 1 500 and mutation probability of 7%. Unlike the first two objec-
tives, we can also observe there are a number of results where CGP is not able even
to reach some high (e.g. more than 100) nonlinearity value. This points us to a fact
that CGP often needs many evaluations just to find a solution that has correlation
immunity equal to two and therefore it does not have enough time to converge to
higher nonlinearity values.
When addressing the algorithm performance with respect to the genotype size
or mutation probability we display the corresponding graphs in Figures 4.20a un-
til 4.20d. We observe that the best genotype size is 1 500 and by far the worst one is
100. Furthermore, we see that the mutation probability does not affect significantly
average fitness value while the probability of 5% gives the highest number of best
obtained values. These results suggest that the algorithm performs well, but just
does not have enough time to converge (another possibility is that it is stuck in some
local optima). We show the average number of active nodes for fitness function 3 in
Figure 4.21. The best parameter combination has the average length of 81.5 active
nodes.
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Figure 4.19: Heatmap of the average values for CGP, fitness function 3.
(a) Fitness value vs genotype size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs genotype size
(c) Fitness value vs mutation probability (d) Number of optimal solutions vs mutation prob-
ability
Figure 4.20: Mutation probability and genotype size dependency for CGP, fitness
function 3.
Genetic Programming
Finally, we present results for the GP and fitness function 3. In Figure 4.22, we see
that the highest average fitness value is 121.3 which is achieved for the population
of 10 000 and a tree depth 7. Figures 4.23a until 4.23d give average fitness value and
the number of optimal solutions for each genotype size and tree depth. From the re-
sults we see that population sizes of 5 000 and 10 000 reach very high average fitness
values while populations 2 000 and 5 000 give higher number of optimal solutions.
Medium sized tree depths (approximately seven to nine) perform the best.
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Figure 4.21: Average number of active nodes for all mutation rates, fitness function 3.
Figure 4.22: Heatmap of the average values for GP, fitness function 3.
Discussion
After comparing all the results, it appears that the fitness function three is the most
difficult one to solve. This is especially apparent with CGP where we observe that
with some genotype lengths CGP has difficulties to evolve optimal solutions in “only”
500 000 evaluations. A fitness function as given in Eq. (4.10) could have been written
differently. Since we know that we want to obtain the nonlinearity value of 112, we
could have set that condition in the delta function we use. However, that option
seems to bring some undesired consequences.
All our experiments show that it is much easier to evolve Boolean function with
high algebraic degree (recall Eq. (4.7) where the algebraic degree and the correlation
immunity are conflicting properties). Indeed, if left without specifying the correla-
tion immunity value, experiments show that all algorithms evolve solutions with the
algebraic degree equal to seven and the correlation immunity equal to zero [PJG13].
In some cases, GP and CGP find functions with the algebraic degree value that equals
six and the correlation immunity equal to one. Therefore, in the case when in the
delta function is the nonlinearity condition, we believe that an additional constraint
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(a) Fitness value vs population size (b) Number of optimal solutions vs population size
(c) Fitness value vs tree depth (d) Number of optimal solutions vs tree depth
Figure 4.23: Population size and tree depth dependency for GP, fitness function 3.
should be put on the algebraic degree property in order not to allow it to step over a
certain threshold value.
As a future work it would be interesting to evolve Boolean functions for each cor-
relation immunity value that still ensures large enough algebraic degree value (for
a Boolean function of eight inputs that would constitute the correlation immunity
values from zero to four [GGK05]). Naturally, there have been previous works on
the evolution of Boolean functions with a certain correlation immunity values (i.e.
resilient Boolean functions) as enumerated in Section 4.2. Still, we believe there is a
certain lack of methodicalness in those works since the correlation immunity is of-
ten either not of primary interest or the researchers are interested in the correlation
immunity with values up to two (for Boolean functions with eight inputs).
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present how to use EAs to evolve cryptographically suitable
Boolean functions. We concentrate on three fitness functions and we compare four
EAs and two more heuristic methods.
In all the cases, GP and CGP perform the best, which indicate that the TT repre-
sentation is not the most appropriate one when evolving cryptographically suitable
Boolean functions. Naturally, that observation is valid for fitness functions we used
in the experiments. We give a short discussion for each of fitness functions where
we also note some possible research avenues. Since here we consider only functions
of eight inputs one research avenue would be to work with larger sizes (this applies
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for all fitness functions we investigate in this thesis).
Another option is to experiment with other unique representations of Boolean
functions (e.g. Walsh-Hadamard transform or algebraic normal form). As evident
from the Section 4.2, this is one extremely well researched area when considering
the total number of applications of EC to cryptology-related problems. However, we
still believe there is much room for improvement, especially in the systemization of
the current knowledge.
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Chapter 5
S-boxes: Phantom Menace
“Linearity is the curse of cryptographer.”
James Massey
I
n this chapter we evolve S-boxes that have better DPA resistivity. We concentrate
on three different properties related with SCA resilience and we present results for
the side-channel experiments.
5.1 Introduction
The security of block ciphers is a very important topic in modern cryptography.
Rather than the more traditional linear [MY93] and differential cryptanalysis [BS91],
the most practical attacks today belong to the Side-channel Analysis (SCA), targeting
actual implementations of block ciphers in both software and hardware. Recall that
in order to improve the algorithmic resiliency to the SCA, there exist many possible
countermeasures such as various hiding and masking schemes [MOP07]. However,
all countermeasures come with a substantial increase in cost due to larger mem-
ory and area requirements and the decrease in performance of the algorithm imple-
mented. Therefore, the question is whether it is possible to increase the side-channel
resistivity without a substantial increase in memory and area requirements. Since
one usual place to mount a side-channel attack in a block cipher is after the non-
linear component, it is reasonable to investigate how to improve the intrinsic SCA
resistance of such elements. As presented in Chapter 2.1.2, one way to distinguish
between block ciphers is on the basis of the source of nonlinearity. One usual source
of nonlinearity in many modern block ciphers is S-boxes (Substitution boxes). There-
fore, S-boxes have an important role in the security of modern block ciphers and it
is desired that they have cryptographic cryptographic properties as good as possi-
ble [LP07]. Naturally, it is possible to make a very good cipher even if the S-box is
mediocre, but then the linear diffusion layer must be very powerful. However, we
This chapter is based on the following papers: “On Using Genetic Algorithms for Intrinsic Side-
Channel Resistance: The Case of AES S-Box”, published in CS2 14. “Optimality and Beyond: The Case
of 4 × 4 S-boxes”, published in HOST 2014. “Confused by Confusion: Systematic Evaluation of DPA
Resistance of Various S-boxes”, published in Indocrypt 2014. “Improving DPA Resistance of S-boxes:
How far can we go?”, accepted in ISCAS 2014. “Cartesian Genetic Programming Approach for Generating
Substitution Boxes of Different Sizes”, accepted in GECCO 2015.
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do not consider such a case since we believe that the prevailing line of thought is to
make the nonlinear layer as strong as possible.
Similarly to the Boolean functions, there exist three approaches when generat-
ing S-boxes, namely, algebraic constructions, random search and heuristic meth-
ods. Naturally, it is possible to create S-boxes with a combination of the afore-
mentioned techniques. For the S-boxes, algebraic constructions (primarily we mean
finite field inversion method [Nyb91]) give unsurpassed results when considering
classical properties. The notion of classical properties is an unofficial one and it
serves us only to distinguish between those properties considered before the ad-
vent of SCA. However, when considering algebraic constructions capable of cre-
ating S-boxes that are more resilient to side-channel attacks the situation is not so
promising. Of course, some methods like the one based on the Rotation Symmetric
S-box (RSSB) [MMS13b, EK14] or on the affine transformation [PEP+14] have ele-
ments of algebraic constructions, but also employ some randomness in the proce-
dure. Random search should not be considered as a viable choice when generating
S-boxes since such S-boxes in general do not have good properties. When consider-
ing particular properties, S-boxes created in this way usually have good nonlinearity
values, but poor δ-uniformity values [Dib14]. However, Daemen and Rijmen show
that randomly created invertible 8 × 8 S-boxes are satisfactory with regards to lin-
ear and differential cryptanalysis [DR07]. Following the line of work presented for
Boolean functions in Chapter 4, it is to be expected that EAs can serve as a viable op-
tion when evolving S-boxes (considering the fact that the S-box is a vectorial Boolean
function).
The Problem. Here we are interested in evolving S-boxes that have better DPA
resistance. Although there exists a plethora of cryptographic properties defined for
S-boxes in the literature, there are only a handful properties related to their SCA re-
sistance. Here we mention all the properties related with the S-box resilience against
SCA for the sake of completeness although we do not experimentally investigate
all those properties. As far as we know, the list of the properties related with SCA
contains the following ones:
• SNR (DPA) [GP04].
• Transparency order [Pro05].
• Modified transparency order [CSM+15].
• A criterion to quantify the weakness of the S-box resilience against CPA at-
tacks [GHPS07].
• Confusion coefficient [FLD12, FDLZ14].
• The second minimum distance in the spectrum [SMC14].
From the previous list, we investigate the influence of transparency order (both
original and modified) and confusion coefficient. Those properties alongside the
96
SNR (DPA) property are also implemented in GET. However, all of those properties
have one thing in common: little or no experimental confirmation of their validity.
For instance, considering the transparency order, which was heavily investigated
so far, results from different groups are somewhat conflicting [MMS13b, MMS13a,
PEB+14, PEP+14]. Yet in all previous works, there is an agreement that the trans-
parency order influences DPA resistance. For example, in the 4 × 4 S-boxes case (as
used in e.g. PRESENT [BKL+07]), it is shown that one can obtain S-boxes that have
better DPA resistance than in those used in PRESENT or PRINCE ciphers, while re-
taining properties of optimal S-boxes [PEP+14]. SNR (DPA) will not be used in the
optimization functions, but it will be evaluated a posteriori for each evolved S-box.
Other properties from the above list are not considered in this chapter.
We concentrate on the two most common sizes of S-boxes, namely, 4×4 and 8×8
sizes. These two sizes are also used in the PRESENT and AES ciphers and therefore
we conduct side-channel analysis for those algorithms. When considering the num-
ber of (n,m)-functions there are in total (2m)2
n
functions which amounts to 264 for
the 4×4 case and 22048 for the 8×8 case (cf. with the number of Boolean functions in
Chapter 4). We emphasize that this chapter gives a perfect example why EAs should
be considered as a serious choice for the cryptographic applications. Both measures,
transparency order and confusion coefficient should provide better DPA resistance,
but how to construct such S-boxes? Naturally, an algebraic construction method
should be an obvious first choice, but that is not trivial to devise. Furthermore, at
the beginning of the research process there is also no evidence that some property
is useful. Consider a situation where a designer spends several months on devising
a new construction method only to discover that the property he is interested in is
useless in the practical setting.
With EAs it is easy to obtain an S-box with good properties, and then, if there is a
need to change the set of properties we are interested in, this implies only a change in
the fitness function. One good example is the transparency order, a property defined
one decade ago that did not receive any experimental verification till the last few
years. Then the researchers developed two methods to generate S-boxes with good
transparency order. One method is based on rotational symmetric S-boxes and the
other one on a constrained random search [MMS13b, MMS12]. However, both those
methods give worse results than the simple GA as shown for instance in [PEB+14]. In
2014, Chakraborty et al. found some mistakes in the first definition of transparency
order and they redefined the property into the modified transparency order prop-
erty [CSM+15]. Consequently, previously mentioned construction methods may not
be any longer applicable to this new property. For GA the modified transparency or-
der property means only a modification of the fitness function. A similar situation is
with the confusion coefficient property. Only recently there appeared experimental
results on this measure [PPE+14] and prior to that, no one confirmed this property
is indeed useful in the practical setting. Although we did not try, we believe that
devising an algebraic construction method that can produce good values of confu-
sion coefficient variance would be challenging and certainly more difficult than just
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programming the evaluation function. That function we need in any case in order to
be able to check the property value, which is the only condition necessary for a pa-
rameter to be added to the fitness function. Therefore, in a way, this chapter shows
better than any other chapter in the thesis the true strength and adaptability of EAs.
However, in this chapter we will also show one realistic difficulty researchers can
encounter when using EC. This difficulty lies in the complexity of a fitness function
and as we show, it can render EAs difficult to use in practical scenarios.
We emphasize that the central point of this chapter is the method for generating
S-boxes that have good values of properties of interest. Experimentally confirming
that those properties are indeed useful is naturally a perfect scenario, but for us it re-
mains of secondary importance. We consider even negative results to be important
since they can show that some property is not practically useful, which is beneficial
both from the theoretical and practical aspect.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we give a short
overview of related research and we present several applications of Monte Carlo
algorithms when generating S-boxes of different sizes. In Section 5.3, we give rele-
vant information about optimal S-boxes and S-box classical properties (i.e. proper-
ties related with differential and linear cryptanalysis) that we consider. Section 5.4
elaborates on cryptographic properties that are connected with the DPA-resilience
of S-boxes. Next, in Section 5.5, we present the evolutionary experiments we con-
duct and in Section 5.6, we give the ongoing side-channel experiments. Finally, in
Section 5.7 we offer a short summary of the research as well as some possible future
research directions.
5.2 Related Work
We divide related work roughly into two groups: the first one dealing with the S-
boxes and their side-channel resistance and the second one concerning on the appli-
cation of Monte Carlo algorithm in the design of S-boxes. In 2004, Guilley presented
SNR (DPA) measure that is, to our best knowledge, the first property related with
the DPA resistance of S-boxes [GP04].
Shortly after, Prouff introduced the transparency order property, which is the
first DPA-related property for the multi-bit case [Pro05]. As previously mentioned
there exists some dilemma when considering the usefulness of transparency order in
practical settings, the idea is valuable, as in the last few years several papers revisit
the topic [MMS13b, MMS13a, PEB+14, PEP+14, EK14, NTN14].
Guilley in 2007 presents a property related with S-box resistance against side-
channel attacks [GHPS07]. This criterion attempts to quantify the weakness of the
S-box resilience against CPA attacks.
Almost 10 years after the original property, Chakraborty et al. redefine trans-
parency order property in an effort to defeat certain errors in the first version of the
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property [CSM+15].
Apart from the transparency-related efforts, a new line of research by Fei et
al. [LF11, FLD12, FDLZ14, DZFL14] attempts to actually model the behavior of a
cryptographic implementation with respect to side-channel resistance. Starting from
the DPA-related models [LF11, FLD12] they expand the concept to the CPA attacks
[FDLZ14] and masking [DZFL14], while offering a probabilistic model for side-channel
analysis.
The latest property known to authors is the measure known as the second mini-
mum distance in the spectrum [SMC14]. In their paper they present a property that
characterizes more resilient S-boxes against DPA attacks in the HW model.
There are several successful applications of Monte Carlo algorithms when creat-
ing S-boxes and we mention here only a few. Clark et al. use the principles from
the evolutionary design of Boolean functions to evolve S-boxes with desired cryp-
tographic properties [CJS05]. They use SA coupled with hill climbing algorithm to
evolve bijective S-boxes with high nonlinearity. In order to do that, they generalize
the approach from the evolution of Boolean functions to evolve S-boxes of size up to
8× 8.
Millan et al. work with GA to evolve S-boxes with high nonlinearity and low
autocorrelation. Furthermore, authors discuss the selection of the appropriate GA
parameters [MBC+99].
On the other hand, Burnett et al. use heuristic method to generate MARS-like
S-boxes [BCDM01]. With their approach they are able to generate fast a number
of S-boxes of appropriate size that satisfy all the requirements placed on MARS S-
box [BCD+99]. With a combination of several techniques, they are even able to find
S-boxes with improved nonlinearity.
Fuller et al. use a heuristic method to evolve bijective S-boxes from the power
mappings [FMD04]. They use only iterated mutation operators and report to gener-
ate S-boxes with the best known tradeoffs among the criteria they consider.
Burnett in her thesis experiments with GA, hill climbing or with the combination
of those two methods in order to evolve S-boxes where M 6= N [Bur05].
P. Tesar uses a combination of a special GA with a total tree searching to generate
8× 8 S-boxes with nonlinearity equal up to 104 [Tes10].
Kazymyrov et al. use an improved gradient descent method to find 8× 8 S-boxes
with optimal cryptographic properties [KKO13].
Ivanov et al. experiment with GA that works in a reverse way in order to generate
bijective S-boxes of dimensions from 8×8 to 16×16 [INN14]. They seed the initial S-
boxes population with solutions based on the finite field inversion method and then
evolve them to find new solutions.
However, we emphasize that our work is significantly different from those men-
tioned above since we are the first to consider the evolution of S-boxes that have
better DPA resistance.
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5.3 Optimal S-boxes
Since we are interested in evolving cryptography-suitable S-boxes, it would be ben-
eficial to offer an answer, i.e. which S-boxes are actually suitable in practice. When
considering 4 × 4 S-boxes, there exist in total 16! bijective S-boxes which is approxi-
mately 244 options to search from. Although conducting an exhaustive search would
be possible as shown in [Saa12], it would be very complex depending on the number
of properties we want to investigate and evaluate. Leander and Poschmann define
optimal S-boxes as those that are bijective, have linearity equal to 8 and δ-uniformity
equal to 4. Since the linearity that equals 8 is the same as nonlinearity of 4, we
continue using the nonlinearity property instead of linearity. By using some clever
shortcuts, they found that all optimal S-boxes belong to 16 classes, i.e. all optimal
S-boxes are affine equivalent to one of those classes [LP07]. In general, for 4 × 4
S-boxes, there are 302 affine equivalence classes [UDCI+11].
For the 4× 4 S-box size, we concentrate only on optimal S-boxes as those of prac-
tical interest. Indeed, as far as the authors know, all ciphers that use 4 × 4 S-boxes
use optimal S-boxes [BKL+07, BCG+12, DPAR00, GNL12, ZBL+14].
For 8× 8 size, there exists no such classification, but in general, it is believed that
nonlinearity of 112 is the maximum possible and therefore the best S-boxes should
reach that nonlinearity [Car10b]. There are other conditions except the nonlinearity
property, but highly nonlinear S-boxes usually also have other classical properties
with good values [Car10b, Bra06]. Of course, since nonlinearity and transparency
order are for instance conflicting properties some trade-off is unavoidable [Car05].
Therefore, for the 8 × 8 size we do not answer which S-box is the best, but rather
present several evolved S-boxes with different property values. Accordingly, for the
8× 8 size, we restrict our attention to the same properties as for the 4× 4 size.
We note that in 2015, Zhang et al. present a new classification of 4 × 4 optimal
S-boxes, but we do not consider it here [ZBRL15].
5.4 DPA-relevant Properties
Although we already discussed some of the DPA-relevant properties in Chapter 3
we revisit here several properties due to their importance for this chapter as well
as for some specifics in their implementation. We note that all the properties con-
sidered in this chapter can be calculated with the GET tool. Furthermore, we are
interested in the improvement of DPA resistivity only through those properties, and
not in combinations with other countermeasures like masking [MOP07] or threshold
implementations [NRR06].
Transparency order formula as given in Eq. (3.25) is quite inefficient to calcu-
late for larger S-box sizes [FZF08]. Therefore, it is not a suitable choice in scenarios
where we expect to use it several thousand times as is realistic with e.g. GA. In accor-
dance to that, we use a faster formula as presented in [FZF08]. According to Prouff,
transparency order has an upper bound of m for an (n,m)-function. This bound is
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achieved if every coordinate function fi is a bent function. In the case that the S-box
is an affine function, then the transparency order equals zero. The higher the trans-
parency order value, the lower is the S-box resistance to the DPA attacks [Pro05].
Since bent functions have maximum nonlinearity, we see that high nonlinearity and
low transparency order are conflicting criteria. Carlet also showed that some S-boxes
with very high nonlinearity have very bad transparency orders [Car05]. Therefore,
in our search we look for S-boxes that have as small as possible transparency order
values.
Fei et al. introduced a new property that relates with the DPA resistance of S-
boxes - so-called confusion coefficient [LF11, FLD12, FDLZ14, DZFL14]. They give
a probabilistic model that encompasses the three core parameters of a side-channel
attack: the target device, the number of traces and the algorithm under examination.
That model manages to separate these three elements and grants us the freedom to
explore the cipher design space by solely focusing on the cipher algorithm. The con-
fusion coefficient stems from the probability that an intermediate value ψ is affected
by different keys kc, kg (Eq. (5.1)). This notion is extended to the confusion matrix K
and ΣY (Eq. 5.3, Eq. 5.5), which directly influence the attacker’s effectiveness SRDPA
(Eq. 5.6).
κ(kc, kg) = Pr[(ψ|kc) 6= (ψ|kg)] (5.1)
κ˜(kc, kgi , kgj ) = Pr[(ψ|kgi) = (ψ|kgj ), (ψ|kgi) 6= (ψ|kc)] (5.2)
K : (Nk − 1)× (Nk − 1), Kij =
{
κ(kc, kg), if i = j
κ˜(kc, kgi , kgj ), if i 6= j
(5.3)
µ¯Y = 2× × κ¯ (5.4)
where κ¯ is the diagonal vector of K and  is the the theoretic Difference of Means
(DOM) for the correct key.
ΣY = 16 ∗ σW /Nmeas ×K + 4× 2/Nmeas × (K− κ¯× κ¯T ) (5.5)
SRDPA = ΦNk−1(
√
NmeasΣY
−1/2µ¯Y ) (5.6)
Eq. (5.6) gives the success rate of a DPA attack (SRDPA). It is computed over the
cumulative distribution function (ΦNk ) of a multivariate Gaussian distribution, with
dimension (Nk) equal to key dimensionality (e.g. 256 for AES if the selection func-
tion partitions into 8-bit targets). The number of traces is directly represented in the
formulas via Nmeas (number of measurements). The target device is characterized
from the signal to noise ratio (SNR = /σw) and the parameters  and σw can be
computed from side-channel measurements.
The cipher algorithm is isolated by defining and constructing the confusion coeffi-
cient κ as given in Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2). The confusion matrix K that is subsequently
constructed is given in Eq. (5.3). The matrix elements capture the behavior of both
the cipher and the selection function with respect to a specific key (kc denotes the
correct key and kg the key guesses that stem from the key space).
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The confusion coefficient with respect to a specific S-box was initially defined as the
probability that two different keys will lead to a different S-box output as given in
Eq. (5.1). Intuitively, a high confusion coefficient indicates that the S-box output (or
any other intermediate value ψ targeted by a side-channel attack) is very distinctive.
Thus, the S-box output is a good candidate for data leakage. Low confusion coef-
ficient values (also referred to as high collision values) make side-channel attacks
harder, i.e. they may require an increase in number of traces or SNR (DPA) to yield
the correct key candidate.
Early work from Fei et al. suggests that the confusion coefficient matrix captures
the algorithmic behavior of the cipher [LF11, FLD12]. However, this matrix incor-
porates all possible confusion coefficients with respect to a given key, making the
whole analysis key-dependent. In addition, we consider beneficial to move towards
CPA-related models instead of DPA. Thus, we use more recent findings from Fei et
al., namely the confusion coefficient for CPA, the confusion coefficient vector and its
frequency distribution [FDLZ14]. We compute the confusion coefficients for a given
CPA selection function as shown in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 CPA selection function.
for all key pairs ka, kb, ka 6= kb do
for all possible inputs in do
κ(ka, kb) = E[(HW (Sbox(in⊕ ka))−HW (Sbox(in⊕ kb))2]
end for
end for
Having computed all possible confusion coefficient values κ w.r.t. CPA attack
and HW power model we compute the confusion coefficient vector. This vector
contains all possible coefficient values for every key combination and its frequency
distribution is deemed by the Fei et al. to be possible characteristic of side-channel
behavior. The natural question that arises is what features of the frequency distribu-
tion of the confusion coefficient vector denotes side-channel resistance. We observe
that the mean value of the distribution is directly related to the choice of the selection
function, i.e. it solely depends on the divide-and-conquer approach that we use in
our attack. Moreover, Heuser et al. demonstrate the link between nonlinearity and
the distribution of the vector [HGR14]. Specifically, highly nonlinear elements lead
to a distribution with low variance. Therefore, we need to find S-boxes that demon-
strate a high variance in the confusion coefficient vector distribution - i.e. we are
evolving S-boxes with as high as possible confusion coefficient variance. Note that
we generate S-boxes under the Hamming weight leakage assumption – depending
on the device this assumption does not always hold.
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5.5 Experimental Setup and Results
In order to generate S-boxes with good cryptographic properties we experiment with
random search, GA, NSGA-II and GP. Random search method should be regarded
as a baseline search method used to give insight whether this problem is difficult
enough to justify the usage of EAs.
Additionally, we investigate the influence of affine transformations to the DPA-
related properties. Experiments with these methods allow us to address the follow-
ing questions related to the DPA-resistant S-boxes:
• Is it possible to get better values of the aforementioned properties than they
are in the currently used S-boxes (for PRESENT and AES case)?
• If yes, how hard is that problem?
• What are the property values we can obtain?
Answers to those questions should give us an insight on not only on the values it
is possible to obtain, but also on how difficult it is to use EAs to solve those problems.
5.5.1 Representations and Fitness Functions
There are several possibilities how to represent uniquely S-boxes (e.g. TT, Walsh
coefficients and lookup tables). By a unique representation, we mean an encoding
where no two S-boxes have the same values at the same positions.
We experiment with two encodings, in the first one S-boxes are represented with
a binary encoding as TT of 2n rows andm columns. In the second representation, we
use permutation encoding. In this representation, n×m S-box is defined as an array
of 2n integer numbers with values between 0 and 2n−1. Each of those values occurs
exactly once in an array and represents one entry for the S-box lookup table, where
inputs are given in lexicographical order. The main advantage of the permutation
encoding is that the bijectivity property is automatically preserved. Both binary and
permutation encoding represent common encodings used in various EAs [ES03].
Maximization of the value of a fitness function is the objective in all evolutionary
experiments. In fitness functions we use a combination of the following properties:
balancedness, nonlinearity, δ-uniformity, transparency order and confusion coeffi-
cient.
When investigating 4 × 4 size, we add δ-uniformity property to the fitness func-
tion. In this way, we ensure that evolved S-boxes belong to the one of optimal S-
boxes classes. Fitness functions for the 4× 4 size are the following:
fitness = NF + (m− TF ) + (2n − δ), (5.7)
fitness = NF + κ+ (2
n − δ). (5.8)
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We subtract δ-uniformity value from the maximum obtainable value since we
represent the problem as a maximization problem and the δ-uniformity property
should be as small as possible.
For the 8 × 8 case, fitness function equals the sum of the nonlinearity (NF ) and
the transparency order or the confusion coefficient variance (κ) property values as
follows.
fitness = NF + (m− TF ). (5.9)
Since the transparency order value should be as low as possible, we subtract the
value obtained from the upper bound value for transparency order.
fitness = NF + κ. (5.10)
All fitness functions can be easily extended to contain more properties that are
of relevance to the evolutionary experiments. We did not include the SNR (DPA)
property into fitness functions since our experiments showed that the value is too
volatile, e.g. every small change in S-box can lead to a relatively big change of the
SNR (DPA) value.
We also experimented with the weighted fitness formula, but the results were
similar. This is because the algorithm finds some nonlinearity level and while re-
maining at the same level, it looks for the best value for transparency order or con-
fusion coefficient.
Here we emphasize that our approach is not only easily adaptable when adding
additional properties, but if we want to change e.g. the leakage model for confusion
coefficient it would only affect one term in the fitness function. Additionally, as it
can be seen later, when we experiment with different definitions of the transparency
order property, this again represents a change of one term in the fitness function.
5.5.2 Algorithms
In this section we present details about random search method and EAs we use when
evolving S-boxes, as well as common parameters used in evolutionary experiments.
Random Search
In random search, solutions are generated by creating uniformly at random a per-
mutation list of values from 0 to 2n−1.
Genetic Algorithm
When using a GA we experiment both with binary TT (bitstring) and with permu-
tation encoding. The mutation operator for bitstring representation is selected uni-
formly at random between simple and mixed mutation [ES03]. The recombination
operator for bitstring encoding is selected uniformly at random between uniform
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and one-point crossover [ES03]. For the bitstring representation we initialize the
population with random individuals where at first we do not require individuals to
be balanced (bijective). In the second set of experiments, we add the constraint that
the coordinate functions of F need to be balanced.
Note, when working with permutation encoding, the operators cannot create
a duplicate of a solution. For permutation representation, a mutation operator is
selected uniformly at random between insert and inversion mutation [ES03]. Re-
combination operator is selected uniformly at random between PMX [GL85] and
OX [Dav85] crossover. For permutation encoding, we use randomly created bijec-
tive S-boxes (recall that permutations are bijective) as individuals.
NSGA-II
In our implementation, the crowded tournament operator (described in Section 2.2.5)
is used in the following manner: first k solutions are randomly selected from the pop-
ulation (where k = 3 in our experiments). The worst of those solutions is identified
with crowded tournament and a new solution is created with the crossover of the
remaining solutions in the tournament. The new solution is mutated with a given
probability and finally inserted in the children population.
Genetic Programming
In GP each individual is represented with n independently evolved trees where n
is the output size of an S-box. Function set for GP in all the experiments is OR,
NOT, XOR, AND, IF where terminals correspond to Boolean variables. IF function
is implemented in the following way; when the first input value equals true, then
we take second value, else we take the first value. Genetic programming has the
maximum tree depth of 11. Variation operators are the same as for the GA with
bitstring encoding. To set the initial population, a random procedure is used to create
the individuals (n Boolean functions with m inputs). We do not require individuals
to be balanced since it would be too difficult to have balanced tree structures at the
beginning of the process.
Common Parameters
For every setting, we run 30 independent runs with a population size equal to 50.
Mutation probability is set to 0.3 per individual. The parameters above are the result
of a combination of a small number of preliminary experiments and our experience
with similar problems; no thorough parameter tuning has been performed. Tourna-
ment selection parameter k is set to three. Evolution process lasts until the stopping
criterion is fulfilled; here the criterion is 50 generations without improvement. We
also display common parameters in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Common parameters for EAs for the S-box evolution.
Parameter Parameter value
Tournament size k 3
Population size 50
Number of experiments 30
Mutation probability 0.3 per individual
Stopping criterion 50 generations without improvement
Table 5.2: Distribution of random S-boxes property values, 4× 4, 5 000 evaluations.
Property Max Min Mean Std. dev.
NLF 4 0 2.1 0.69
TF 3.73 3 3.47 0.1
MTF 2.93 1.6 2.44 0.14
κ 3.07 0.77 1.36 0.44
5.5.3 Experimental Results
Results with GA with bitstring encoding and GP did not yield any balanced S-boxes.
All our experiments suggest that the problem of obtaining balancedness when using
bitstring (TT) or tree encoding is too difficult problem for EAs when evolving S-
boxes (contrary to the examples when evolving Boolean functions). Therefore, in the
rest of this chapter we present results only for the permutation encoding. With the
permutation encoding the complexity of the problem is high: for the 4× 4 size there
are 16! possible solutions and for the 8× 8 size there are 256! possible solutions.
First, we present basic statistical data for the random search in Tables 5.2 and 5.3
for the 4× 4 and 8× 8 sizes, respectively.
In Table 5.4, we give values for transparency order, modified transparency order
and confusion coefficient variance for the class representatives of 16 optimal classes.
Here, G0 until G15 are the names of class representatives for each optimal class and
S0 until S7 are the names for class representatives acceptable for PRINCE algorithm.
Table 5.3: Distribution of random S-boxes property values, 8× 8, 5 000 evaluations.
Property Max Min Mean Std. dev.
NLF 98 84 92.57 2.13
TF 7.83 7.77 7.8 0.01
MTF 6.9 6.83 6.86 0.01
κ 5.61 0.28 1.46 0.8
106
Table 5.4: Results for the optimal classes’ representatives, 4× 4.
S-box PRINCE notation TF MTF κ
G0 - 3.47 2.23 0.86
G1 - 3.53 2.53 1.05
G2 - 3.6 2.57 1.05
G3 S0 3.53 2.47 1.05
G4 S1 3.47 2.57 0.77
G5 S2 3.47 2.53 0.77
G6 S3 3.47 2.47 0.77
G7 S4 3.53 2.53 0.96
G8 - 3.47 2.3 0.86
G9 - 3.53 2.5 1.05
G10 - 3.47 2.37 1.05
G11 S5 3.53 2.47 1.05
G12 S6 3.6 2.5 1.05
G13 S7 3.6 2.67 0.86
G14 - 3.47 2.6 0.8
G15 - 3.53 2.5 0.86
Evolved Permutation Based S-boxes
When evolving 4×4 size S-boxes, we consider only optimal S-boxes and therefore we
do not write explicitly the nonlinearity and the δ-uniformity property values. Rather,
it is implied that all S-boxes possess those values. For the 4× 4 size, we provide the
best results for evolved S-boxes and Eqs. (5.7) and (5.8) in Table 5.5.
Notice here that when evolving for instance for as good as possible transparency
order, confusion coefficient and SNR (DPA) can have worse values than for the
PRESENT S-box (which actually happens). This shows us that it could be impos-
sible to evolve an S-box that is optimal in all properties related with DPA resistance.
When considering the 8×8 size, we present several solutions since now there are
differences in the nonlinearity property and the δ-uniformity (to mention only those
two properties). We give results for fitness functions as in Eq. (5.9) in Table 5.6 and
for Eq. (5.10) in Table 5.7.
When considering the 8 × 8 size, evolved S-boxes suffer from two major draw-
backs. The first drawback stems from the fact that an improved S-box (concern-
ing the transparency order or confusion coefficient properties) may (and in general,
will) result in the deterioration of properties related with the linear and differential
resistance of the algorithm (e.g. nonlinearity and δ-uniformity). The second major
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Table 5.5: Properties of evolved S-boxes, 4× 4.
S-box TF κ SNR
PRESENT 3.53 1.71 2.13
Evolved for TF 3.2 1.62 2.19
Evolved for κ (Phantom) 3.33 3.07 1.6
Evolved for κ (New) 3.47 3.03 1.61
Table 5.6: Properties of evolved S-boxes, transparency order, 8× 8.
S-box NF TF SNR δ ∆F σF
AES S-box 112 7.86 9.6 4 32 133120
Random S-box 92 7.8 9.17 12 96 272128
Evolved S-box 1 100 7.72 8.69 10 104 245632
Evolved S-box 2 98 7.36 5.83 12 104 341248
Evolved S-box 3 98 7.41 6.03 14 112 370816
Evolved S-box 4 100 7.53 5.44 12 104 298624
Evolved S-box 5 98 7.50 6.55 14 112 356224
Table 5.7: Properties of evolved S-boxes, confusion coefficient, 8× 8.
S-box NF κ SNR δ ∆F σF
AES S-box 112 0.111 9.56 4 32 133120
Random S-box 92 0.127 9.17 12 96 272128
Evolved S-box 1 98 4.057 1.97 12 96 287488
Evolved S-box 2 98 3.935 2 12 112 263680
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drawback is the necessity to implement such improved S-boxes as lookup tables. For
instance, an improved AES S-box (e.g. derived from the heuristic search) loses the
algebraic properties that are important for compact implementations [Can05, CB08].
Still, there are possible settings where the improvement in DPA resistance makes up
for the previously mentioned drawbacks. In contrast to this, when considering 4× 4
S-boxes, the situation is improved since both implementation options, as a lookup
table and as a Boolean functions in hardware, are viable.
In the following four graphs we display results for random (5 000 results), evolved
and original S-boxes (PRESENT and AES) for sizes 4× 4 and 8× 8, respectively. We
give graphs depicting distribution of the solutions in the search space for the 4 × 4
size in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b. Afterwards, we display graphs for the 8 × 8 size in
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b.
(a) Nonlinearity versus transparency order. (b) Nonlinearity versus confusion coefficient vari-
ance.
Figure 5.1: Random, original and evolved solutions, 4× 4.
(a) Nonlinearity versus transparency order. (b) Nonlinearity versus confusion coefficient vari-
ance.
Figure 5.2: Random, original and evolved solutions, 8× 8.
When considering a weighted fitness formula against the version we use we no-
tice the following. When adding more weight to the transparency order property for
instance, this artificially adds the importance of transparency order for lower values
of nonlinearity, but still achieves same transparency order values for each nonlinear-
ity level. In order to display the connections between variables of a fitness function,
we display Pareto fronts when using NSGA-II algorithm. We display results for 4×4
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and 8 × 8 sizes in Figures 5.3a until 5.3d, respectively. Recall that here each compo-
nent of the fitness function is evaluated separately.
(a) NSGA-II, 4× 4, transparency order. (b) NSGA-II, 4× 4, confusion coefficient.
(c) NSGA-II, 8× 8, transparency order. (d) NSGA-II, 8× 8, confusion coefficient.
Figure 5.3: NSGA-II solutions, 4× 4 and 8× 8 sizes.
Best Evolved S-boxes
When considering the transparency order property, the best value we found for
4 × 4 size is 3.2 for an optimal S-box. We see that for 4 × 4 S-box size we obtain
maximum confusion coefficient variance of 3.07 while staying in optimal classes.
For the 8 × 8 size, the best transparency order value we found equals 7.35. The
best confusion coefficient variance for the same size we found is 4.057. However,
these values come at a cost of deterioration of nonlinearity to 98 and δ-uniformity to
12 (recall that AES has nonlinearity 112 and δ-uniformity 4).
Improving the Nonlinearity Value
When considering 8 × 8 S-box size, it is evident that the nonlinearity (to mention
only that property) value for the evolved S-boxes is inferior when compared with
AES S-box. The question is: does the improvement in the transparency order or in
the confusion coefficient value justify the deterioration of other properties?
Despite the deterioration of the δ-uniformity value, it is possible to show that the
probability of the success of the differential attack is still lower than the required
threshold for the AES algorithm [MMS13a].
Next, we present an upgrade of a GA in order to reach higher nonlinearity values.
We experiment with three different approaches, namely:
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Table 5.8: Evolved S-boxes with improved nonlinearity and transparency order, 8×8.
NLF 100 102 104 106 108 110
TF 7.52 7.67 7.76 7.8 7.82 7.84
1. Seed initial population with mutated AES S-boxes that have nonlinearity in the
range [100, 110] and then run GA.
2. Seed initial population with mutated AES S-boxes that have predefined level
of nonlinearity and then run GA.
3. Seed initial population with mutated AES S-boxes, but punish all solutions that
do not have defined level of nonlinearity. Punishing is done by giving fitness
value of zero to the S-boxes that have different (smaller) levels of nonlinearity.
We see that in all three strategies we use a two-stage optimization where the first
stage is in a sense a de-evolution phase where we devolve solutions to the worse
ones. This phase serves to create new individuals from the starting one. In the
second phase, we evolve the population in order to reach solutions with desired
properties. The first two strategies proved to be unsuccessful since the mutated S-
boxes are very similar to the AES S-box so they soon converge back to the AES S-box.
Third strategy produces the best results. In Table 5.8, we give results for 8 × 8 size
where the goal is the transparency order as good as possible for each nonlinearity
value between 100 and 110.
Although we do not show it here, the same procedure can be repeated when the
goal is as good as possible confusion coefficient value for each nonlinearity level.
5.5.4 Modified Transparency Order
Next, we present results for the modified transparency order property. We opted to
show them in a dedicated section to promote the adaptability of GAs. To evaluate
what is the value of the modified transparency order property for a certain S-box
we need an evaluator for that property. This is also required to run GAs where the
goal is that the modified transparency order value is as good as possible. We present
fitness functions for that criterion for 4 × 4 and 8 × 8 sizes in Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12),
respectively.
fitness = NF + (m−MTF ) + (2n − δ). (5.11)
fitness = NF + (m−MTF ). (5.12)
As with the original transparency order, we evolve S-boxes that have the modi-
fied transparency order values as small as possible. In Figures 5.4a and 5.4b, we dis-
play results for random (5 000 results), original and evolved S-boxes for sizes 4 × 4
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Table 5.9: Properties of evolved S-boxes, modified transparency order, 4× 4.
S-box MTF κ SNR
PRESENT 2.467 1.709 2.129
Evolved S-box 1.9 2.838 1.664
and 8× 8. In Table 5.9, we display only the best solution that is in one of the optimal
classes for size 4 × 4. When evolving 8 × 8 size we encounter a situation that also
shows one possible drawback when using EC methods; the speed of the evolution
(evaluation). Since the formula for the modified transparency order is quite com-
plicated, one evaluation on a PC with Intel i5 processor and 6 GB of RAM takes on
average 8 s for the 8 × 8 size. Taking this conservative estimate that represents the
complete time needed to evolve and evaluate one individual we can easily calculate
the following. Our population has 50 individuals and therefore one generation lasts
400 s or approximately 6.5 minutes. After 24 hours of experiments, we would have
only 200 generations. When considering that often the evolution process needs sev-
eral thousands of generations the time needed to finish the evolutionary experiment
can be months. We emphasize that this example has a problem with fitness function
and not with EAs. In a situation like this where the evaluation is so time consum-
ing, some algebraic construction that only a posteriori evaluates the property value
would be in a huge advantage. This is because there the formula would be ideally
used only a few times. We give results for several evolved S-boxes as well as for the
AES S-box in Table 5.10. Note that we needed almost one month to finish 50 runs of
GA where the stopping condition is 500 generations without improvement.
(a) Nonlinearity versus modified transparency or-
der, 4× 4.
(b) Nonlinearity versus modified transparency or-
der, 8× 8.
Figure 5.4: Random, original and evolved solutions, 4× 4 and 8× 8.
5.5.5 Affine Equivalence
Recall that for two (n, n)-functions S1 and S2 to be affine equivalent, the following
equation needs to hold:
S2(x) = B(S1(A(x)⊕ a))⊕ b, (5.13)
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Table 5.10: Properties of evolved S-boxes, modified transparency order, 8× 8.
S-box NF MTF SNR δ ∆F σF
AES S-box 112 6.92 9.6 4 32 133120
Random S-box 92 6.87 9.17 12 96 272128
Evolved S-box 1 100 6.82 9.13 10 104 258304
Evolved S-box 2 98 6.59 5.83 12 104 341248
Table 5.11: PRINCE S-box.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S(x) B F 3 2 A C 9 1 6 7 8 0 E 5 D 4
where A and B are invertible n × n matrices and a, b are constants in Fn2 . Here, “⊕”
denotes addition modulo 2 (bitwise XOR).
To analyze whether DPA-related properties are affine invariant, we work with
the 4× 4 size since it is computationally easier to evaluate the properties of S-boxes.
Moreover, to simplify the procedure even further, for now we restrain our attention
to the PRINCE algorithm [BCG+12]. Out of the 16 optimal classes, for the PRINCE
algorithm there are only 8 suitable S-box classes for usage. In the PRINCE algorithm,
the authors chose class S7 (or class G13 of optimal S-boxes) to derive the actual S-
box. Class representatives are not suitable due to a number of fixed points since
they are chosen according to the lexicographical ordering. However, since affine
transformation does not change linear and differential properties of S-boxes [LP07],
one can apply affine transformation to the class representative to remove fixed points
and retain all good properties of optimal S-boxes. We give the actual S-box used in
the PRINCE algorithm in Table 5.11.
After running the analysis on that S-box, we see that the classical properties re-
lated with the differential and linear cryptanalysis remain unchanged with trans-
parency order value of 3.4 and SNR (DPA) of 2.129. Here we note that the class
representative has transparency order value of 3.6 and SNR (DPA) value of 2.946.
Based on this fact we reach two conclusions. The first one is that it matters (in
terms of side-channel resistance) which class (for the 4 × 4 size) an S-box is chosen
from. The second conclusion is that affine transformation changes transparency or-
der and SNR (DPA) values, therefore changing the DPA resistance of an algorithm
using that S-box. Recall the results for transparency order property for optimal class
representatives as given in Table 5.4. Based on the results from that table, we give
the following conjecture:
S-boxes that are affine equivalent (and therefore equivalent with respect to the properties
related with the linear and differential cryptanalysis) need not be equivalent with regards to
the DPA-related properties.
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To show experimentally that this conjecture holds, it is enough to compare the
transparency order values for the PRINCE S-box. Since we establish that an affine
transformation can change transparency order and SNR (DPA) values, next question
is how difficult is to change it, i.e. what kind of affine transformation results in the
change of those properties. To do this, we experiment with four affine transforma-
tions as given in Chapter 3, Table 3.2. For each of the eight class representatives we
experiment with all four affine transformations for 25 000 times which gives in total
800 000 generated S-boxes.
The following conclusions apply both for 4 × 4 and 8 × 8 S-box sizes. In our
experiments we observe that each kind of transformation causes a change in the SNR
(DPA) property. However, only when applying at least two multiplications with
invertible matrices it results in the change of transparency order values. Therefore,
only transformations 3 and 4 change transparency order where those values go from
3.4 to 3.73 (for the PRINCE suitable classes). If we check the remaining eight classes
that are optimal, but not a choice for the PRINCE algorithm, we find with affine
transformations 3 and 4 S-boxes that they have transparency order from 3.2 to 3.73.
We note that Evci and Kavut further improved the result given above and they
show that to change the transparency order property it suffices to use the transfor-
mation of the form S(x)B [EK14]. In their work, they use steepest-descent-like iter-
ative search to find S-boxes with good properties. However, they search in the class
of RSSBs where the search space is much smaller when compared with the whole
search space of 8× 8 S-boxes [Kav12].
Note that we did not consider this affine transformation, as it is a special case of
transformations 3 and 4 where matrix A is the identity matrix and constants c and d
equal zero. Since by using this transformation it is possible to conduct an exhaustive
search of all optimal S-boxes, we check what is the best possible transparency order
value. As the experiments show, the lowest transparency order value for optimal S-
boxes is 3.2 [Kav14], which is the same value we got with our affine transformations
as well as with the GA. This can also serve as an evidence that GA performs well on
this problem (and 4× 4 size).
Next, we check what happens with the confusion coefficient variance property
under different affine transformations. We apply transformations as listed in Ta-
ble 3.2 to the AES S-box as well as to representatives of 16 optimal classes for the
4× 4 size.
To change the confusion coefficient property, transformations 2, 3 and 4 are ap-
plicable. Here we note that our experiments show that the transformations 3 and 4
change confusion coefficient more significantly. For instance, PRESENT S-box has a
confusion coefficient variance of 1.709, when applying transformation 2 we succeed
in obtaining maximal confusion coefficient variance of 1.803. However, when ap-
plying transformations 3 or 4, we obtain maximal confusion coefficient of variance
that equals 3.07. Therefore, we can conclude that it is easier (in terms of the affine
transformation computational complexity) to change confusion coefficient than the
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transparency order property. However, if we want to significantly change confu-
sion coefficient then we need the same affine transformations as those to change the
transparency order property.
In order to check the influence of various affine transformations to the modified
transparency order property, we repeat the same procedure as in the two previous
cases. After conducting experiments with affine transformations as in the Table 3.2,
we observe that the modified transparency order property changes under the same
transformations as the original transparency order measure. This means that affine
transformations 3 and 4 are suitable to change the value of MTF .
After running the experiments with all three properties, we see that the trans-
parency order and modified transparency order properties change under the same
transformations. When examining the confusion coefficient property, we see it is
possible to change it even more easily, and therefore, with more affine transforma-
tions. In accordance to that, we present results for all three properties when applying
transformation as in [EK14]:
S2(x) = B(S1(x)). (5.14)
With the above transformation, we conduct an exhaustive search with all repre-
sentatives of optimal classes. We present the minimum and the maximum obtainable
values for each class and property of interest in Table 5.12.
When considering 4 × 4 size, classes G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G11, G12, G13 and G14
reach maximal confusion coefficient value of 3.02 while other seven classes reach the
maximal confusion coefficient value of 3.07. We can observe than in the case of 4× 4
size, affine transformation reaches the same maximum values (although different S-
boxes) as the GA for 9 out of the 16 optimal classes. Furthermore, division between
the classes that reach values 3.02 and 3.07 is the same (with the exception ofG14 class)
as in the case of optimal S-boxes and PRINCE suitable S-boxes [BCG+12]. Classes
that reach values 3.07 are those not suitable for the usage in the PRINCE algorithm.
For the confusion coefficient variance, we see that the minimal value is the same
for all the classes, and the maximal value varies between two values. In the case
of the transparency order property, there are five different minimal values and two
different maximal values. For the modified transparency order property, there is
only one class that reaches the minimal value of 1.9 and there are 10 different max-
imal values over all classes.Base on these results, we can conclude that the hardest
scenario is when evolving S-boxes with good values of the modified transparency
order property. This is because there is only one class that has S-boxes with minimal
value of 1.9. In Figure 5.5, we give a frequency distribution of all obtainable values
under the affine transformation from Eq. (5.14) for the optimal class G1.
For the 8 × 8 size affine transformation improves both transparency order and
confusion coefficient variance only slightly. When considering transparency order,
the best obtained value equals 7.84 (while original S-box has a value 7.86) and for
confusion coefficient the best obtained value is 0.169 (while original S-box has a value
0.111). For the modified transparency order, the best value we found equals 6.89
(while AES S-box has 6.916).
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Table 5.12: Results for the exhaustive search with affine transformation, 4× 4.
TF MTF κ
S-box Min Max Min Max Min Max
G0 3.2 3.73 2.07 3 0.77 3.07
G1 3.2 3.73 1.9 2.8 0.77 3.07
G2 3.26 3.73 2.03 2.87 0.77 3.07
G3 3.47 3.73 2.4 2.8 0.77 3.03
G4 3.4 3.73 2.3 2.83 0.77 3.03
G5 3.4 3.73 2.33 2.93 0.77 3.03
G6 3.33 3.73 2.23 2.73 0.77 3.03
G7 3.4 3.73 2.26 2.7 0.77 3.03
G8 3.2 3.73 2.03 2.87 0.77 3.07
G9 3.27 3.73 2.17 2.8 0.77 3.07
G10 3.267 3.73 2.17 2.77 0.77 3.07
G11 3.33 3.73 2.23 2.67 0.77 3.03
G12 3.4 3.67 2.33 2.83 0.77 3.03
G13 3.33 3.73 2.26 2.9 0.77 3.03
G14 3.26 3.73 2.2 2.93 0.77 3.03
G15 3.26 3.73 2.13 2.9 0.77 3.07
5.5.6 One S-box to Rule Them All
Up to now, we concentrated on evolving S-boxes that have one of the DPA-related
properties optimal, whether that being transparency order, modified transparency
order of confusion coefficient. However, we see that the affine transformation is
capable of obtaining the same (optimal) result. Since affine transformation is a de-
terministic way of constructing S-boxes with improved DPA resistance, one can ask
why even to use EAs. Of course, EAs are faster when compared with exhaustive
search that is necessary in the case of affine transformation. Furthermore, there are
16 classes from which one needs to choose a class to use for the affine transformation
and as we see in the case of modified transparency, only one class gives optimal val-
ues. One can disregard all those problems when using EAs. However, we can go one
step further and attempt to evolve S-box that is optimal in regards to two (or three)
DPA related properties. In such a scenario, an affine transformation cannot be used
without some other search algorithm.
Next, we evolve S-boxes with regards to the two and three DPA-related proper-
ties. The experiments we conduct only for the 4×4 size, since in this case we see that
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Figure 5.5: Frequency distribution of MTF values for the class G1.
we can obtain optimal “classical” properties.
When evolving with regards to the transparency order and the modified trans-
parency order properties the fitness function is the following:
fitness = NF + (2
n − δ) + (m− TF ) + (m−MTF ). (5.15)
When we evolve with regards to transparency order and confusion coefficient
then the fitness function is:
fitness = NF + (2
n − δ) + (m− TF ) + κ. (5.16)
Finally, when we evolve with regards to the modified transparency order and the
confusion coefficient, the formula is:
fitness = NF + (2
n − δ) + κ+ (m−MTF ). (5.17)
Common parameters are the same as in Table 5.1. We give the results of the
preceding fitness functions in Table 5.13. For each of the fitness functions we present
several solutions where all S-boxes are optimal.
Finally, we evolve an S-box with regards to all three DPA-related properties as
given in:
fitness = NF + (2
n − δ) + (m− TF ) + (m−MTF ) + κ. (5.18)
We give results for the Eq. (5.18) where we conduct optimization under three
criteria in Table 5.14. The results indicate that it is not possible to obtain an S-box
that has all three DPA related properties optimal. However, when observing class
G1 (since that is the only class that is capable of obtaining MTF value of 1.9) we see
that all such S-boxes have a worse combination of values than those as presented in
Tables 5.13 and 5.14.
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Table 5.13: S-boxes evolved under two criteria, 4× 4.
Eq. TF MTF κ
5.15 3.27 1.9 2.74
5.15 3.27 2.03 1.33
5.15 3.2 2.13 1.23
5.16 3.2 2.17 3.03
5.16 3.27 2.17 3.03
5.16 3.33 2.4 3.07
5.17 3.27 2.07 3.03
5.17 3.27 1.9 2.84
5.17 3.33 2.13 3.03
Table 5.14: S-boxes evolved under three criteria, 4× 4.
Eq. TF MTF κ
5.18 3.27 2.07 3.03
5.18 3.27 1.9 2.84
5.18 3.2 2.17 3.03
5.6 Side-channel Experiments
As mentioned previously, the emphasis in this chapter is on the methods of evolution
of DPA resistant S-boxes and not on the practical SCA of such S-boxes. However,
evolved S-boxes require a real-world analysis to quantify how much of a change in
the property value will result in a certain gain in the side-channel resistance in terms
of the number of measurements required to recover the key. We emphasize that we
are aware of the fact that such S-boxes with improved DPA resistance cannot serve
as the only countermeasure against SCA in practical settings. Furthermore, there is a
question whether one should consider such properties even to be a countermeasure
or simply as an inherent property of S-boxes. Therefore, this research gives insights
in the strength of one possible improvement against the SCA attacks.
Here, we do not give judgment about the quality of any of the properties. Rather,
we show a sample of the result while we leave for the readers to decide whether
some metric represents an interesting future research avenue. However, we list here
some example from the literature that has practical side-channel experiments for
each of the metrics of interest:
• Transparency order - [MMS13b, MMS12, PEB+14, PEP+14].
• Modified transparency order - [CSM+15].
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• Confusion Coefficient - [PPE+14, EPBP15].
We give results for software and hardware implementations as well as for the
simulated measurements.
Software (AVR) Implementation
For the software analysis, we use an AVR smartcard with an ATmega163 micro-
controller. To collect the traces we use LeCroy WaveRunner 610Zi Oscilloscope and
Riscure Power Tracer 3 to communicate with the smartcard. The ATmega163 micro-
controller leaks the HW of the intermediate values and therefore we work with the
selection function as given in Algorithm 7, Section 5.4.
Hardware (FPGA) Implementation
For the hardware analysis, we use the Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation
Board (SASEBO) board with a XILINX Virtex-II Pro (XC2VP7) FPGA. However, we
underline the fact the S-boxes evolved for confusion coefficient variance are evolved
based on the HW leakage model and not the HD leakage model.
First, we display a photo of laboratory setting we used in all experiments in Fig-
ure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Laboratory setup for the SCA.
5.6.1 SCA and Modified Transparency Order
In this set of experiments, we consider Pearson’s coefficient as the statistical analysis
parameter with the security metric called success rate to measure how easily the
physical observable can be turned into a successful attack [SMY09]. The efficiency
of a side-channel attack to reach a certain success rate (e.g. 80%) is the minimum
average number of queries such that the success rate of this attack attains the value
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(80%). We measure this efficiency of the DPA attacks in terms of number of queries
required to extract the secret key.
We consider the Gaussian noise distribution N with zero mean and standard de-
viation σ added to the HW of the S-box output S(x⊕ k) as the physically observable
power trace. We show the success rate of the CPA with noise with standard devi-
ation values from 0.1 to 2.0 on the synthesized S-boxes in Figures 5.7a until 5.7d.
(a) Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces, S-
box 1.
(b) Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces, S-
box 2.
(c) Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces, S-
box 3.
(d) Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces, S-
box 4.
Figure 5.7: Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces.
Next, we perform the same experiment on the PRESENT 4 × 4 S-box where we
show results in Figure 5.8.
In comparison of success rate results in both the figures, we observe that in the
presence of noise with high standard deviation, the success rate of DPA attacks of
the synthesized S-boxes is less than that of the PRESENT S-boxes. From Table 5.15,
for Gaussian noise with standard deviation as high as 2.0, the maximum success rate
attained in our class of synthesized S-boxes is less than half of that of PRESENT S-
box. In case the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise is small, the number of
queries required to attain a success rate of 80% in case of our synthesized S-boxes is
lesser compared to the PRESENT S-box.
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Figure 5.8: Success rate, CPA, simulated power traces, PRESENT.
Table 5.15: Comparison of MTF with success rates of the CPA attacks.
S-box TF MTF # queries to reach 100%
success rate (SD = 0.1)
Max success
rate (SD = 2.0)
PRESENT 3.53 2.47 8 65%
S-box 1 3.27 1.9 8 28%
S-box 2 3.4 2.17 10 32%
S-box 3 3.33 2.2 8 35%
S-box 4 3.4 2.23 7 34%
5.6.2 SCA and Confusion Coefficient
First, we present results for simulated experiments where we use three newly gen-
erated S-boxes and the PRESENT S-box as the baseline case. One of the three newly
generated S-boxes is the so called “Phantom” S-box that leads to the case that two
key candidates have correlation values equal in magnitude, hence making it more
difficult for an attacker who has no knowledge of the exact leakage model of a de-
vice to deduce the correct key with 100% accuracy. We define the “Phantom” S-box
as an S-box leading to ghost peaks in the correlation trace after running the attacks.
This happens since the S-box outputs have either the same or the complementary
HW values for inputs with a particular XOR difference.
Figures 5.9a and 5.9b present the logarithm (log2) of the guessing entropy [SMY09]
with respect to the number of traces. These traces are processed for the attacks we
run on the simulated traces produced with the inclusion of Gaussian noise with
mean value 0 and standard deviation value 16. An important point to note about
Figure 5.9a is that the PRESENT S-box has a confusion coefficient variance of 1.709.
Therefore, it can be clearly seen that the Figure 5.9a shows a clear distinction in
guessing entropy with respect to the variance of the confusion coefficient. Similarly,
one should note that the AES has a confusion coefficient variance of 0.11, and Fig-
ure 5.9b shows a good distinction in guessing entropy w.r.t. the confusion coefficient
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(a) 4× 4 S-box, confusion coefficient. (b) 8× 8 S-box, confusion coefficient.
Figure 5.9: Guessing entropy for simulated S-boxes with respect to the number of
traces.
variance. Furthermore, we show the frequency distribution values for PRESENT,
“Phantom” and “New” S-boxes in 5.10a, 5.10b and 5.10c, respectively.
AVR Results
To be able to make a fair assessment of the side-channel security of different S-boxes
when investigating confusion coefficient implemented in software, we collect the
information from 50 separate attacks and combine them in terms of guessing entropy
in Figures 5.11a and 5.11b. Again, it is clear that when the attack is applied using
the HW model, the S-box having the better confusion coefficient value shows better
resistance against side-channel attacks.
FPGA Results
We have computed the confusion coefficient with this assumption in mind, but if the
leakage of a device is known, it is straightforward to integrate that leakage model
in our GA and produce an S-box which will resist to side-channel attacks better in a
device leaking in that particular leakage model.
To obtain the results for the DPA analysis, 150 000 traces for the “New” S-box,
70 000 traces for the “Phantom” S-box, and 50 000 traces for the original PRESENT
S-box are acquired. To compute the guessing entropy, we run ten separate attacks
and give the results in Figure 5.12.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we consider the DPA resistance properties of S-boxes of various sizes.
We show it is possible to evolve S-boxes that have better transparency order (original
and modified one) and confusion coefficient variance values. With GA, we are able
to produce both 4× 4 and 8× 8 size S-boxes that exhibit improved DPA resistance.
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(a) PRESENT S-box. (b) “Phantom” S-box.
(c) “New” S-box.
Figure 5.10: Frequency distributions for PRESENT, “New” and “Phantom” S-boxes,
confusion coefficient.
(a) 4× 4 S-box, confusion coefficient. (b) 8× 8 S-box, confusion coefficient.
Figure 5.11: Guessing entropy for S-boxes with respect to the number of traces, AVR.
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Figure 5.12: Guessing entropy for S-boxes with respect to the number of traces,
SASEBO, 4× 4 case, confusion coefficient.
However, this “countermeasure” should not be regarded as a whole solution, but
rather as one possibility in a chain of improvements of S-boxes against DPA attacks.
Indeed, when offered with a choice whether to use masking or some of S-boxes with
improved inherent resistance against DPA attacks, the obvious choice is masking.
However, if having several S-boxes with same masking complexity, one should use
an S-box that has the best intrinsic DPA resistance. Based on the results we conclude
that EAs are not only capable of obtaining good results, but they also can serve as
the first step when evaluating the usefulness of a certain property. Finally, we show
that an affine transformation changes the DPA resilience of S-boxes. This fact can be
important not only from the theoretical perspective, but also from the practical one.
Future research should concentrate on the effect of the leakage model for the
confusion coefficient property as well as adding masking countermeasure. One more
interesting research avenue is a possibility of application of CGP in the evolution of
S-boxes [PMJB15]. In contrast with GP where the algorithm produces one output,
CGP can produce multiple outputs and therefore presents more suitable choice in
the future design.
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Chapter 6
Need for Speed: Pipelining Combinatorial
Circuits
“It is not the strongest or the most intelligent who will
survive but those who can best manage change.”
Charles Darwin
I
n this chapter we use EAs in order to add Flip Flops (FFs) to a combinatorial circuit
that represents the AES S-box. In this way, we optimize the circuit implementation
with regards to the throughput.
6.1 Introduction
Cryptographic implementations are of constant interest for security companies. The
challenges vary from very compact, low-power/energy to high-speed implementa-
tions of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Ever growing
number of applications require security services, introduce more constraints and
real-time cryptography has become of paramount importance. This race for the
fastest implementations in both hardware and software is especially difficult for
algorithms that feature numerous implementation options such as Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) and the AES standard.
For example, AES can be implemented through table lookups (see Chapter 3.3.2)
or via multiple composite field representations, each of which has certain advantages
in terms of area, performance and resistance against implementation attacks [FD01,
SMTM01, MBPV05, Can05]. Moreover, some practitioners have relied on resource
sharing and folded architectures for reducing the implementation area [FDCG05,
CG03]. However, when considering fast hardware implementations, pipelining is
an obvious choice to increase the throughput. Nevertheless, as pipelining implies
adding FFs, this results in the increase of the area. Besides that, some modes of
operation are more difficult to pipeline (e.g. the CBC mode) so that also presents a
factor to be considered.
The Problem. An interesting research challenge is to optimize throughput, while
keeping the area under control. More precisely, considering compact options for the
AES S-box, namely those relying on composite field arithmetic, which are the best
This chapter is based on the following paper: “S-box pipelining using genetic algorithms for high-
throughput AES implementations: How fast can we go?”, published in INDOCRYPT 2014.
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pipeline solutions to maximize the throughput? Strategies for solving this problem
typically involve hardware tools and rely mostly on good hardware design practice,
but are generally far from straightforward. Here we investigate the problem of opti-
mizing the performance via pipelining such that the best throughput is found for a
given composite field S-box. For this purpose, we use GAs that have already found
their place in other cryptographic applications as presented in previous chapters.
Our goal is to evaluate comprehensively how to boost the performance of AES
implementations based on composite field arithmetic. To this end, we consider a
hardware implementation where the S-box is realized using a polynomial basis in
F(((22)2)2) as used for example by Satoh et al. [SMTM01] and Mentens et al. [MBPV05].
We deploy GAs to explore the design space of a standard cell netlist that has many
unbalanced and partially overlapping paths from input to output. In order to achieve
a high throughput, we use GAs to choose the position of the pipelining FFs. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first application of GAs for generating netlists with
high throughput.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present different alterna-
tives for exploring the design space of an AES implementation. In Section 6.3, we
illustrate the initial design of the AES S-box based on composite fields that we have
selected. Then, in Section 6.4, we present the framework that we have developed
for analyzing Verilog netlists, first generating an appropriate input for the GA, then
evaluating the correctness of the resulting netlist and finally synthesizing our solu-
tion. We describe the results for the first version of our framework in Section 6.5.
Next, in Section 6.6, we present several improvements in the framework as well as
new EAs. We summarize our results and conclude in Section 6.7.
6.2 Related Work
Considering previous works on hardware implementations of AES, numerous pa-
pers appeared optimizing various implementation properties i.e. throughput, area,
power, energy, etc. Here we remind the reader to some of those that are using a
design choice that is similar to ours. The main focus is on implementations using
composite field arithmetic to boost compactness and/or speed.
Satoh et al. introduce a new composite field F(((22)2)
2
)-based implementation
which resulted in the most compact S-box at the time with a gate complexity of 5.4
kgates [SMTM01].
Wolkerstorfer et al. use arithmetic in F((24)2) to achieve an implementation with
a gate count comparable to the one presented by Satoh et al. (5.7 kgates) [WOL02].
Mentens et al. [MBPV05] and Canright [Can05] find the best choice of polynomi-
als and representation to optimize the S-box area for polynomial and normal basis
respectively.
However, Moradi et al. have recently published the most compact AES imple-
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mentation of the size of only 2.4 kgates [MPL+11]. This result is obtained by opti-
mizing AES encryption on all layers and pushing the area to this minimum.
Macchetti and Bertoni describe an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
implementation for the same composite field F((24)2) as Wolkerstorfer et al., but
relying on a different representation [BBF+02].
Hodjat and Verbauwhede implement pipelined AES, but they use different archi-
tecture [HV06, HV04]. However, these papers are relevant to our investigation since
they nicely show different pipeline options and results.
We note that contemporary hardware design tools may feature algorithms for
optimizing area, speed and/or power/energy consumption. However, none of these
tools handle automatic pipelining to the extent that we do in this chapter.
6.3 S-box Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation options for the AES S-box that was
used in our experiments. It was shown before in the works of Canright [Can05] and
Mentens et al. [MBPV05] that the most compact solutions rely on composite field
arithmetic.
Considering various arithmetic options in binary extension fields to optimize the
inversion operation in the AES S-box, there are basically two implementation op-
tions. We can either perform the subfield operations in F(24) or we can perform
computations in the tower field F(((22)2)
2
) and use the fact that inversion is linear in
F(22). The latter option is the one we choose. The field F(((22)2)
2
) is considered as
an extension of degree 2 over F((22)2) constructed using the irreducible polynomial
P (x) = x2 + p1x+ p0, where p1, p0 ∈ F((22)2).
F((22)2) is a field extension of degree 2 over F(22) using the irreducible polyno-
mial Q(y) = y2 + q1y + q0 with q1, q0 ∈ F(22). F(22) is a field extension of degree 2
over F(2) using the irreducible polynomial R(z) = z2 + z + 1. Here, x, y and z are
roots of polynomials P (x), Q(y) and R(z), respectively. Next, we give the details of
the constants used for our composite field implementations of the AES S-box.
Satoh et al. made the following choices for the coefficients of the irreducible
polynomials [SMTM01]:
p1 = 1 = {0001}2 , (6.1)
p0 = λ = ωy = (z + 1)y = {1100}2 , (6.2)
q1 = 1 = {01}2 , (6.3)
q0 = φ = z = {10}2 . (6.4)
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Figure 6.1: Schematic of the S-box as implemented by Satoh et al. [SMTM01].
The multiplicative inverse is implemented as:
∆ = δ1x+ δ0 ∈ F(((22)2)
2
)
∆−1 = (δ1x+ (δ1 + δ0)) · (λδ21 + (δ1 + δ0)δ0)−1 , (6.5)
δ = d1y + d0 ∈ F((22)2)
δ−1 = (d1y + (d1 + d0)) · (φd21 + (d1 + d0)d0)−1 .
Inversion in F(22) requires only one addition:
d = t1z + t0 ∈ F(22) : d−1 = t1z + (t1 + t0) . (6.6)
Here, ∆ is an arbitrary element in F(((22)2)
2
) and δ is an arbitrary element in
F((22)2). For further details about the S-box implementation, we refer interested
reader to [MBPV05].
A schematic of operations where the building blocks are decomposed into oper-
ations in F((2)4) is depicted in Figure 6.1.
Unlike the inversion in F((24)2), the building blocks are not implemented as 4-bit
lookup tables, but as operations in F((22)2), which can be computed as follows (with
a1, a0, b1, b0 ∈ F(22)):
(a1y + a0) · (b1y + b0) = (a1b1 + a1b0 + a0b1)y + (a1b1φ+ a0b0)
(a1y + a0)
2 = a1y + (a1φ+ a0)
(a1y + a0) · λ = (a1y + a0)ωy = (a1 + a0)ωy + a1ωφ. (6.7)
These equations consist of operations in F(22) that can be computed as follows
(with g1, g0, h1, h0 ∈ F(2)):
(g1z + g0) · (h1z + h0) = (g1h1 + g0h1 + g1h0)z + (g1h1 + g0h0)
(g1z + g0)
2 = a1z + (a1 + a0)
(g1z + g0) · φ = (g1z + g0) · z = (g1 + g0)z + g1
(g1z + g0) · ω = (g1z + g0) · (z + 1) = g0z + (g1 + g0). (6.8)
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Figure 6.2: Workflow of our approach for pipelining the AES S-box.
6.4 Methodology
In this section, we provide an explanation of the framework that we have developed
for interfacing the GA with different parts of our system. We use those modules to
analyze, simulate and synthesize evolved netlists as depicted in Figure 6.2.
First, we parse the Verilog description of a certain circuit (netlist), which is, in our
case, the S-box design described in Section 6.3. This design also includes the affine
transformation part of the S-box.
This step provides us with different statistics of the target design such as the
number of standard cells, cell inputs and paths of the circuit. A path consists of every
unique combination of nodes connecting a single input to a single output. Then, an
appropriate input for the GA is generated in accordance to the delay of each element
of the netlist. From the GA, we receive a certain arrangement of FFs. That layout
represents a solution where the aim is to maximize the throughput of the S-box. The
FFs are inserted in a new netlist, simulated and synthesized (Steps 3–5 in Figure 6.2).
Although in our workflow we consider the scenario when simulation is not OK, this
is something we do not expect in the final solution. Therefore, this step serves for
avoiding the synthesis of the circuit if the GA outputs a wrong solution, i.e. it has a
different number of FFs in circuit paths.
In the following sections, we first describe the optimization problem. Then, we
continue on each step and relate our results using the design described in Section 6.3.
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6.4.1 Pipelining as an Optimization Problem
Our task consists of inserting a combination of FFs in order to increase throughput
via a certain number of pipeline stages. As an input parameter, we consider the
number of pipeline stages. With this parameter, we control how many layers of FF
elements we want in our circuit. A valid solution to this problem requires that all
the paths in the circuit contain the same number of FFs, which are placed in a way
that minimizes the delay in each pipeline stage. For a given number of stages, the
number of FFs at every path is one less than the number of stages, i.e. one FF per
path is a two-stage pipeline.
To define this as an optimization problem, we encode each possible solution as
a bitstring (a sequence of bits) where each bit represents every input location for
all standard cells in the circuit. In this encoding, a bit is set to the value “0” if the
corresponding input does not have an associated FF and to the value “1” if there is
a FF preceding that input. This means that the unmodified (original) circuit is thus
represented with all zeros.
The total bitstring length is equal to the sum of all the inputs in the circuit, which
in this case amounts to 432. A potential solution is therefore a sequence of bits of
length 432, which defines a search space of 2432.
The quality (i.e. the fitness value) of each potential solution is determined by the
delay of the pipeline stage with the greatest delay among all the stages. However,
since the optimization algorithm operates with any combination of bits in the search
process, a great number of potential solutions are expected to be infeasible. This is
because those solutions represent circuits with a different number of FFs when re-
garding all paths. To handle that constraint, a penalty factor can be included in the
quality estimate to differentiate between feasible (solutions with the same number
of FFs in all the paths) and infeasible solutions. The penalty should be great enough
such that each feasible solution (a circuit with the same number of FFs in every path),
regardless of the delay, is still better than any infeasible solution, to guide the search
to valid solutions. In this experiment, we disregard the cost of FFs in the area. How-
ever, adding that would be a simple extension of fitness function.
Based on the previous, we define the following fitness function that represents
the optimization problem:
fitness = max_delay_time+ (1 000 ∗ number_invalid_paths). (6.9)
Here, max_delay_time presents the longest delay for every pipeline stage and in-
valid paths are all those that do not have a predefined number of FFs. We experimen-
tally set the weight to be 1 000 in the formula above. Intuitively, the weight needs
to be large enough such that even in the case that there is only one invalid path, the
total fitness should be worse than for the solution without FFs. For the same reason,
every larger weight factor would work the same. The optimization objective is the
minimization of the fitness function. To calculate the maximum delay, we use an al-
gorithm where all possible paths in the network need to be traversed, which poses
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Figure 6.3: Small combinatorial circuit example without flip-flops.
a fairly large computational demand. Optimizing that algorithm represents one fu-
ture research direction. However, we note that the complexity of this problem does
not stem from the calculation of the maximum delay, but from the total number of
possible solutions.
We start with a small example to clarify the pipelining as an optimization prob-
lem. In Figure 6.3, we give a circuit with only six cells. Note that although we depict
NAND gates here, we imply them to be generic cells and therefore with different
delay times. In addition, delay times are set in a way such that there exists a trivial
solution for this problem. Our goal is to find an optimal two-stage pipeline imple-
mentation.
If we parse the Verilog netlist that describes this circuit, we obtain the following
output. Here, the first column represents the cell identifiers, the second column is
the number of inputs for each cell, the third column represents the inputs to each cell
and the last column represents delay of each cell. The exact procedure for obtaining
this output is explained in Section 6.4.2.
U1 2 I0 I1 5
U2 2 I2 U1 10
U3 2 I3 U2 5
U4 2 U1 I4 5
U5 2 U4 I5 15
U6 2 U3 U5 5
In order to increase the throughput of this circuit, we want to add FFs. We dis-
play here one combination that is correct and faster than the version without FFs.
The circuit with the added FFs is shown in Figure 6.4 where FFs are depicted with
rectangles.
In the next section, we describe in details the first step in Figure 6.2, focused on
the analysis of netlists.
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Figure 6.4: Small combinatorial circuit example with added flip-flops.
6.4.2 Analysis of Verilog Netlists
Our framework generates information about a circuit represented as a Verilog netlist.
In Table 6.1, we show the facts related to our choice of representation. These param-
eters are extracted using the framework we developed for pipelining the AES S-box.
The number of inputs refers to the number of inputs to all standard cells. Finally, the
number of paths denotes the number of different possible paths through the circuit
from an input to an output.
Table 6.1: Facts of the preliminary S-box design for pipeline application.
# Cells # Inputs # Paths Shortest path Critical path (ps)
165 432 8 023 409 4 3 884.52
Given a netlist of the S-box in Verilog, our framework first parses it accord-
ing to a predefined grammar and then, each cell from the UMC 0.13 µm standard
cell library is identified [Cor04]. This is done using a framework developed in
python 2.7.5-5 in combination with the pyparsing 2.0.1 library (http://
pyparsing.wikispaces.com/).
Relying on that library, we have defined a grammar that deconstructs each en-
try of a Verilog netlist into a set of cells and their connections. For instance, a
NOT AND (NAND) gate defined in the standard cell library can appear in a given
netlist as “ND2CLD U181 ( .I1(\input [0]), .I2(\input [1]), .O(n1)
);”. Hence, the parser must identify that cell as a NAND gate (ND2CLD) associated
to the U181 identifier. Moreover, it must detect that it is connected to the first two
inputs of the S-box and that the n1 wire routes its output.
This process is performed by creating a grammar that accepts a set of entries
consisting of:
• The name of the cell. The name of the cell is not unique, e.g. ND2CLD can
appear any number of times in a circuit.
• The cell identifier. Each cell has a unique identifier.
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• A comma-separated list of inputs and outputs (i.e. I1, I2 and O in the ex-
ample) connected to the circuit inputs, outputs or internal Verilog wires (i.e.
\input [0], \input [1] and n1).
Each cell of the netlist is abstracted in a data structure that stores the cell type,
the cell identifier, the number of inputs of the cell and all the cells that are connected
to their inputs i.e. their adjacent cells. Moreover, the delay associated to each cell
according to the standard cell library is also stored. This information is later used as
an input to the optimization algorithm. We note that we consider only intrinsic delay
here, and not delays connected with fanout and wire loads. For further information
about standard cell delay, we refer readers to [TFG06].
The resulting list contains all the circuit cells together with their number of inputs
and their adjacent nodes (that is, the cells that are connected to their inputs) as well
as the delay of each cell.
Next, we give a small excerpt of the parser output for the actual circuit:
U163 2 U251 U248 146.8
U164 3 U198 U256 U163 86.471
U165 4 U198 U163 U256 U164 98.369
U166 1 U207 59.39
U167 4 U207 U209 U210 U166 114.406
This example describes the number of inputs for the cells U163-U167 (i.e. 2, 3,
4, 1, 4 respectively) together with the cells that are connected to those inputs and the
respective delay of the cell according to the standard cell library.
These delay values are obtained as the average values for all possible combina-
tions (transitions from low to high and from high to low) for each cell. Taking the
average of low-to-high and high-to-low delays and assuming a low load capacitance
of 1.5 fF is an approximation that gives good results. Nevertheless, to improve our
methodology, the actual delay information based on the load of each standard cell
should be taken into account. There is also a possibility to work with the worst case
delays, but that would not change the methodology. Furthermore, such scenario is
not a very realistic one, since it would assume that each wire has a high load, which
does not occur so often. For each FF element that will be inserted in order to maxi-
mize the throughput, we use a D-FF with a single output and no clear, set or enable
(QDFFCLD) with an average delay time of 320.35 ps.
In the next section, we present the optimization algorithm we use to generate
pipelined circuits.
6.4.3 Genetic Algorithm
Prior into going to the details about the GA and its parameters, we first offer a short
rationale behind the choice of that algorithm. Since there is no previous work that
uses EC to evolve the optimal arrangement of FF elements in a combinatorial circuit,
we believe we should start with some well-researched algorithm that can be easily
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Table 6.2: GA parameters for the pipeline problem.
Parameter Parameter Value
Number of experiments 30
Tournament size 3
Population size 30
Stopping criterion Stagnation in 50 generations
Mutation rate 0.45
adapted. We opted for bitstring representation, which limits us to several algorithms
out of those used in this thesis. As shown in previous chapters (or referenced in liter-
ature) GAs performs good on various difficult optimization problems and therefore
lend themselves as a natural starting point. In Section 6.6, we present the experi-
ments with several other optimization techniques and compare these results with
those obtained with GA.
Common Parameters
The parameters used in each run of the algorithm are the following: the number of
independent runs for each evolutionary experiment is 30 and the population size
is 30. The tournament size in the SST is equal to three. Mutation probability is set
to 0.45 per individual. Stopping condition is stagnation in 50 generations. We chose
the aforementioned parameters on a basis of a small set of tuning experiments where
they showed the best results on average. All common parameters we also present in
Table 6.2.
From Table 6.1 we see that the number of cells in the shortest path is four. There-
fore, this path can have only three layers of FFs and that is the maximum number of
FFs our circuit can have in order to obtain a correct output.
Evolutionary Process
After the parameters are set, the EA generates the initial population. In this part,
the GA reads all the cells of the parser output file and for each cell input it reserves
one position in the bitstring representation. Notice that our bitstring size is fixed
for a given circuit and it cannot be dynamically changed during the evolutionary
process. This means that our current setting does not support multiple FFs one after
another. Naturally, this can be viewed as a weakness of this design, but we consider
it a design feature. It is important that once the evolutionary process starts, solution
length cannot be changed. Therefore, if one needed more than three layers of FFs, it
would be possible to add the necessary number of dummy cells to obtain more FF
layers, but with a constant solution length. The initial population is built by creating
random bitstrings of the designated length corresponding to randomly setting FFs
in the preliminary netlist.
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Figure 6.5: Graph representation of the S-box connections for each cell identifier.
When the initial population is generated, the GA starts with the evolution pro-
cess. In each iteration it randomly chooses k possible solutions (where k is the tour-
nament size) and eliminates the worst solution among those to ensure elitism. The
remaining solutions are used as parents: they create one offspring via variation op-
erators. Then, the offspring replaces the worst individual in the population and
additionally undergoes a mutation with a given probability.
For each offspring, a genetic operator is selected uniformly at random between
all operators within an operator class (mutation or crossover). We use simple and
mix mutations [ES03] and uniform [Sys89] and one-point [Hol92, ES03] crossover
operators. These variation operators are selected among those that are commonly
used nowadays.
The evolution process repeats until the stopping criterion is met. In our case,
the stopping criterion is based on 50 generations without improvement of the best
solution.
6.4.4 Reconstructing Evolved Individuals to the Netlist
Using the list of structures described in Section 6.4.2 it is possible to compute all
the paths of the circuit based on all the possible combinations for the 8 inputs and
outputs of the AES S-box. This is done by transforming the list of cell structures
described above into a non-directed graph, where the cells are represented by nodes
and their connections by edges. Then, it is possible to extract the connections in
the circuit and identify all the paths for all the input-output combinations using a
graph exploration algorithm such as the breadth-first search (cf. [Knu97]). We have
depicted in Figure 6.5 how our framework abstracts a Verilog netlist.
From the GA, we obtain the precise arrangement of FFs that will be inserted in the
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Figure 6.6: Simulation of AES S-box output for a certain input.
new netlist in order to maximize its throughput as described in Section 6.4.1. Given
the internal structure that we create from a Verilog netlist, it is possible to reconstruct
the circuit according to the output of the GA (Step 3 in Figure 6.2). Our framework
first splits the bitstring from the GA in different chunks according to the number of
inputs of each cell.
Then, it associates the respective FFs to each cell input. Moreover, the required
Verilog wires that connect each FF to the input/output of the cell are added. For
instance, for an XOR gate with two inputs (e.g. XOR2ELD) and an output “11” from
the GA, this cell would be reconstructed with two FFs attached to their inputs using
two wires (e.g. ff_9_q, ff_10_q) as:
QDFFCLD FF9 ( .CK( c l k ) , .D( n180 ) , .Q( f f_9_q ) ) ;
QDFFCLD FF10 ( .CK( c l k ) , .D( n198 ) , .Q( f f_10_q ) ) ;
XOR2ELD U212 ( . I1 ( f f_9_q ) , . I2 ( f f_10_q ) , .O( n201 ) ) ;
Finally, a test bench with assertions for all the 256 possibilities of the S-box is
created for the regenerated netlist. This is used in Mentor Graphics ModelSim 6.5c to
guarantee the correctness of the new circuit. The resulting circuit is then synthesized
using Synopsys Design Compiler in order to get pre-layout implementation results
for the critical path delay and the area. In Figure 6.6, we depict the corresponding
output for a certain input of one AES S-box when simulated in Mentor Graphics
ModelSim.
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6.5 Results
In this section, we present our performance figures for the developed framework
that analyzes and reconstructs Verilog netlist. We also show the synthesis results for
our best candidates i.e. those S-boxes that obtained the maximum throughput.
6.5.1 Analysis framework
In our S-box design, based on 165 cells (Table 6.1), we required 0.465 seconds for
generating the input for the GA using the described framework with an Intel Core
i5-3230M CPU clocked at 2.60 GHz (Step 1, Figure 6.2). The evaluation of one gener-
ation consisting of 30 individuals requires 60 seconds on average (Step 2, Figure 6.2).
We conduct all GAs experiments on an Intel i5-3470 CPU clocked at 3.60 GHz and
equipped with 6 GB of RAM.
Table 6.3 depicts the number of paths for the best found solution. Here, we give
a total number of paths sorted into classes according to the delay time. The original
circuit represents a solution without FFs (i.e. solution encoded as 432 zeros) whereas
the evolved circuit is the solution with the delay time (e.g. the best solution has
maximum delay time of 2 793.62 ps as given in Table 6.4). Additionally, in the same
table, we present different statistics for several evolved circuits.
Table 6.3: Number of paths per delay class for original and pipelined circuit.
Class Initial circuit Evolved circuit
0 – 500 2 5 570
500 – 1 000 2 164 78 5432
1 000 – 1 500 149 944 3 751 897
1 500 – 2 000 2 026 442 2 639 751
2 000 – 2 500 3 580 150 816 636
2 500 – 3 000 1 899 675 26 411
3 000 – 3 500 361 708 0
3 500 – 4 000 3 324 0
In Table 6.4 column “# of FFs” represents the total number of FFs GA added in
the evolution process. Column “# of gens” indicates in which generation GA reached
the designated solution.
6.5.2 Synthesis
As can be seen from Table 6.4, the best solution the GA finds when dividing the
circuit into two stages (i.e. inserting one layer of FFs) has an estimated critical path
of 2 793.62 ps. The best solution with two layers (three-stage circuit) of FFs has the
critical path equal to 2 918.92 ps. Intuitively, we would expect the solution with two
layers of FFs to have a shorter critical path.
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Table 6.4: Maximum delay times for pipelined circuits, GA with SST.
Max. delay time (ps) # of stages # of FFs # of generations
2 793.62 2 73 587
2 826.52 2 68 15
2 942.42 2 66 691
3 155.11 2 49 482
3 223.02 2 64 4 452
3 247.64 2 42 1 434
3 247.64 2 43 750
3 247.64 2 48 806
3 448.59 2 57 740
3 489.24 2 58 699
3 523.16 2 30 4 315
3 523.16 2 49 695
3 676.83 2 52 807
2 918.92 3 100 618
The best solution found by the GA for the three-stage circuit is worse than the
best solution it finds for the two-stage circuit. This suggests that three-stage circuit
pipelining is more difficult optimization problem than the two-stage circuit pipelin-
ing. Nevertheless, we expect that better solutions should exist for three stages than
for two stages.
We synthesize both solutions as well as the original solution without FFs, result-
ing in Table 6.5. In order to evaluate the critical path properly, we insert FFs at the
inputs and outputs of all the S-boxes. The netlist with one stage only contains these
input and output FFs. The netlists with two and three stages contains one and two
layers of FFs, respectively. Because of these input and output FFs, the netlist with
only one stage is larger in area than the composite field S-boxes reported in litera-
ture (they do not contain any FFs).
Table 6.5 shows that the two-stage S-box introduces a 50% improvement in through-
put, which is equal to the number of bits at the output (eight in our case), divided by
the delay of the critical path. The increase in area is only 18%. The synthesis results
for the critical path are even slightly better than the estimate of the GA. The reason is
that the synthesis tool optimizes the generated pipelined netlist again, which leads
to further improvements. For the 3-stage S-box, the synthesis results are worse than
the estimate of the GA. This is probably because there is less room for optimization
with two layers of pipelining FFs and thus less logic in between the layers.
6.6 EAs Comparison and Improvements
In this section, we present our results for several other optimization algorithms as
well as for the improvements in evolution process.
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Table 6.5: Pre-layout synthesis results of the netlist with 1, 2 and 3 stages.
# of stages Critical path (ns) Throughput (Gbits/s) Area (µm2) Gate count
1 3.9 2.05 2 450 612.5
2 2.6 3.07 2 901 725.25
3 3.2 2.50 3 433 858.25
6.6.1 New Algorithms and Comparison
In this phase, we add three more algorithms, namely GA with the roulette-wheel
selection (RW), GAn and ES. The GA with the roulette wheel selection has crossover
probability pc of 0.7. With GAn, we set the energy bank parameter to the value
100 000, cooling factor to 0.7 and we enforce elitism. In ES, we set the λ value to four.
The rest of parameters are given in Table 6.2. Those parameters are selected on a
basis of our previous experience with those algorithms.
With GAn and ES we did not find any correct solutions. We believe this is due
to the inefficiency of their variation operators when dealing with this problem. This
is especially apparent for ES since it uses only mutation and usually requires much
larger number of generations. In the case of GA with RW selection, we present re-
sults in Table 6.6. The results show that GA with RW selection is able to find solutions
that improve significantly over the initial solution, but are still worse than the best
solutions when using SST selection.
Table 6.6: Maximum delay times for pipelined circuits, GA with RW.
Max. delay time (ps) # of stages # of FFs # of generations
3,079.23 2 67 2 696
3 129.69 2 50 1 951
3 384.45 2 33 1 511
3 466.96 2 34 1 783
3 577.25 2 38 1 387
3 577.25 2 45 2 228
6.6.2 Reducing the Complexity
When using random initialization of the population, the fitness equals to 8.02·109
when averaged over all individuals and 30 independent runs of the algorithm. As
evident from that value, random solutions (individuals) have a large number of in-
correct paths (second part of the Eq. (6.9)). Therefore, depending on the particular
individual in any run of the algorithm, it can be very difficult for the EAs to converge
to the correct solution (especially when looking for high quality solutions).
In order to improve the convergence capability of EAs, we add the option of seed-
ing the initial population with correct individuals with FFs and therefore smaller
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maximum delay paths. Naturally, first we need to employ EAs to find such individ-
uals before we can use them in next EAs runs. To support such a design, we add
a mechanism of “protected” locations inside an individual. Protected locations are
those that have FFs and which should not be changed during the run of EAs. With
this improvement, we help EAs not only by lowering the complexity of the prob-
lem since now we do not have 2432 solutions, but 2432−n solutions, where n equals
the number of protected locations. Furthermore, this improvement should also help
when looking for solutions that have more than two stages.
To illustrate this with a simple example, consider the bitstring “000011001100”,
which represents a solution as presented in Figure 6.4. There, all locations that have
value “1” are “protected” and therefore not to be changed in the subsequent run of
the optimization algorithm. Therefore, the number of solutions decreases from 212
to 28.
In order to implement this option, we add the notion of “mask” file, which in-
cludes the solution we wish to use. After the program starts, it first looks for the
“mask file” to check all positions it cannot modify. After that the standard evolu-
tionary process starts. We present the solutions obtained with the aforementioned
technique in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: Maximum delay times for pipelined circuits with protected locations.
Max. delay time (ps) # of stages # of add. FFs # of gens Based on sol. (ps) Search space size
2 793.62 3 43 486 3 223.02 368
2 847.37 3 46 458 3 247.64 390
2 888.02 3 50 423 3 247.64 390
3 075.61 3 37 433 3 247.64 390
3 219.48 3 41 418 3 223.02 368
The first observation is that not every mask leads to correct solutions, i.e. if the
mask is “wrong” then we obtain only incorrect solutions. Next, we see that in av-
erage this technique is faster than those as presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.6. Finally,
three solutions from this phase are better than the best solutions for three layers
(2 918.92) when using initial version of algorithm. The best solution has a critical
path of 2 793.62 ps which is the same value as for the best solution with two layers.
However, we note that this solution does not have FFs at the same positions as in
the two layers case, i.e. this best solution is not just the best two layer solution plus
some additional FFs.
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter presents a methodology for pipelining composite field AES S-boxes to
maximize the throughput using EAs. The best trade-off between throughput and
area results in a throughput of 3.07 Gbits/s and an area of 2 901 µm2 in a UMC
0.13 µm standard cell library. This comes down to a solution that adds one layer of
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pipelining registers in order to increase the throughput of the S-box with 50% while
the extra FFs only increase the area with 18%. To underline the complexity of this
problem, we add some facts on the circuit under investigation, which show to find
this solution is far from straightforward.
In order to improve the throughput even more, the design space should be in-
creased with more composite field representations. The search algorithm can be fur-
ther optimized, e.g. by making a more intelligent choice of the seed. Naturally, more
optimization techniques should be also investigated.
On a more general level, we plan to investigate the efficiency of this method when
pipelining the full AES circuit or even some circuit not connected with cryptography.
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Chapter 7
A Search for the Fault
“The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to
originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order
it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of
anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is
to assist us in making available what we are already
acquainted with.”
Ada Lovelace
This chapter deals with the application of EC to a problem of finding fault injec-tion parameters that can cause faults. In this chapter, we also give more details
on a process of building a custom EC method.
7.1 Introduction
Smart cards and other small security devices such as Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tags are used on daily basis by billions of users for applications such as public
transportation, Internet banking, online shopping, etc. The exposure to numerous
threats, mainly coming from the adversary aiming at physical security have led to
this being one of the most actively researched topics by both academia and industry
in the past two decades.
Already in 1996, Anderson and Kuhn [AK96] put some doubt on the claimed
tamper-resistance of smart cards, followed by the set of techniques for actually tam-
pering with them by Kömmerling and Kuhn as presented in [KK99].
Recall that, generally speaking, the techniques for tampering can be classified
as passive or active [MOP07]. In passive techniques some side-channel information
is monitored while there is no interference with the normal processing of the card.
Examples of these passive techniques include the analysis of power consumption,
as introduced by Kocher et al. [KJJ99] or electromagnetic radiation [QS01]. In the
case of active techniques, the device is not only monitored, but also external inter-
ferences affect the normal behavior of the device. An example is FI attack. These
interferences, the so-called glitches, can be of different nature: optical (laser pulses)
This chapter is based on the following papers: “Glitch it if You Can: Novel Parameter Search Strate-
gies for Successful Fault Injection”, published in CARDIS 2013. “Evolving Genetic Algorithms for Fault
Injection Attacks”, published in MIPRO 2014. “Search Strategy for Fault Injection Using Memetic Algo-
rithms”, published in COSADE 2015.
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and electrical glitches (voltage, clock), temperature changes, electromagnetic (EM)
radiation, etc. To define it more formally, a glitch is an abnormal signal that is in-
jected into a device and is defined by a set of parameters. Glitches are used to cause
malfunctioning, resulting in some cases in secret key recovery.
FI techniques by glitching are typically non-invasive techniques, in the sense that
the smart card under investigation is not physically modified (versus other invasive
techniques that require hardware modifications).
An FI attack is considered to be successful if after exposing the device under
attack to a specially crafted external interference, the device shows an unexpected
behavior, which can be exploited by an attacker (e. g. leaking of sensitive informa-
tion, bypassing security checks, etc.). However, this external interference has to be
precisely tuned for the fault injection to succeed. As an example, a complete charac-
terization of a clock signal glitch requires the security analyst to define more than 10
parameters (related to clock signal voltage levels, time offset of the glitch, etc.). To
deal with this problem, security analysts usually set a value range for each param-
eter, and leave their fault injection setup experimenting over thousands of different
parameter configurations within those given ranges to be analyzed off-line after-
wards.
The Problem. Finding the correct search space parameters for a successful FI can
be considered as a search problem where one aims to find, within minimum time,
the parameter configuration or ranges of parameter values, which result in a suc-
cessful FI. The search space, considering all possible combinations of the values
of interest for the FI such as voltage, timing, offset, etc., is too large to perform an
exhaustive search. Considering this problem within the black box testing as often
required in reality, setting an accurate range for the parameters can be quite chal-
lenging. Furthermore, a bad estimation of these ranges leads to this daunting task
becoming infeasible. For example, there are in total eight parameters to be set for
voltage (Integrated Circuit Power Supply Pin (VCC)) glitching even without con-
sidering multiple glitches [CPB+13]. As a simple example, testing only six values
for each parameter yields 68 = 1676916 parameter combinations. This is infeasible
to test in a reasonable amount of time, as it would take over 19 days assuming a
quite fast rate of one measurement per second. Here, by a measurement we mean
a complete execution of the algorithm of interests on the device including the final
response (which can have several different outcomes such as reset, stop, etc.).
Due to all these issues, there is a clear need for a methodology for parameter
search that can ultimately lead to a more effective security evaluation and hence bet-
ter protected embedded security devices. In this chapter, we investigate the problem
of inducing effective faults in the black box scenario. By “effective”, we imply that
such a faulty computation could lead to some cryptanalysis for the secret data recov-
ery. To this aim we first start with GA and modify it to tackle the problem better.
At the moment when we reach the full capabilities of the aforementioned GA, we
transform it further into a MA that is capable of finding such faults. Furthermore,
the same algorithm can be also used if the goal is to find a proper subspace in the
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huge set of all possible parameters values. Being able to restrict our FI attempts to
this subspace allows us to find more effective faults in much less trials compared
with the random search approach.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, in Section 7.2, we present relevant
research. In Section 7.3, we describe the problem, more precisely the model, search
space parameters, verdict classes and smart card details. In Section 7.4, we describe
the design and implementation of a custom GA. We extend the GA algorithm in
Section 7.5 by combining it with the two other algorithms and adding search space
characterization option. We conclude with Section 7.6, where we give short sum-
mary and possible future research directions.
7.2 Related Work
The concept of fault analysis-based attacks is known in the research community for
around twenty years. Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton published an attack on RSA where
they exploit hardware faults for cryptanalysis [BDL96, BDL97].
Kömmerling and Kuhn present an extensive overview of techniques for fault in-
jection and other tampering techniques and give ideas on how to mitigate some of
them [KK99]. The paper highlights the case of VCC fault injection (referred to as
glitch attacks) and emphasizes those as the ones most useful in practice.
Aumüller et al. performed one of the first practical works on fault analysis, in
which they describe a real-life scenario of the impact of injecting glitches VCC and
clock lines of an Integrated Circuit (IC) [ABF+03]. They also suggest some counter-
measures applicable in this specific case.
Approximately at the same time, Skorobogatov and Anderson introduce optical
(laser) fault injection, where they describe injecting faults with a laser on a decapsu-
lated IC [SA03]. This technique is still very successful nowadays for defeating the
security of many protected devices, but it is out of scope for this work.
Van Woudenberg et al. describe a real attack scenario for an Optical Fault Injec-
tion attack [vWWM11]. The practical problem of setting the parameters for fault in-
jection is introduced in their work and the authors briefly discuss the lack of method-
ology to solve it as the main direction they rely on is based on heuristics. In addition,
the paper gives a nice overview of all the practical issues that arise during a real ex-
ecution of the FI attacks on actual hardware.
Balasch et al. explore the effects when glitches are injected in the clock line of an
IC [BGV11]. This work is very interesting for identifying various effects that a glitch
can cause on real hardware in terms of defining all possible outcomes of a successful
FI. However, it has to be noted that current smart cards usually run on an internal
clock, which makes this FI technique unfeasible.
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7.3 Problem Statement
The goal is to design a search strategy for VCC FI parameters that lead to a successful
fault injection.
Input of the search consists of the parameters required by the search strategy to
proceed, and an estimated initial range for every parameter.
Search space is a set of all the possible combinations of values for every param-
eter required to define the VCC FI attack. Parameters that can have real values are
considered as discrete-valued parameters sampled with the maximum resolution of
the acquisition hardware devices, and all value ranges are bounded. The goal of
the search is to get the maximum information about the behavior of a device with
the minimum number of measurements given a black-box scenario. Furthermore,
the goal is to find parameters that define a successful VCC FI attack in the case that
device is vulnerable to fault attacks caused by glitching.
Output of the search is a report of the behavior of the device. Additionally, an
output can include a parameter combination or a set of parameter combinations that
lead to a successful VCC FI attack.
7.3.1 Model
We divide the search into two phases: in the first phase, we look for the appropriate
glitch shape (containing all the parameters that define the signal) and in the second
phase we look for the timing instant in which we have to inject the fault. The moti-
vation for the parameter split into two stages is obtaining a reduction in the dimen-
sionality (thus, complexity) of the problem. The feasibility of this parameter splitting
was experimentally tested to be possible and useful: all Target of Evaluations (TOEs)
(from this point on, targets) covered by this research show a similar behavior w.r.t.
glitch shape-related parameters. The second stage search consists of a time sweep
with glitch shapes obtained by the first stage search. The time range defined in the
initial search space is discretized in n time instants. In each time instant, a subset of
the glitch shapes output by the first stage is tested. The verdicts of all measurements
are reported as the final output of the parameter search.
7.3.2 Verdict Classes and Boundaries
Fault injection testing equipment can output only verdict classes that correspond to
the effectiveness of the measurement. There exist several possible classes for classi-
fying a single measurement (i.e. attack attempt):
1. NORMAL: smart card behaves as expected and the glitch is ignored.
2. RESET: smart card resets because of the glitch.
3. MUTE: smart card stops all communication as a result of the glitch.
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4. CHANGING: smart card gives different responses for the same glitch (only in
the first phase of the experiments).
5. INCONCLUSIVE: smart card responds in a way that cannot be classified in
any other class (only in the second phase of the experiments).
6. SUCCESS: smart card response is a specific, predetermined value that does not
happen under normal operation.
In the rest of this paper, we will consider RESET and MUTE classes as equivalent
when interpreting the results. Additionally, when depicting graphs with measure-
ment results, for each class we allocate a color. When the card responds NORMAL,
we depict a green dot in search space, for RESET/MUTE we depict blue color, for IN-
CONCLUSIVE yellow color and finally, for SUCCESS red color. CHANGING class
is not depicted in the graphs. This is because CHANGING actually outputs some
other class (different classes in multiple measurements) and is therefore depicted as
one of those classes.
Looking for parameter combinations that lead to the successful fault injection
can be regarded as optimization problem where we want to find as much as possible
successful combinations in the minimal amount of time. However, before trying to
give an answer about appropriate methods, we explain how difficult the problem is.
In a realistic setting that we consider, glitch voltage parameter ranges from -5000
mV to -50 mV , with a step of 50 mV . Second parameter, glitch length ranges from 2
ns to 150 ns with a step of 2 ns. If we conduct experiments where we are interested
in only those two parameters and do exhaustive search, we need to collect 7 400
measurements. If we assume that each measurement takes one second, this results
in the total time of two hours. However, if we add just one more parameter, e.g.
glitch offset that ranges from 100 ns to 400 ns with 1 ns step, then we have in total
2.2 million measurements. This equals to more than 600 hours of measurement time.
Naturally, here one also needs to take into account possible consequences for a smart
card if it is tested for more than 600 hours and the fact that there are several more
parameters of interest not mentioned in this calculation. Therefore, we conclude that
the complexity of the problem depends on the number of considered parameters and
it can be regarded as a difficult problem (in realistic test environments).
In the first phase of the experiments, we concentrate only on two parameters,
namely, glitch length and glitch voltage in order to better control the behavior of our
algorithm. Only when we are satisfied with the algorithm performance, we add the
third parameter, glitch offset in the second phase of our experiments. We display a
photo of our laboratory setup in Figure 7.1.
7.3.3 Search Space Parameters
Multiple search space parameters need to be set for finding faults in FI process. We
informally divide those parameters into two groups, the first group consists of pa-
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Figure 7.1: Laboratory setup for FI testing.
rameters that we influence with external search algorithm and are therefore of pri-
mary interest. The second group consists of parameters that we leave for fault injec-
tion framework to be set randomly.
In the first group, we include the parameters for glitch length, glitch voltage and
in the second phase of experiments glitch offset. The glitch length refers to the time
(ns) that the VCC line is perturbed. The glitch voltage is the number of millivolts
(mV ) that is added to the VCC line. The glitch offset is the start time (ns) of the
perturbation relative to the start of the clock cycle.
In order to understand better the influence of those parameters, next we give few
examples of their working. Suppose that the glitch length is 100 ns, the glitch voltage
is -3500 mV , the glitch offset is 250 ns, and the supplied VCC is 5 V . What happens
is that 250 ns after the start of the clock cycle the VCC line will be pulled down to 1.5
V for 100 ns, after which it will be restored to 5 V . These three parameters determine
the electrical effect on the target: roughly speaking the product of glitch length and
glitch voltage represents the amount of energy that is exerted on (or withheld from)
the target. Since the current propagation within a clock cycle is not constant, the
offset timing is also important. We refer to these parameters as the “shape” of the
glitch. Note that this is a physical effect: if the glitch is too strong the target will
“mute” or reset, if the glitch is too weak the target will not be disturbed, but if the
glitch is of appropriate shape the target will behave in an unspecified way. This
is unrelated to the logical effect, which refers to the exact instruction that is being
glitched.
The second parameter group covers the logical effect and it consists of the num-
ber of wait cycles and the number of glitch cycles. The wait cycles parameter refers
to the number of clock cycles that are skipped before the glitch attack is performed,
counting from the sending of the smart card command. The glitch cycles parameter
specifies the number of successive clock cycles that are glitched.
For example, we could wait for 800 clock cycles and then apply the glitch in
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the next five cycles, assuming the relevant instruction is executed around that time
frame. The fact that the electrical effects can be observed independent of the logical
effects allows the security analyst to work in two phases. First, he finds a glitch
“shape” that triggers the target to behave in unspecified way. In the second phase he
can search for the right wait cycles and glitch cycles values while applying the right
glitch.
In the rest of this chapter, we do not investigate the logical parameters. We as-
sume reasonable ranges for the wait/glitch cycles and select uniformly at random.
A nice property of the glitch shape parameters is that they display locality. The
glitch offset has only a small range of values that “work”. On top of that, the glitch
voltage and the glitch length are monotone: once a glitch voltage is strong enough
to force a card reset, then bigger than the threshold values will also force a reset.
The same goes for the glitch length. In practice, this means that there is a clear
phase transition in the voltage/length dimensions between NORMAL results and
RESET/MUTE results. In addition, the class of SUCCESS results (when offset is also
guessed correctly) is often located around this phase transition. Note however that
the exact effect of a glitch is stochastic and a perfect separation of parameter regions
is impossible.
7.3.4 Smart Card Details
In all our experiments we use smart cards that are based on ATMega163+24C256 IC,
realized in Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology. Those
cards do not exhibit any side-channel or fault injection countermeasures. All process-
ing of the card is performed in software, and cards are running on an external 1MHz
clock frequency. For experimental purposes, we attack a vulnerable Personal Iden-
tification Number (PIN) authentication mechanism. The PIN authentication mecha-
nism is implemented as follows:
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if (pin[i] == input[i])
ok_digits++;
}
if (ok_digits == 4) //LOCATION FOR ATTACK
respond_code(0x00, SW_NO_ERROR_msb, SW_NO_ERROR_lsb);
else
respond_code(0x00, 0x69, 0x85);
In the code above, we want to glitch the target while it is executing the second
if-statement. However, we want to emphasize that our approach makes no assump-
tions on the software that runs on the smart card. First, we regard the target as a
black box and only hypothesize that there exists a weakness in the implementation
and that we can roughly estimate its location in time. Secondly, the most difficult
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part of finding good FI parameters are the electrical properties like glitch voltage
and glitch length. The right values for these dimensions will make the target phys-
ically behave in an unspecified way, and most importantly, they will do so on any
smart card of the same make (or production batch), regardless of the software.
7.4 First Experimental Phase
In all the experiments, we use Inspector software as FI framework [Ris]. All the
points are measured three times to enable the detection of changing behavior (the
CHANGING class). Since a CHANGING class simply corresponds to different be-
havior in subsequent probes, a minimum of two measurements is required for en-
abling detection of that class. The motivation for this lies in the fact that for some
unstable protected targets more measurements per point are required to mitigate
some side-effects during data acquisition.
The goal of the first phase it to give an answer to the following question:
• Can we use GA to find search space parameters that produce faults?
7.4.1 Interfacing Frameworks
In order for experiments to be conducted, we need an interface between the frame-
work that performs the measurements (FI framework) and EAs framework (and
more precisely, GA). Furthermore, since the FI framework conducts measurements
on the basis of the EAs framework results, those frameworks need to communicate in
real time. We experimented with several different approaches and in the end, we de-
cided to use the following one. The EAs framework generates individuals in batches
and writes them to the “INPUT” file, and then changes the value in “SEMAPHORE”
file from 0 to 1. The FI framework detects that “SEMAPHORE” file value is 1 and
reads everything from the “INPUT” file and conducts measurements. Results (ver-
dict classes) are then written in batch to the “OUTPUT” file and “SEMAPHORE”
file value is set to zero. At that point, the EAs framework reads the verdict classes
and sets appropriate fitness values for individuals. This process is repeated until a
specified number of iterations is reached.
7.4.2 Monte Carlo Search
This search strategy consists of performing measurements with randomly selected
parameter combinations within the given initial search space. The random distribu-
tion for selecting values is considered to be uniform for each parameter present in
the search space. This strategy is considered as the baseline search strategy.
A typical result for Monte Carlo search is given in Figure 7.2. All graphs are pro-
duced automatically by the Inspector program [Ris] and they depict only NORMAL,
RESET/MUTE and SUCCESS verdict classes.
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Figure 7.2: Plot of measurement classification for Monte Carlo search.
Test run for the Monte Carlo strategy consists of 3072 measurements and it com-
pleted with no SUCCESS measurement. Because of the random nature of parameter
values selection, there is also a significant number of repeated parameter combina-
tions.
7.4.3 Genetic Algorithm Approach
For a GA to work, we need to assign to each verdict class a distinct fitness value.
Since we set the problem to be maximization, better classes will have higher fitness
values.
In the initial version of the algorithm NORMAL, RESET or MUTE verdict classes
are assigned value of one. CHANGING verdict class is assigned value eight and
SUCCESS verdict class is assigned a value of ten. To obtain a verdict class for each
parameter combination we conduct three measurements. Formally, the GA aims to
find a pair (e.g. glitch length, glitch voltage) such that the fitness value F is maximal
as defined in Eq. (7.1):
objective = max(F (glitch_voltage, glitch_length)). (7.1)
7.4.4 Common Parameters Phase One
In Table 7.1, we give FI search space parameters that we used in every experimental
run.
We present GA parameters in Table 7.2. These parameters are in common for all
versions of GA in the first experimental phase. Some of those values are set after
a short parameter tuning phase where we experimented with different population
sizes and stopping criteria.
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Table 7.1: FI framework parameters, phase one.
Parameter Parameter value
VCC Voltage 5 V
CLK High Voltage 5 V
CLK Low Voltage 0 V
Glitch length [2, 150] ns
Glitch voltage [-5000, -50] mV
Glitch offset random from [100, 400] ns
Glitch cycles random from [1, 10]
Wait cycles random from [750, 850]
Table 7.2: EA framework parameters, phase one.
Parameter Parameter value
Tournament size 3
Population size 30
Number of experiments 30
Stopping criterion Stagnation in 10 generations
Mutation rate 0.1
7.4.5 Initial Results
Since there are only a few different verdict classes, it means that a big portion of the
search space will be impossible to differentiate. Therefore, we developed a version
of tournament generational algorithm that is more appropriate for this specific prob-
lem. We describe a single generation of the algorithm with the pseudocode as given
in Algorithm 8.
In all the experiments, EC framework creates the population in the first genera-
tion randomly. We depict the results from the initial version of GA in Figure 7.3a.
In Figure 7.3b we present the same experiment, but with 50 generations without
improvement as a stopping criterion.
It can be observed that the algorithm outputs a valid point. By valid it is un-
derstood that the value is in the boundary between the two unimodal components.
When speaking in terms of classifiers, the output point would be on top of the de-
cision boundary between the two classes. The algorithm finished when no better
fitness values could be found.
After running the first set of experiments, we notice some undesired effects. Once
the algorithm finds a point with a high fitness value (in this case, CHANGING class),
it seems to fix one variable and explores the full range of the other. For this prob-
lem, spreading the search so much only in two directions is not so desirable. in the
sense that points too distant from each other that belong to the CHANGING class
will likely classify to one of the low fitness valued classes (NORMAL or RESET/-
MUTE). In other words, the decision boundary between classes will always have the
same shape (convex, monotonically increasing curve and ideally it would mimic an
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Algorithm 8 Genetic Algorithm for FI - initial version.
Require: count = 0, crx_count = 0
repeat
randomly select 3 individuals
select best of the 3 individuals
copy best to new population
count = count + 1
until N >count
replace old with the new generation
repeat
randomly select parents p1, p2
child1 = crossover (p1, p2)
child2 = crossover (p2, p1)
replace p1 with child1
replace p2 with child2
crx_count = crx_count + 1
until N * pc > crx_count
perform mutation on all individuals with pm
evaluate population
(a) Stagnation in 10 generations. (b) Stagnation in 50 generations.
Figure 7.3: Measurements for GA, initial algorithm.
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exponential curve). Therefore, the direction that contains points belonging to the
CHANGING class is not explored in depth by a vertical or horizontal line. We give
an example of monotone behavior between two verdict classes in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Example of monotone behavior between two verdict classes [CPB+13].
Our GA would be more successful in terms of finding more points that classify
to CHANGING class by exploring the surroundings of a point that classifies into
CHANGING inside a neighborhood of distance d (increasing d if needed) from it.
Another effect that we observed is that once the GA finds a point belonging to the
CHANGING class, the rest of the search space is ignored. This elitism is good in a
sense that we want the search to be as short as possible, but it often does not result
in exploring interesting parts of the search space sufficiently.
7.4.6 Improving Crossover and Parameter Tuning
Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) in general (and GA in specific) do optimization by
default, which means they always try to find points with a higher fitness value. The
behavior of current algorithm is expected, especially with such small variances in
fitness values. However, as we want to find as many points that belong to a certain
class, we change the crossover operator to be more adequate.
The new crossover operator - local crossover (LCX) works in the following way.
The first crossover point (potential solution) is chosen randomly. The second point
is chosen so the LCX operator crosses two points that belong to different classes, and
it generates a new offspring point between the parents in the search space. The posi-
tion of the offspring point is chosen on the basis of the number of solutions in com-
plete population that belong to the parents classes: a child is proportionally closer to
the parent with the class that is less represented, i.e. the class with the smaller num-
ber of individuals in the population. Only in the case when the first parent belongs
to SUCCESS class, this operator tries to find a second parent in the same class. A
mutation is conducted by adding some random value to the parameters. We show
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Figure 7.5: Measurements for the GA with modified crossover.
the results for the new algorithm with improved crossover operator in Figure 7.5.
Although it may seem that the results depicted in Figure 7.5 are not better than those
with the original algorithm, note that the graph does not show CHANGING class.
7.4.7 Optimization + Classification Algorithm
In a classical black-box optimization scenario, the best possible fitness value is not
known in advance. The optimization algorithm will therefore always strive to find
points with better values, regardless of how good the current solution is. If the best
value is known, or if the goal is to find a solution of an acceptable predefined fitness
value, then the algorithm is usually configured to stop as soon as it finds a single
solution of the desired quality.
In this application, we diverge from the described principle in the following
ways:
• We define a target fitness level where all the solutions having fitness equal or
better than the target value are regarded as equally good and called target
points.
• Points worse than target value are divided into a number of subclasses corre-
sponding to their fitness (we presume there is a small number of discrete fit-
ness values).
• Instead of satisfying with a single target solution, the algorithm should find as
many distinct target points as possible.
From the first two bullets above stems the “Classification” part of this algorithm
since we classify solutions to the target points. The fitness assignment in this ver-
sion is also not the same as in previous version of the algorithm, to allow distinction
of different subclasses. Here we opted for a small change in values, so that NOR-
MAL class retains the value of one, RESET or MUTE classes are assigned value 2,
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Table 7.3: Comparison of the Monte Carlo and GA in final version
Strategy Measurements # SUCCESS
Monte Carlo 3072 0
GA + classification 1560 8
CHANGING class is assigned value 8.5 and the target fitness level value is 8. This
allows the algorithm to perceive NORMAL and RESET/MUTE points as different
subclasses, and all points that classify to CHANGING as target class points.
The next generation in the search algorithm is produced in part by crossing the
points from the current population of N size, and in part by selecting the better indi-
viduals by tournament selection operator. The proportion of crossover is controlled
by the crossover probability (pc), and the remaining individuals are selected with the
tournament operator.
The selection of parents in the crossover operator is designed to promote diver-
sity and explore boundaries between classes (points of different fitness values). The
first parent is selected randomly from current generation; then, if the first parent is
worse than the target level, the second parent is randomly selected from another
class (point with a different fitness value). If, on the other hand, the first parent is of
the target class, the algorithm tries to select another target class point as the second
parent. If no such individual exists, a random parent is taken otherwise.
The crossover operation also acts depending on the parent classes. If crossing
points belong to different classes, the child is generated as a point between the par-
ents in search space, but proportionally closer to the parent whose class is repre-
sented with a smaller number of individuals in current population. In this way, the
search is guided towards the class that covers a smaller area of the search space. If
crossing points are from the same class, the child is generated randomly between the
parents in the search space.
After the crossover and tournament selection, a mutation operator is invoked on
the new set of individuals, where the total number of mutations is determined with
the mutation probability parameter (pm). Algorithm 9 represents a pseudocode for a
single iteration of the modified GA.
In Table 7.3, we give the comparison of the effectiveness of Monte Carlo and GA
that uses modified crossover operator and classification.
We show a typical result of the modified GA version in Figure 7.6. In this case,
the algorithm succeeded in finding the most target class points in a limited number
of measurements.
7.5 Second Experimental Phase
In the second phase of the experiments, we start with the Algorithm 9, but we make
several changes in an effort to make it simpler yet more powerful and fast.
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Algorithm 9 Genetic algorithm + classification.
Require: crx_count = 0, mut_count = 0
repeat
select first parent
if first parent of target class then
try to find matching second parent
else
try to find second parent of different class
end if
perform crossover (depending on parent classes)
copy child to new generation
crx_count = crx_count + 1
until pc ∗N > crx_count
repeat
select random individuals for tournament
copy best of tournament to new generation
mut_count = mut_count + 1
until (1− pc) ∗N > mut_count
perform mutation on new generation with probability pm
evaluate population
First, we remove verdict class CHANGING since we experiment with smaller
number of measurements and consequently each location is measured only once.
We add the class INCONCLUSIVE for all those measurements that cannot be clas-
sified in any other class. Next, we change the stopping condition for GA from 10
generations without improvement to 10 generations. Finally, we change the values
that the verdict classes are assigned to. Furthermore, to make the search setting
more difficult (and therefore more realistic) we add the third parameter to the search
- glitch offset. In this phase, we use a Memetic Algorithm (MA) that combines GA,
Tabu Search (TS) and Local Search (LS).
7.5.1 Common Parameters Phase Two
In Tables 7.4 and 7.5, we give common parameters for the second phase of the exper-
iments for FI and EA parts, respectively.
As it can be seen in Table 7.5, we use a small number of generations and a small
population size since we are interested in rapid characterization or finding faults. In-
deed, if one has sufficient time at his disposal no method can outperform exhaustive
search.
7.5.2 Redefining the Problem
In the second phase, we concentrate on the following questions of interest.
• How to find maximal number of faults in a small number of measurements?
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Figure 7.6: Measurements for GA + classification.
Table 7.4: FI framework parameters, phase two.
Parameter Parameter Value
VCC Voltage VCC 5 V
CLK High Voltage 5 V
CLK Low Voltage 0 V
Glitch length [2, 150] ns
Glitch voltage [-5000, -50] mV
Glitch offset [100, 400] ns
Glitch cycles random from [1, 10]
Wait cycles random from [750, 850]
• How to describe the search space region in a small number of measurements?
Those questions can be connected in certain scenarios, but we regard them as
two different problems. Indeed, when looking for faults we can expect that some
regions around those faults will be better analyzed, but from the other perspective,
that analysis will use more measurements and it will result in other regions being
less analyzed. From the other side, when looking for a region of interest, we can
expect that the algorithm will also find faults, but that behavior should not be spe-
cially rewarded. Rather, in this scenario, we aim to find as complete as possible
region between the NORMAL and RESET/MUTE classes in a minimal number of
Table 7.5: EAs framework parameters for FI, phase two.
Parameter Parameter Value
Tournament size 3
Population size 30
Stopping criterion 10 generations (250 measurements)
Mutation rate 0.1
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measurements.
7.5.3 Memetic Algorithm
A Memetic Algorithm (MA) represents a synergy between EAs (or any other population-
based algorithm) and local improvement algorithms [Wei09]. For that synergy to
reach the best results, there are several design questions to be answered.
• What local improvement method to use?
• How often to apply a local improvement method?
• On which solutions to apply the local improvement method?
• How long to run the local improvement method?
These questions guide us not only in the design of MA, but also help us balance
between evolutionary and local improvement techniques.
7.5.4 Genetic Algorithm
As already stated, the starting algorithm for this phase is the final version of the GA
from the first phase as presented in Algorithm 9.
We are looking for parameters that behave differently than NORMAL behavior;
therefore, for NORMAL class we give the smallest fitness value of one. RESET and
MUTE classes we consider the same and we give them a value 2 since we expect
to find faults in areas between NORMAL and RESET. Finally, for SUCCESS class
we give a value 3. Since we do not know where INCONCLUSIVE class actually
belongs (in what of the antecedent classes), we also assign it the same value as for
RESET/MUTE class.
7.5.5 Tabu Search
Since we have only a few different verdict classes (and consequently, only a lim-
ited number of different fitness values) it is to be expected that some solutions (i.e.
search points) will be repeated. Since every such solution consequently leads to an
unnecessary measurement, we adopt the technique from Tabu Search (TS) optimiza-
tion method. Tabu Search (TS) works by declaring solution candidates that already
have been visited as tabu and therefore not to be visited again [Wei09]. The advan-
tage of using TS method is twofold in this case: first, we lower the total number of
measurements performed and second, if not revisiting already visited locations, the
algorithm is less likely to get stuck in a local optimum. Note that we do not imple-
ment the whole TS algorithm, but only the part related with keeping the tabu list.
However, for the simplicity sake, we still call it TS. The easiest way to implement
TS is by using a list, which stores all the solutions that have been already measured
and allocated fitness value. If a new solution is created that is on the list, it is not
measured but discarded immediately.
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7.5.6 Local Search
Local Search (LS) algorithms work on a single solution (instead of multiple solutions)
and generally transcend only to neighbors of the current solution. They move in
the space of candidate solutions by applying local changes until they find the local
optimum or the time bound is elapsed [GK03].
In our experiments, we use one version of the divide-and-conquer algorithm
where each new solution is located in the middle of parent solutions (binary search).
In order to behave in such a manner, we need to define the space of candidate so-
lution, i.e. in what neighborhood it can operate. To be able to do that, we need to
define an appropriate distance metric.
Distance Measures.
Two solutions are neighbors if they are at the distance smaller than d. We experiment
with the following two distance metrics.
Euclidean Distance. Euclidean distance between two points~a and~b in n-dimensional
space is given by the following formula [FCTB08]:
d(~a,~b) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(ai − bi)2. (7.2)
Manhattan Distance. In this metric, distance between two points is the sum of
absolute differences of their Cartesian coordinates [Kra88]:
d(~a,~b) =
n∑
i=1
|ai − bi|. (7.3)
Since the search space parameters are of different magnitudes, we use normalized
values in range [0, 1] for every dimension of the search space.
Now, we can give the answers to questions related with MA. We use the LS algo-
rithm after each GA generation. Local search works on all individuals that are closer
than the distance d from each other and belong to different classes; it runs while the
distance between solutions is larger than the resolution r. With the resolution pa-
rameter, we can control how precise characterization of the search space we want.
We see that it was necessary to add two parameters to control the LS algorithm. The
first parameter, distance d, ensures that only individuals that are closer than that
distance can participate in local search. The second parameter, resolution r, controls
when the LS should stop operating on each pair of individuals. We give pseudocode
for the LS in Algorithm 10.
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Algorithm 10 Local Search Algorithm.
create pool with all individuals ind
for all ind in the pool do
select ind_tmp from the pool
d = distance (ind, ind_tmp)
if d > resolution and d < distance and class (ind) != class (ind_tmp) then
make pair
remove individuals from pool
end if
end for
for all pairs do
d = distance (ind_1, ind_2)
if d > resolution then
create point in between points
call evaluator
replace parent from the same class as offspring
else
remove pair
end if
end for
7.5.7 Experimental Results
When conducting experiments, we compare our results with the random search and
the exhaustive search methods.
Random Search.
In this method, search space parameters are chosen uniformly at random. We dis-
play results for a random search with 2 500 measurements in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Random search, 2 500 measurements.
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Exhaustive Search.
In order to check the full characterization of the search space we also run exhaustive
search. Since there are too many possible solutions for any realistic exhaustive search
we conduct exhaustive search for glitch length and glitch voltage while other param-
eters are chosen uniformly at random. We show results with 7 500 measurements in
Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8: Exhaustive search, 7 500 measurements.
Next, we present results for our algorithm separately for the case where the goal
is to find as many as possible faults and for the case where the goal is the character-
ization of search space. After a short tuning phase we set the distance d parameter
to the value of 0.3 and the resolution r parameter to the value of 0.1 since with those
values we observed the best behavior. However, our experiments also show that
these parameters are quite robust and small changes in values do not significantly
change algorithm performance.
7.5.8 Finding Faults
When the goal is finding faults, we conduct several runs of different algorithms and
then we present averaged values in Table 7.6. Columns Normal, Reset and Suc-
cess show the average number of NORMAL, RESET/MUTE and SUCCESS mea-
surements and column TOTAL shows the total number of measurements with and
without TS (value in brackets) algorithm.
In Figures 7.9a and 7.9b, we give example of one run of GA+TS+LS algorithm
with Euclidean distance and 250 measurements. In this experiment, with 250 mea-
surements in total, we found 21 glitches which represent 8.5% of total measured
points.
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Table 7.6: Average results of FI experiments, phase two.
Algorithm Normal Reset Success Total
GA+TS 128.6 88.5 4.3 227 (300)
GA+TS+LS, Euclidean 144.2 109.2 7.4 250 (300)
GA+TS+LS, Manhattan 146 84.8 1.83 208 (300)
(a) Glitch voltage vs. glitch length. (b) Glitch voltage vs. glitch length.
Figure 7.9: GA + TS + LS, Euclidean distance, 250 measurements.
7.5.9 Search Space Characterization
When the goal is to characterize the search space, or more precise the region between
NORMAL and RESET/MUTE classes, we are not interested in SUCCESS points.
Therefore, we treat them as RESET/MUTE points and give them value 2. Again,
the number of measurements is set to 250. In Figures 7.10a until 7.10d, we display
results for four different versions of algorithm.
We see that random search is not capable to characterize interesting regions with
small number of measurements. Combination of GA, TS and LS algorithms with
Manhattan distance performed best since it accurately described longest part of the
interesting region.
As evident from our results, the MA behaves much better than the GA (although,
our new GA is specialized and behaves much better than the standard GA). Next,
we see that the first improvement, tabu list, in average reduces the total number of
measurements more than 20%, which results in so many more unique spots our al-
gorithm can generate. Furthermore, although exhaustive search in two dimensions
(with some parameter steps) would take several hours we still consider it to be re-
alistic approach while with three parameter dimensions this problem becomes com-
pletely non practical in realistic environment. Lastly, here we set strict constraints
on the available number of measurements which was not the case in previous works
(there the goal was minimal number of measurements without explicitly stating that
minimal level).
The observant reader can notice that we do not compare algorithms from the first
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(a) Random search, search space characteriza-
tion.
(b) GA + TS, search space characterization.
(c) GA + TS + LS, Manhattan distance, search
space characterization.
(d) GA + TS + LS, Euclidean distance, search
space characterization.
Figure 7.10: FI for search space characterization.
and second phase. There are several reasons why we choose not doing so. First, we
added TS functionality to avoid duplicate measurements. Therefore, it is not fair to
compare algorithms from phase one and phase two since in phase one we do not
care about duplicate measurements. Furthermore, in phase one we measure each
point three times to check for CHANGING class, in phase two this is impossible due
to TS extension. In phase two we work with three parameters while in phase one we
work with two parameters. Comparing those two problem difficulties is therefore
not straightforward.
With the increase of the number of parameters, the methods presented here need
no additional adjustment and should prove even more efficient with regard to ran-
dom search, which remains to be addressed. Third, in phase one we do not limit the
number of measurements while we do so in the phase two. Since the usual behavior
of EAs is to converge in time, it is to be expected that the number of solutions grow
progressively with the number of measurements.
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7.6 Conclusions
Our experiments show it is possible successfully to find search space parameters
that cause faults with a limited number of measurements. Additionally, our algo-
rithm from phase two can be used to characterize interesting search space regions.
Both scenarios are explored with a small number of measurements. By adding more
measurements (and therefore GA generations), we obtain even better results since
GA works by using existing solutions to find new, better solutions.
We do not claim that GAs (or the MAs) are the best possible methods, but we
demonstrate that there are nature-inspired algorithms that can significantly improve
the FI process. Glitch testing in this work has only been performed on a target with
no countermeasures. Since it is expected that the search space is affected by such
countermeasures, e.g. glitch sensors, the applicability of this approach in a real
world attack scenario remains to be assessed. A possible step in our research is
therefore to experiment with smart cards on which countermeasures against FI are
implemented.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Open Problems
“Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the
end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
Winston Churchill
Here we summarize the most important conclusions from the previous chapters.
We divide this chapter into four parts. In the first part, we discuss the problems
investigated in this thesis. The second part concerns with some constraints when
using heuristics. In the third part, we discuss what can be learned from the inves-
tigation presented in this thesis. We extend this with a discussion on some lessons
learned when using Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) for solving cryptology-related
problems. Finally, in the fourth part we elaborate on open problems with regards to
this thesis.
8.1 What is in This Thesis
W
e present several examples how to use EAs in order to “solve” difficult cryp-
tographic problems. While doing that, we try to reconcile two very different
areas: Evolutionary Computation (EC) and cryptology.
We are aware that in this process we made some simplifications. There will be
topics that the cryptographic community will concede too easy and even trivial, and
those areas they will consider not clear enough. The same goes for the EC commu-
nity. Naturally, interdisciplinary work often suffers from this problem, and there is
no easy solution. However, we believe the most important contribution of this the-
sis is a methodical approach one can use in order to solve other, related problems.
Indeed, we show a number of successful applications where one can recognize steps
one needs to follow in one’s research.
One can argue that the choice of problems investigated in this thesis is not the
best possible. In a way, this can be regarded as true. Naturally, this does not mean
we made a mistake when choosing problems. Rather, we could have chosen prob-
lems that are either easier to connect with EAs paradigm or problems that are more
difficult, in order to better justify the usage of heuristics.
We opted to work with different problems and that usually brings a touch of
intuition and experimentalism when using heuristics. This is especially evident in
Chapter 7 where one can assume that we need to make a lot of customization for
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a problem that is not too difficult to begin with. However, partially due to those
circumstances, we are able to show a process of an evolution of EAs that we believe
is important to address. Often, heuristics need to be customized to produce good
results and that process of customization can be the source of unnecessary confusion.
8.2 What is Not in This Thesis
The topics presented here are selected based on our personal preferences and their
relevance to the area. In accordance to that, we work with only a few EAs. There are
many other EAs that are widely accepted and provide good results. Such algorithms
could be also used on the problems we discuss in this thesis.
Furthermore, in this thesis we do not give any example where EAs were not able
to find good solutions. This does not mean that EAs can be used to solve every
problem. Indeed, in every chapter in this thesis we could have taken some other
direction, whether that being a different representation of a problem or another fit-
ness function or something else. We experiment with several options and at the end
we present the combination we deem to be the best. Other options we decide not
to present here in order not to make this thesis even longer. This naturally does not
mean we did not encounter difficulties in experimental settings. Since we use heuris-
tics, in most of the investigations in this thesis we cannot be sure whether we found
optimal values. Therefore, this thesis should not be considered containing the best
possible solutions to the presented problems.
8.3 What is there to Learn?
Although the results should be the central point, we want to give an emphasis on
the approach and possibilities. Besides these topics, we work on several more prob-
lems with varying success. However, poor results do not always need to mean bad
algorithms.
In every work, there is always a human factor where the researcher can conduct
good or not so good experiments. Besides that, since we are working with heuristics,
there is always an element of coincidence, or even luck. A keen reader probably
notices that we often write that the EAs parameters are the results of some short
tuning phase. Since we work on diverse topics, such “impreciseness” is a necessity.
However, one could claim that it is possible to obtain much better results with a more
detailed tuning phase. This is a valid argument, but since we made such tuning
phases for each of the experimental settings, our comparisons (and results) are as
relevant and as fair as possible. We leave more intense and detailed experiments in
the tuning phase for some future work.
The aim of this thesis is to learn concepts; how to use EC and when to use it.
Additionally, we try to give insights in the intricacies of heuristics as well as some
guidelines when developing custom made algorithms. Naturally, it would be too
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ambitious to encompass all relevant material in this thesis. Therefore, we persevere
to give relevant references and pointers for future researchers in this area. Here
we emphasize the two most important EAs lessons one should learn: to be careful
when devising appropriate representation of a problem and the fitness function for a
problem. There are other settings of importance, but that will come with experience
and better availability of frameworks.
Is it necessary to use EAs to solve the problems presented in this thesis? The
answer is a definitive no. Even the related work sections often point to some other
heuristics used for said problems. Our suggestion is always to try to work with
the algorithms one is acquainted with. Even if the algorithm is not the best possi-
ble one, it can be considered as a good first option if the researcher has experience
with it. Often, less powerful algorithms that are used in a proper way present a
much more potent option than the more powerful algorithms that are used with-
out proper understanding. Now the question one can ask is whether it is necessary
to use heuristics to solve those problems? Maybe not, but it is a viable option. As
already mentioned in several places, we believe that it is always better to use a spe-
cialized algorithm if possible. Heuristics should come in mind in those occasions
where we do not have more appropriate options on our hands.
8.4 What are the Open Problems?
In some way, all problems we consider here remain open. Naturally, for each of
the problems we offer solutions that are (at least) competitive. However, a hard-
ship with EC is that one rarely knows that he has reached the best possible solution
(famed global optimum). Next, we give a short intersection of open problems for
each chapter. Alongside the open problems, we also discuss future research direc-
tions.
In Chapter 3, we consider a tool for the analysis and generation of S-boxes and
Boolean functions. Since we discuss a program there is a natural life cycle when
developing software. There is always a need for various improvements and updates.
Currently, we are developing a new version of the program that will be written in
C++ and will support multithreading and GPU computing. Besides that, we are
working on various optimizations in an effort to support the treatment of nonlinear
elements of larger sizes.
In Chapter 4, we evolve Boolean functions that fulfill different cryptographic cri-
teria. Although we work on a several criteria, those represent only a small part of
what is possible and relevant. Naturally, there are the two main perspectives that we
consider throughout the thesis. The EC perspective says that everything is open; we
are interested in statistical comparison among multiple algorithms, different sizes of
Boolean functions and different design criteria. The easiest (and most practical from
the cryptographic perspective) avenue is to investigate Boolean functions with more
than eight inputs. Often it is remarked that for the bigger sizes (e.g. n ≥ 9), EAs
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cannot compete with some combinations of algorithms (e.g. theory supplementing
optimization methods [KMY06]. From the cryptography perspective, still the prob-
lem of finding balanced 8-bit Boolean function with nonlinearity 118 remains open.
Recently, it was shown that Boolean functions with small Hamming Weight (HW)
and high correlation immunity can be used to reduce the masking overhead. How-
ever, in [BCG13] we can see that for correlation immunity equal to four, five and six
and Boolean functions with 11, 12 and 13 inputs there are no known minimal values
of cardinality of support. Finding those values would be interesting goal not only
from EA perspective, but also from cryptographic one. Furthermore, while read-
ing literature, one can encounter problems that were open for years and then solved
with some algebraic construction. It would be interesting to see whether EC can find
comparable solutions.
In Chapter 5, we work on evolving S-boxes that have better Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) resistance. There, for the 4 × 4 size, we decisively show what the
best possible solutions are and we show that a Genetic Algorithm (GA) is capable of
finding such solutions. This is also the only place where we know we found a global
optimum. For the 8 × 8 size the problem remains open. Recently, we became aware
there are other properties that characterize the resistance of S-boxes against DPA
attacks. For the sake of completeness, conducting experiments with that properties
would be of relevance. Furthermore, there is an apparent gap between the 4 × 4
size where the problem seems to be quite easy and the 8 × 8 size where EAs cannot
come close to finite field inversion method results. One natural step would be to
investigate all S-box sizes between those two extremes (i.e. 5 × 5, 6 × 6 and 7 × 7)
to see at what point problems start for EAs. Naturally, one can argue that even
suboptimal values are good enough to resist most cryptanalytic attacks. However,
improving on those results would be good to boost the confidence of cryptographic
community in EAs.
Chapter 6 shows how to evolve combinatorial circuits with higher throughput.
We are aware that this research could be declared quite “S-box centric” and therefore
looking at a more global approach could be beneficial. By a more global approach,
we mean to consider also other parts of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) like
MixColumns and AddRoundKey as parts of the circuitry. Furthermore, this is an ex-
citing research avenue that has more than merely cryptographic applications. Along-
side throughput, it is also possible to consider energy, power or area perspective.
Next step is to experiment with approaches that offer to lower the problem com-
plexity. At this point our algorithm works best when we add only one layer of Flip
Flops (FFs). However, we are confident that even those solutions can be signifi-
cantly improved. Naturally, this also extends to multi-stage case where one expects
even better solutions. Interesting research avenue would be to use Memetic Algo-
rithm (MA) where one combines EA with local search. Lastly, we observe there is
a lot of room for improvement when considering the evaluation of the circuit. Al-
though this is not directly connected with the problem, we still deem it important.
This is because the improvement in speed with regards to the evaluation function is
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directly translated to the improvement in speed with regards to the evolution pro-
cess.
Lastly, Chapter 7 deals with the problem of finding search space parameters that
cause faults in smart cards. After all experimental work, we can ask whether this
problem in the current form is hard enough to justify the usage of EA paradigm. The
answer is not easy, since usually, when exhaustive search can finish so fast (or better
to say, relatively fast) there is little need for optimization algorithms. However, in
scenarios where the allowed number of measurements is low, every improvement
can be of significance. It would be interesting to see whether it is possible to use the
same (or similar) approach with regards to Electromagnetic (EM) Fault Injection (FI).
Furthermore, we experimented only with a target that has no countermeasures. It is
to be expected that the search space is affected by such countermeasures and there-
fore experiments with smart cards that have countermeasures is a natural extension
of this work.
Application of EC in the cryptology area is not a large research domain since
there are not many researchers studying it. Therefore, it is hard to expect cryptology
breakthroughs. However, it is a rewarding area that is just starting and there is still
much work to be done. We believe that good results can be achieved only if both
crypto and EC community work together and combine their strengths. This is truly
an area where the complementary work of both communities has larger impact than
just the sum of those two communities.
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Appendix A
Installation and Running of ECF and Projects
“Intelligence is the faculty of making artificial objects,
especially tools to make tools.”
Henri Bergson
I
n this chapter, we give short instructions how to install ECF and run some projects
related with this thesis.
A.1 Installation
Here we give short information how to install Windows (Visual Studio) version of
the framework. For more detailed instructions as well as for the instructions for
other operating systems we refer reader to http://gp.zemris.fer.hr/ecf/
install.html.
All evolutionary methods (except CGP) that are used in this thesis are part of
ECF. CGP code is written by Julian Miller and available at http://www.cartesiangp.
co.uk/resources.html.
To install ECF first one needs to install boost library http://www.boost.org/.
After all the paths are correctly set, one can build the solution “ECF_lib.sln”. If ev-
erything is done correctly, this step results in the generation of ECF.lib file. When
one has the *.lib file, specific projects (in the “examples” folder) can be compiled and
run.
A.2 EvoCrypt
All necessary files as well as the list of published papers can be found at http:
//gp.zemris.fer.hr/crypto/.
Under the section Tools one can find “EvoCrypt working tool” link. EvoCrypt
tool can be used to evolve Boolean functions and S-boxes. First, one needs to down-
load and extract the files. Currently, we offer only a version for Windows operating
system, but one can take all the source files and compile it for other operating sys-
tems. After opening the EvoCrypt folder locate EvoCrypt.sln file and open it (you
need newer version of Visual Studio to do this - version 2005 and newer).
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After the solution is open, you can see it contains three projects. The first project is
the “Boolean-GP” and it is used to evolve Boolean functions in the form of trees (GP).
The second project is “Boolean-TT” and it can be used to evolve Boolean functions
where the individuals are bitstrings (TT representation). The last project is “sbox”
which is used to evolve S-boxes of different sizes where the representation is per-
mutation. These three projects are used to evolve most of the solutions as presented
in Chapters 4 and 5. All the projects in the EvoCrypt tool link to the existing ECF
installation. The easiest way to link is to place the entire EvoCrypt solution folder
within the “examples” folder of the ECF framework.
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Appendix B
Examples and Best Solutions
“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of
theories to suit facts.”
Arthur Conan Doyle
H
ere, we present several solutions primarily to offer an insight about the GP and
CGP representation to the interested readers (especially those readers that never
before used EAs). Naturally, solutions below are also representative examples for
each of three objectives.
B.1 Examples of Solutions for Chapter 4
B.1.1 The First Objective
An example of a bent function generated with GP that has a tree size 17 (tree depth
equal to three):
XOR XOR AND v5 v2 AND v4 v6 XOR IF v3 v1 v0 IF v7 v5 v1.
This translates to the following TT in hexadecimal format:
66006600690F690F660099FF690F96F055335533A5C3A5C35533AACCA5C35A3C.
An example of a bent function generated with GP that has a tree size 63 (tree
depth 7):
XOR AND AND2 XOR OR v2 v1 OR v4 v6 XNOR XOR v2 v2 OR v1 v4 XOR OR XOR
v7 v1 XNOR v2 v0 AND2 OR v7 v7 AND2 v0 v4 XOR XOR AND XOR v0 v2 OR v5 v5 XOR
AND2 v1 v7 XNOR v3 v6 XOR AND2 XNOR v1 v7 AND2 v7 v0 XOR AND v0 v6 AND v1
v4.
This translates to the following TT in hexadecimal format:
FF33CC5AA56996555566660F0F3C3CAA559966F00FC000FFFFCCCCA5A59800.
Next, we give an example of a bent function evolved with CGP that has genotype
size of 100 and mutation probability of 7%:
(2,5,[11]:8) (5,1,[11]:9) (8,1,[6]:10) (2,7,[11]:11) (11,3,[12]:12) (0,4,[10]:13) (1,10,[10]:14)
(8,1,[12]:15) (4,15,[7]:16) (13,7,[12]:17) (8,10,[11]:18) (14,8,[6]:19) (10,0,[11]:20) (19,14,[12]:21)
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(12,17,[12]:22) (0,6,[7]:23) (9,1,[10]:24) (14,8,[6]:25) (6,7,[6]:26) (3,14,[6]:27) (23,9,[11]:28)
(21,22,[7]:29) (17,4,[10]:30) (5,28,[6]:31) (6,17,[7]:32) (29,29,[6]:33) (12,0,[7]:34) (22,1,[7]:35)
(21,20,[6]:36) (27,10,[11]:37) (29,28,[10]:38) (17,21,[11]:39) (2,26,[12]:40) (10,35,[7]:41)
(35,25,[10]:42) (12,27,[7]:43) (13,2,[10]:44) (34,17,[12]:45) (10,8,[7]:46) (43,2,[6]:47) (39,9,[11]:48)
(9,22,[7]:49) (30,30,[12]:50) (12,47,[12]:51) (40,10,[11]:52) (17,7,[12]:53) (29,20,[11]:54)
(49,13,[12]:55) (30,25,[6]:56) (21,49,[6]:57) (3,32,[11]:58) (40,32,[10]:59) (55,18,[6]:60)
(4,22,[10]:61) (4,6,[6]:62) (44,33,[7]:63) (1,6,[11]:64) (20,31,[6]:65) (27,31,[6]:66) (49,39,[12]:67)
(29,27,[7]:68) (3,51,[6]:69) (25,10,[12]:70) (57,19,[11]:71) (65,59,[10]:72) (18,10,[10]:73)
(36,40,[12]:74) (37,73,[11]:75) (13,51,[6]:76) (5,40,[12]:77) (35,33,[11]:78) (78,3,[11]:79)
(0,38,[10]:80) (53,21,[10]:81) (17,39,[12]:82) (59,59,[7]:83) (74,29,[6]:84) (53,51,[12]:85)
(68,2,[10]:86) (84,53,[7]:87) (29,80,[11]:88) (82,50,[7]:89) (11,65,[12]:90) (88,12,[10]:91)
(65,1,[10]:92) (87,16,[6]:93) (89,55,[11]:94) (47,10,[12]:95) (13,8,[12]:96) (93,66,[10]:97)
(59,95,[12]:98) (79,59,[11]:99) (16,24,[7]:100) (99,83,[11]:101) (91,71,[7]:102) (70,20,[12]:103)
(15,31,[12]:104) (49,37,[6]:105) (88,36,[11]:106) (67,91,[10]:107) 107.
This solution has 22 active nodes and it translates to the following TT given here
in hexadecimal format:
F05AA50F0FA5A800AA55FF00AAAA0069C33C96963C3C969933CC6699333000.
B.1.2 The Second Objective
First, we give an example of balanced Boolean function with nonlinearity 116
evolved with GP that has the tree size 41 (tree depth 7):
XOR OR v1 v7 XOR AND AND XOR AND v7 v0 XOR v5 v6 AND2 OR v6 v6 XOR v7 v7
XNOR XOR v7 v2 XOR v4 v1 XOR XOR AND2 v4 v3 XOR OR v0 v2 v5 OR v6 v0,
which translates to the following TT:
3939C639C6C639C66060906F6C6C936CF5F50AF50A0AF80075752AD5B5B51AE5.
An example of balanced Boolean function with nonlinearity 116 evolved with
CGP where the solution has the genotype size of 300 and mutation probability of
5%:
(0,2,[7]:8) (5,1,[10]:9) (2,6,[10]:10) (0,10,[11]:11) (11,6,[10]:12) (11,7,[10]:13) (5,0,[10]:14)
(3,13,[7]:15) (4,13,[12]:16) (3,6,[6]:17) (14,5,[11]:18) (8,7,[11]:19) (2,2,[7]:20) (9,0,[7]:21)
(15,3,[6]:22) (21,8,[6]:23) (19,20,[11]:24) (16,5,[10]:25) (24,4,[10]:26) (25,21,[11]:27) (11,23,[10]:28)
(23,15,[12]:29) (23,2,[10]:30) (18,17,[11]:31) (0,21,[10]:32) (32,14,[12]:33) (21,26,[10]:34)
(2,15,[12]:35) (7,32,[12]:36) (2,20,[7]:37) (20,37,[10]:38) (5,33,[6]:39) (34,10,[6]:40) (8,3,[10]:41)
(39,30,[12]:42) (10,18,[7]:43) (32,11,[6]:44) (14,13,[10]:45) (22,26,[10]:46) (33,46,[11]:47)
(4,33,[6]:48) (34,47,[12]:49) (49,7,[10]:50) (8,48,[7]:51) (31,9,[10]:52) (25,21,[6]:53) (51,25,[7]:54)
(40,1,[6]:55) (15,36,[6]:56) (48,1,[11]:57) (53,21,[6]:58) (11,20,[6]:59) (53,0,[12]:60) (35,50,[11]:61)
(1,53,[11]:62) (51,62,[7]:63) (29,32,[12]:64) (45,62,[7]:65) (62,11,[7]:66) (7,56,[12]:67)
(27,14,[12]:68) (37,27,[12]:69) (9,63,[6]:70) (55,42,[12]:71) (63,32,[10]:72) (59,23,[7]:73)
(40,36,[6]:74) (18,63,[7]:75) (44,70,[6]:76) (74,19,[11]:77) (32,69,[12]:78) (65,40,[12]:79)
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(22,50,[11]:80) (7,24,[11]:81) (81,64,[10]:82) (51,29,[12]:83) (43,40,[10]:84) (6,2,[7]:85)
(84,41,[10]:86) (3,59,[12]:87) (42,7,[12]:88) (17,30,[11]:89) (46,29,[6]:90) (31,81,[11]:91)
(52,44,[10]:92) (48,26,[6]:93) (21,49,[6]:94) (48,10,[6]:95) (88,22,[10]:96) (16,72,[7]:97)
(78,13,[10]:98) (15,17,[6]:99) (39,81,[11]:100) (69,6,[11]:101) (83,7,[10]:102) (99,88,[11]:103)
(94,39,[11]:104) (29,31,[7]:105) (49,75,[10]:106) (69,39,[12]:107) (97,28,[6]:108) (45,100,[7]:109)
(59,10,[12]:110) (30,102,[6]:111) (16,41,[7]:112) (53,96,[12]:113) (82,70,[12]:114) (55,56,[11]:115)
(28,33,[6]:116) (95,91,[10]:117) (1,21,[12]:118) (89,78,[11]:119) (45,46,[12]:120) (58,1,[11]:121)
(18,48,[12]:122) (122,50,[7]:123) (25,106,[10]:124) (30,19,[6]:125) (24,15,[6]:126) (25,76,[7]:127)
(40,76,[6]:128) (38,114,[11]:129) (67,40,[12]:130) (47,102,[12]:131) (30,33,[11]:132) (113,14,[7]:133)
(36,45,[6]:134) (76,8,[6]:135) (73,45,[11]:136) (22,130,[12]:137) (45,37,[7]:138) (72,23,[6]:139)
(96,57,[6]:140) (42,137,[12]:141) (60,58,[6]:142) (105,52,[11]:143) (11,94,[7]:144) (89,83,[11]:145)
(77,80,[10]:146) (44,107,[12]:147) (140,1,[7]:148) (41,110,[12]:149) (120,32,[11]:150) (59,7,[12]:151)
(29,41,[12]:152) (61,28,[6]:153) (11,45,[6]:154) (86,25,[6]:155) (124,39,[10]:156) (46,62,[11]:157)
(31,52,[6]:158) (144,52,[10]:159) (4,157,[11]:160) (53,36,[12]:161) (98,142,[10]:162) (74,122,[7]:163)
(105,145,[7]:164) (2,136,[11]:165) (2,57,[7]:166) (70,120,[6]:167) (6,67,[12]:168) (55,40,[7]:169)
(87,139,[10]:170) (151,45,[12]:171) (9,168,[7]:172) (56,86,[7]:173) (86,87,[11]:174) (114,81,[7]:175)
(111,24,[12]:176) (87,17,[7]:177) (143,18,[11]:178) (157,154,[7]:179) (0,151,[11]:180)
(137,106,[7]:181) (130,10,[10]:182) (83,90,[6]:183) (37,32,[6]:184) (19,145,[11]:185) (54,56,[12]:186)
(137,79,[7]:187) (101,166,[11]:188) (184,25,[7]:189) (104,46,[6]:190) (32,79,[7]:191) (165,31,[7]:192)
(183,107,[6]:193) (90,86,[11]:194) (139,136,[11]:195) (104,114,[11]:196) (89,102,[11]:197)
(92,180,[7]:198) (108,198,[12]:199) (102,136,[12]:200) (1,178,[11]:201) (34,101,[6]:202)
(169,38,[10]:203) (55,105,[12]:204) (83,115,[12]:205) (75,69,[12]:206) (131,162,[12]:207)
(163,48,[12]:208) (81,100,[11]:209) (140,120,[6]:210) (122,154,[12]:211) (204,29,[6]:212)
(211,171,[7]:213) (94,100,[12]:214) (113,205,[11]:215) (84,50,[7]:216) (96,209,[6]:217)
(132,146,[10]:218) (147,147,[10]:219) (3,124,[6]:220) (201,78,[11]:221) (97,17,[7]:222)
(107,150,[10]:223) (35,10,[7]:224) (47,75,[12]:225) (70,90,[7]:226) (29,60,[11]:227) (175,99,[11]:228)
(83,64,[6]:229) (85,200,[10]:230) (182,79,[12]:231) (65,44,[7]:232) (80,42,[6]:233) (174,177,[7]:234)
(232,40,[12]:235) (220,217,[6]:236) (134,191,[11]:237) (210,20,[6]:238) (47,143,[11]:239)
(129,45,[11]:240) (1,13,[10]:241) (189,112,[7]:242) (130,21,[12]:243) (128,243,[7]:244)
(143,47,[7]:245) (4,220,[11]:246) (175,175,[6]:247) (129,143,[12]:248) (207,22,[6]:249)
(129,183,[7]:250) (103,59,[11]:251) (104,212,[11]:252) (148,80,[12]:253) (33,92,[7]:254)
(129,136,[10]:255) (22,24,[11]:256) (251,209,[12]:257) (32,26,[12]:258) (24,120,[11]:259)
(1,72,[7]:260) (139,241,[10]:261) (229,184,[6]:262) (165,174,[12]:263) (127,81,[12]:264)
(233,86,[12]:265) (103,13,[6]:266) (7,149,[6]:267) (6,228,[12]:268) (84,147,[10]:269) (76,86,[6]:270)
(164,42,[12]:271) (143,216,[11]:272) (245,110,[10]:273) (92,88,[12]:274) (103,204,[12]:275)
(275,22,[7]:276) (237,99,[12]:277) (95,95,[11]:278) (98,7,[11]:279) (237,264,[10]:280)
(98,19,[10]:281) (32,16,[6]:282) (140,146,[7]:283) (86,47,[10]:284) (117,238,[12]:285)
(213,178,[11]:286) (18,62,[7]:287) (118,190,[7]:288) (131,169,[11]:289) (272,36,[10]:290)
(34,119,[6]:291) (192,267,[10]:292) (250,252,[10]:293) (3,185,[7]:294) (27,271,[11]:295)
(39,132,[12]:296) (139,6,[10]:297) (28,7,[6]:298) (4,276,[7]:299) (42,53,[6]:300) (162,6,[10]:301)
(95,92,[6]:302) (55,218,[11]:303) (38,121,[6]:304) (259,47,[12]:305) (235,14,[10]:306)
(295,197,[11]:307) 307.
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This solution has 33 active nodes and it translates to the following TT:
A50F69C3AA0068005AF0963C55FF9933AACCEF10A5C36800AACCEF10A5C36800.
B.1.3 The Third Objective
Here we give examples of balanced Boolean function with nonlinearity 112, correla-
tion immunity 2, algebraic immunity 4 and algebraic degree 5. The first example is
evolved with GP where it has tree size 51 (tree depth 7):
XOR XOR v1 XOR XNOR XOR XOR XNOR v7 v2 XOR v4 v6 XOR XOR v2 v5 OR v3 v0
AND2 AND2 XOR v0 v7 v4 v7 v5 XOR AND XOR XOR XNOR XOR v4 v2 v1 v5 AND AND2
v7 v0 AND AND2 v6 v0 AND2 v1 v0 v4 v2,
which translates to the following TT:
63C9A60C369C59F3C96359F39C36A800963C56FC963CA80069C38B2169C374DE.
The next solution is evolved with CGP where it has the genotype size of 300 and
mutation probability of 7% with 34 active nodes:
(0,5,[10]:8) (6,6,[12]:9) (8,6,[10]:10) (4,9,[6]:11) (6,7,[12]:12) (1,12,[10]:13) (1,13,[11]:14) (7,0,[7]:15)
(0,13,[11]:16) (6,7,[7]:17) (16,9,[11]:18) (2,17,[10]:19) (17,3,[12]:20) (15,15,[11]:21) (5,0,[6]:22)
(5,5,[12]:23) (8,19,[10]:24) (1,3,[11]:25) (20,10,[12]:26) (12,3,[6]:27) (19,4,[10]:28) (26,9,[12]:29)
(23,0,[6]:30) (1,6,[11]:31) (28,7,[7]:32) (30,26,[10]:33) (18,12,[12]:34) (25,12,[12]:35) (24,0,[6]:36)
(21,35,[7]:37) (22,16,[11]:38) (10,8,[10]:39) (6,22,[10]:40) (14,38,[7]:41) (22,15,[11]:42) (5,42,[7]:43)
(43,18,[7]:44) (22,31,[12]:45) (16,33,[12]:46) (15,10,[12]:47) (36,14,[7]:48) (9,42,[11]:49)
(23,3,[11]:50) (12,14,[10]:51) (16,8,[12]:52) (11,33,[11]:53) (14,4,[6]:54) (23,27,[11]:55)
(47,44,[10]:56) (14,51,[10]:57) (29,8,[6]:58) (2,38,[11]:59) (41,46,[12]:60) (19,21,[6]:61) (7,59,[7]:62)
(22,36,[7]:63) (19,16,[11]:64) (43,7,[6]:65) (57,51,[6]:66) (45,28,[6]:67) (11,56,[10]:68) (54,44,[7]:69)
(29,7,[7]:70) (65,20,[12]:71) (59,13,[10]:72) (53,43,[6]:73) (22,66,[11]:74) (6,30,[11]:75)
(57,47,[10]:76) (43,33,[6]:77) (3,31,[11]:78) (60,47,[11]:79) (20,44,[12]:80) (62,16,[10]:81)
(79,78,[6]:82) (42,44,[7]:83) (5,61,[11]:84) (23,53,[7]:85) (53,28,[12]:86) (55,30,[6]:87)
(71,32,[12]:88) (75,10,[11]:89) (39,68,[6]:90) (28,53,[12]:91) (28,75,[11]:92) (19,33,[7]:93)
(57,31,[12]:94) (92,67,[12]:95) (82,1,[10]:96) (87,82,[6]:97) (96,47,[12]:98) (94,82,[6]:99)
(13,36,[11]:100) (81,28,[11]:101) (72,38,[11]:102) (40,35,[7]:103) (54,43,[12]:104) (56,53,[12]:105)
(43,19,[7]:106) (17,5,[10]:107) (11,49,[6]:108) (40,88,[10]:109) (10,16,[11]:110) (54,13,[7]:111)
(40,46,[12]:112) (67,48,[7]:113) (112,2,[11]:114) (54,72,[6]:115) (70,109,[7]:116) (98,70,[7]:117)
(48,75,[6]:118) (111,9,[11]:119) (106,6,[6]:120) (4,75,[7]:121) (79,0,[7]:122) (91,107,[11]:123)
(96,21,[7]:124) (104,29,[10]:125) (84,47,[7]:126) (65,100,[10]:127) (113,82,[12]:128) (45,3,[10]:129)
(90,85,[11]:130) (64,119,[6]:131) (18,95,[6]:132) (70,103,[11]:133) (44,29,[6]:134) (116,63,[11]:135)
(102,0,[7]:136) (55,15,[11]:137) (52,52,[12]:138) (13,29,[12]:139) (26,101,[6]:140) (41,111,[7]:141)
(58,34,[12]:142) (80,62,[7]:143) (7,125,[6]:144) (121,64,[7]:145) (115,28,[12]:146) (108,129,[12]:147)
(145,101,[7]:148) (146,20,[7]:149) (70,146,[11]:150) (129,132,[10]:151) (22,47,[10]:152)
(123,35,[7]:153) (110,46,[11]:154) (104,114,[10]:155) (81,100,[6]:156) (127,56,[10]:157)
(145,147,[7]:158) (68,127,[11]:159) (135,93,[11]:160) (19,107,[12]:161) (101,100,[10]:162)
(57,99,[7]:163) (82,129,[6]:164) (33,141,[7]:165) (114,103,[11]:166) (152,135,[6]:167)
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(132,75,[11]:168) (95,141,[12]:169) (83,71,[10]:170) (108,145,[7]:171) (130,138,[11]:172)
(88,89,[12]:173) (104,87,[12]:174) (50,152,[10]:175) (107,32,[7]:176) (20,57,[11]:177)
(55,108,[11]:178) (147,149,[10]:179) (83,108,[7]:180) (38,168,[10]:181) (2,29,[7]:182) (70,20,[6]:183)
(28,178,[10]:184) (0,16,[7]:185) (81,54,[10]:186) (77,117,[7]:187) (146,97,[11]:188) (42,28,[11]:189)
(52,19,[7]:190) (82,122,[7]:191) (45,183,[11]:192) (11,5,[6]:193) (155,144,[11]:194) (187,122,[6]:195)
(36,140,[10]:196) (189,124,[6]:197) (152,164,[7]:198) (54,42,[11]:199) (16,60,[10]:200)
(63,38,[7]:201) (73,86,[6]:202) (44,92,[12]:203) (7,157,[6]:204) (146,10,[11]:205) (157,133,[10]:206)
(131,22,[12]:207) (10,192,[11]:208) (145,167,[12]:209) (126,100,[12]:210) (127,156,[12]:211)
(12,27,[6]:212) (191,7,[6]:213) (96,204,[7]:214) (44,125,[10]:215) (12,168,[11]:216) (76,164,[12]:217)
(193,24,[6]:218) (91,123,[7]:219) (141,140,[6]:220) (125,157,[10]:221) (72,51,[11]:222) (99,7,[6]:223)
(27,187,[6]:224) (214,103,[6]:225) (103,36,[10]:226) (193,4,[12]:227) (189,217,[10]:228)
(173,219,[10]:229) (224,26,[11]:230) (165,94,[10]:231) (90,76,[12]:232) (47,3,[7]:233)
(125,123,[10]:234) (64,152,[10]:235) (189,133,[6]:236) (175,72,[11]:237) (202,192,[7]:238)
(120,44,[12]:239) (221,85,[6]:240) (49,240,[7]:241) (177,165,[11]:242) (35,41,[10]:243)
(115,194,[7]:244) (207,194,[11]:245) (77,43,[12]:246) (204,119,[12]:247) (134,184,[10]:248)
(77,176,[7]:249) (6,226,[11]:250) (130,182,[10]:251) (88,196,[12]:252) (36,59,[10]:253)
(108,67,[7]:254) (209,44,[12]:255) (137,62,[7]:256) (140,226,[12]:257) (191,172,[6]:258)
(121,31,[10]:259) (153,87,[12]:260) (4,69,[11]:261) (19,212,[6]:262) (13,227,[11]:263)
(122,107,[7]:264) (168,112,[12]:265) (27,238,[12]:266) (237,33,[10]:267) (220,187,[11]:268)
(131,146,[11]:269) (147,232,[10]:270) (98,24,[10]:271) (252,214,[12]:272) (0,170,[6]:273)
(184,21,[11]:274) (58,84,[12]:275) (182,212,[11]:276) (67,274,[12]:277) (12,150,[11]:278)
(19,204,[7]:279) (161,243,[12]:280) (122,89,[11]:281) (224,224,[7]:282) (196,131,[7]:283)
(140,2,[10]:284) (279,254,[6]:285) (84,258,[12]:286) (133,212,[6]:287) (143,91,[11]:288)
(199,181,[10]:289) (255,142,[11]:290) (172,36,[7]:291) (44,92,[12]:292) (137,277,[10]:293)
(116,264,[10]:294) (212,6,[6]:295) (279,168,[11]:296) (170,112,[12]:297) (73,200,[12]:298)
(118,275,[11]:299) (183,259,[6]:300) (177,282,[12]:301) (184,100,[11]:302) (212,270,[10]:303)
(142,300,[12]:304) (263,236,[6]:305) (4,109,[11]:306) (253,248,[11]:307) 307.
This translates to the following TT:
5B862CF15B862CF1A17CD60BA17CD80078B70BC48748F43B844BFB347BB40800.
B.2 Examples of Solutions for Chapter 5
Note that in this section we consider only the properties that are of primary inter-
est for our research (nonlinearity, δ-uniformity, transparency order, modified trans-
parency order and confusion coefficient). In accordance to that, some of the pre-
sented solutions have for instance fixed points, but that is easily solved with some
affine transformation. In the cases where S-boxes are given a name inside the chap-
ter, we present it here with the same name.
B.2.1 4× 4 Size
An example of optimal S-box with the best possible transparency order value:
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Transparency = (0xb, 0x0, 0xf, 0xa, 0x6, 0x5, 0x4, 0x8, 0x7, 0x1, 0xe, 0xc, 0xd, 0x2, 0x9, 0x3).
An example of optimal S-box with the best possible modified transparency order
value:
Modified_transparency = (0x2, 0x0, 0xc, 0x6, 0xa, 0xe, 0xf, 0x7, 0x3, 0x1, 0x8 , 0x4 , 0x9 ,
0xd , 0xb , 0x5).
An example of optimal S-box (“Phantom”) with the best possible confusion coef-
ficient value:
Phantom = (0x6, 0x4, 0x7, 0x8, 0x0, 0x5, 0x2, 0xa, 0xe, 0x3, 0xd, 0x1, 0xc, 0xf, 0x9, 0xb).
An example of optimal S-box (“New”) with high confusion coefficient value
(3.03):
New = (0xf, 0xb, 0x8, 0x4, 0x2, 0x0, 0xe, 0xd, 0x9, 0x3, 0x1, 0x5, 0xc, 0xa, 0x7, 0x6).
An example of optimal S-box evolved when considering the transparency order,
modified transparency order and the confusion coefficient:
Unity = (0xc, 0x3, 0xe, 0xf, 0xa, 0x6, 0x4, 0x2, 0xd, 0x7, 0x5, 0x1, 0x8, 0x0, 0x9, 0xb).
B.2.2 8× 8 Size
An example of S-box with nonlinearity value of 98, transparency order value of 7.36
and modified transparency value of 6.59:
S-box 2 = (0x61, 0xde, 0xf8, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x0, 0xa6, 0x9f, 0x25, 0x7b, 0x88, 0x16 , 0x34, 0x7e,
0x6b, 0x1d, 0x9c, 0x6e, 0xc5, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x49, 0x65, bf, 0xdc, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x64, 0xf6, 0xd, 0x11,
0xca, 0xf5, 0x5, 0x1f, 0xcc, 0x7d, 0xe3, 0x82, 0xfc, 0x5e, 0x20, 0xd3, 0xbd, 0xcd, 0x42, 0x45,
0xba, 0xf7, 0xaf, 0x52, 0x80, 0xc, 0xb9, 0xbe, 0x2, 0xe, 0xcf, 0x76, 0x91, 0x2a, 0x6c, 0xc4, 0x2b,
0x68, 0xc6, 0xd2, 0x1b, 0xc0, 0x5c, 0xa4, 0x7f, 0xf0, 0xeb, 0x2c, 0x8c, 0xa8, 0x3b, 0x4b, 0x5a,
0x12, 48, 0xe0, 0x27, 0x8d, 0x74, 0xc3, 0x63, 0xb5, 0x39, 0xc2, 0x46, 0xdf, 0xf4, 0x8a, 0x40, 0x26,
0x32, 0x43, 0x67, 0x47, 0x99, 0x71, 0x8, 3, 0x70, 0xc7, 0x31, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x55, 0x23, 0x56, 0x3f,
0x6, 0x7a, 0xbc, 0x33, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x5d, 0x44, 0xb, 0xf2, 0x59, 0x41, 0xef, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x35,
0x92, 0xfd, 0xed, 0x93, 0xf, 0xa0, 0x78, 0x8e, 0xd7, 0x9d, 0x4d, 0xc1, 0x97, 0xb1, 0xd5, 0xa9,
0x9a, 0x84, 0x15, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xf1, 0x53, 0xc9, 0x57, 0x24, 0x19, 0x60, 0x9e, 0xa7, 0xa1, 0xc8,
0x94, 0x3a, 0x6a, 0x18, 0x83, 0xe7, 0xa5, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x62, 0x7, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x4e, 0x38, 0xa, 0xad,
0xb6, 0x22, 0x2d, 0xe6, 0x7c, 0xb3, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xd4, 0xe4, 0xab, 0x69, 0xdd, 0x87, 0xa2, 0x8b,
0x10, 0x86, 0xae, 0x6f, 0x9, 0xcb, 0xe2, 0xec, 0xb0, 0x50, 0xac, 0xfe, 0x1, d9, 0xa3, 0x58, 0xb2,
0xd6, 0x21, 0xdb, 0xe8, 0xee, 0xe1, 0x75, 0x3e, 0xda, 0x81, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x4, 0x13, 0x1e,
0x9b, 0x51, 0x95, 77, 0xb7, 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x3c, 0x90, 0x2e, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x28, 0xd0, 0xe5, 0x17, 0x89,
0x4f, 0x98, 0x37, 0x85, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0xce, 0x8f, 0xf3, 0x29, 0x14).
An example of S-box with nonlinearity value of 98 and confusion coefficient
value of 4.06:
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S-box 1 = (0xb1, 0x23, 0x98, 0x27, 0x4b, 0x14, 0x9, 0x5c, 0x55, 0xa, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x1b, 0x3a,
0xa2, 0x53, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0xae, 0xde, 0xe7, 0 x9e, 0x4f, 0x97, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0xbe,
0xab, 0x2b, 0x91, 0x87, 0x36 , 0x1c, 0x81, 0x9d, 0xe5, 0x1a, 0xac, 0x1e, 0x5b, 0x86, 0x8c, 0x74,
0x6a, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0x65, 0xd5, 0x3f, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0xf, 0x37, 0xdd, 0x7d , 0xf2, 0xec, 0xf6, 0xe2, 0xb3,
0xaf, 0x77, 0x99, 0xca, 0xb9, 0xbb, 0xd0, 0x6c, 0xa7, 0x3d, 0xcb, 0x17, 0x75, 0x76, 0x4d, 0xad,
0xcf, 0x5 0, 0x68, 0x16, 0x2, 0x12, 0x78, 0x56, 0x1, 0xb0, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x29, 0 x6, 0x69, 0x58, 0x88,
0x8b, 0x6b, 0xe9, 0x8e, 0xc1, 0xc7, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x13, 0xbc, 0x2f, 0x38, 0x96, 0xbd, 0xdc, 0x62,
0xa8, 0x82, 0x24, 0 xa1, 0xb8, 0x0, 0x80, 0x61, 0xcc, 0x83, 0x22, 0x2c, 0xc2, 0xc0, 0xa0, 0x90,
0xf0, 0xdf, 0xdb, 0xba, 0xe8, 0xf9, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x7b, 0 xeb, 0xd8, 0xa3, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xf8,
0xc8, 0x5, 0x64, 0x66, 0xaa, 0xa9, 0xe, 0xb2, 0xd2, 0x19, 0x10, 0x70, 0x45, 0xc, 0x2a, 0x79, 0x3e,
0x5 d, 0x6d, 0xfa, 0xed, 0xda, 0xe1, 0x9a, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x8d, 0xf5, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0x57, 0xfd, 0xd,
0xe4, 0x95, 0x18, 0xb4, 0xb5, 0x1d, 0x26, 0x4 8, 0x93, 0x67, 0x7, 0x51, 0xd4, 0x34, 0x43, 0x84,
0x9b, 0x92, 0x60, 0x28, 0x49, 0xc6, 0xc4, 0x8, 0x54, 0xa5, 0x41, 0x40, 0xea, 0xa4, 0x44 , 0x35,
0x15, 0x3b, 0xce, 0xf4, 0xd3, 0x33, 0xb6, 0x8f, 0xcd, 0x25, 0xef, 0xb7, 0x3c, 0x46, 0xee, 0x85,
0x32, 0x3, 0xc3, 0x31, 0xb, 0x30, 0x72, 0xd1, 0x20, 0x4, 0xa6, 0xc9, 0x21, 0x89, 0x47, 0x52, 0x7e,
0x 6f, 0x11, 0xc5, 0xf1, 0xd7, 0x39, 0x94, 0x1f, 0xe3, 0x9c, 0xe0, 0x73, 0xe6, 0x42).
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Energy bank, 38
Genetic Programming, 38
Functions, 38
Primitives, 38
Terminals, 38
Genotype, 32
Ghost peak, 121
Glitch, 143
Glitch shape, 146
Glitch length, 146
Glitch offset, 147
Glitch voltage, 146
Global optimum, 32
Hash function, 18
Heuristics, 30
Hiding scheme, 95
Hill Climbing, 59
Ideal cipher model, 21
Implementation attacks, 26
Individual, 32
Initialization vector, 18
Internet of Things, 1
Inversion operation, 128
Irreducible polynomial, 127
Kronecker function, 73
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Las Vegas algorithms, 29
Lexicographical ordering, 47
LFSR, 25
Local optimum, 32
Local search, 59, 160
Locus, 32
Lookup table, 96
Maiorana-McFarland class of bent Boolean
functions, 83
Maiorana-McFarland construction, 66
Manhattan distance, 160
MARS algorithm, 99
Masking scheme, 95
Matyas-Meyer-Oseas construction, 19
MD4 algorithm, 43
Message origin authentication, 18
Metaheuristics, 30
Microcontroller, 119
Miyaguchi-Preneel construction, 19
Monte Carlo algorithms, 29
Multi-objective optimization, 40
Mutation, 33
Netlist, 129
No Free Lunch theorem, 42
Non-directed graph, 135
Non-repudiation, 18
Nonnormal bent Boolean function, 83
Normal basis representation, 126
Normal bent Boolean function, 83
NSGA-II
Crowding sort, 41
One-time pad, 25
Optical fault injection, 145
Optimal S-box, 100
Optimization algorithm
Approximate algorithm
Approximation algorithm, 29
Heuristic algorithm, 29
Approximate methods, 29
Exact methods, 29
Parse tree, 38
Parseval theorem, 68
Partial Spread class of bent Boolean functions,
83
Phenotype, 32
Pipeline, 125
Pipeline stages, 130
Plaintext, 17
Polybius square, 2
Polynomial basis representation, 126
Population, 32
Population based metaheuristics, 31
Power leakage model, 28
Hamming distance, 28
Hamming weight, 28
PRESENT, 24
Primitives, 38
PRINCE algorithm, 113
Pseudo-random permutation, 21
Public-key cryptography, 19
Rønjom-Helleseth attack, 73
RAKAPOSHI cipher, 67
Random search, 59
Receiver, 17
Recombination, 33
Reed-Muller code, 70
Representation, 32
RFID tag, 143
Rijndael, 23
Roulette-wheel selection, 35
Round function, 21
S-box, 96
t-resiliency, 51
Global Avalanche Criterion (GAC), 51
Propagation Characteristic (PC), 51
DPA Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR (DPA)),
52
Difference Distribution Table (DDT), 52
Linear Approximation Table (LAT), 53
Lookup Table (LUT), 48
Affine equivalance, 61
Algebraic degree, 51
Algebraic normal form, 48
Autocorrelation function, 48
Balancedness, 52
Branch number, 53
Component AI, 52
Confusion coefficient, 99
Correlation immunity, 51
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Differential delta uniformity, 53
Extended affine equivalance, 61
Fixed points, 53
Mofidied transparency order, 52
Nonlinear degree, 51
Nonlinearity, 51
Opposite fixed points, 53
Sage, 55
SNR (DPA), 98
Transparency order, 52, 98
Truth table, 48
Walsh-Hadamard transform, 48
S-box Evaluation and Generation tool, 45
SASEBO, 119
Scytale, 16
Secret-key cryptography, 18
Selection, 33
Sender, 17
Shannon’s model, 21
Side-channel attack, 27
Side-channels, 27
Side-channel countermeasure, 95
Simulated Annealing, 38
Simulated measurements, 121
Single-solution based metaheuristics, 31
Smart card, 143
Specific heuristics, 30
Standard cell, 129
Steady-state model, 35
Steady-state tournament selection, 35
Tournament size, 35
Stream cipher, 25, 65
Asyncronous stream cipher, 25
Combiner generator, 25
Filter generator, 25
Self-synchronizing stream cipher, 25
Syncronous stream cipher, 25
Subset cover problem, 43
Symmetric-key cryptography, 18
Syntax tree, 38
Synthesis, 137
Tabu search, 159
Tap, 25
Target of Evaluation, 146
Terminals, 38
Tower field, 127
Trace, 27
Tree structure, 38
Turing machine, 17
Upper bound for nonlinearity, 70
Variation operators, 33
Vectorial Boolean function, 46
Verilog, 129
Vernam cipher, 25
Weakly normal bent Boolean function, 83
Wiener-Khintchine theorem, 48
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Notation and Symbols
“All notation should be a simple as the nature of the
operations to which it is applied”
Charles Babbage
Mathematical Operations and Symbols
: Such that
O
(·) Upper bound, f(n) = O(g(n)) if ∃ some constant c > 0 : f(n) ≤ c · g(n)
∈ Member of
⊕ Addition modulo 2 (exclusive OR)∑
Addition in characteristic 0
f(x) Function of x
Fields, Groups and Vector Spaces
F Field (arbitrary)
F2n Galois field with 2n elements
F2 Galois field with two elements
Fn2 n-dimensional vector space over F2
Z Ring of the integers
GL(n,F2) The general linear group of degree n over F2
Vectors
~a ·~b Inner product of vectors ~a and~b
~a ≤ ~b Lexicographical ordering
~x = (x0, ..., xn−1) Element of Fn2
~x  ~a Partial ordering, xi ≤ ai, ∀i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}
HW (~a) Hamming weight of vector ~a
supp(~a) Support of vector ~a
Codes
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ρ(r, n) Covering radius of RM(r, n)
RM(r, n) Reed-Muller code of order r and length 2n over Fn2
Boolean Functions and S-boxes
(n,m)-function Function F from Fn2 to Fm2
δ Differential delta uniformity
∆F Absolute indicator of S-box F
∆f Absolute indicator of a Boolean function f
 Bias of nonlinearity of Boolean function f
κ Confusion coefficient variance
BFn The set of Boolean functions on Fn2
M Maiorana-McFarland class of bent Boolean functions
N Class of bent Boolean functions introduced by Dobbertin
N Partial Spread class of bent Boolean functions
σF Sum-of-square indicator of S-box F
σf Sum-of-square indicator of Boolean function f
AIf Algebraic immunity of Boolean function f
AIcomp Component algebraic immunity of S-box F
ANFF Algebraic normal form of S-box F
ANFf Algebraic normal form of Boolean function f
bF Branch number of S-box F
Cf1,f2 Crosscorrelation function of Boolean functions f1 and f2
CIF (t) Correlation immunity of order t of S-box F
CIf (t) Correlation immunity of order t of Boolean function f
DDT Difference distribution table of S-box F
degF Algebraic degree of S-box F
degf Algebraic degree of Boolean function f
LAT Linear approximation table of S-box F
MTF Modified transparency order
NF Nonlinearity of S-box F
Nf Nonlinearity of Boolean function f
ndegF Nonlinear degree of S-box F
rF Autocorrelation function of S-box F
rf Autocorrelation function of Boolean function f
SNR(DPA)F DPA Signal to Noise Ratio of S-box F
suppf Support of a Boolean function f
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TF Transparency order of S-box F
WDaF Walsh-Hadamard transform of the derivative of F with respect to ~a
WF Walsh-Hadamard transform of S-box F
Wf Walsh-Hadamard transform of Boolean function f
R Robustness to differential cryptanalysis
Cryptography
K Key space
d Decryption key
Dd Decryption process
e Encryption key
Ee Encryption process
Ciphers, Hash Functions and Modes of Operation
Achterbahn Stream cipher
AES Block cipher
Blowfish Block cipher
CBC Block cipher confidentiality mode of operation
CBC-MAC Block cipher authenticity mode of operation
CFB Block cipher confidentiality mode of operation
CMAC Block cipher authenticity mode of operation
CTR Block cipher confidentiality mode of operation
DES Block cipher
ECB Block cipher confidentiality mode of operation
GCM Block cipher authenticated-encryption mode of operation
Grain Stream cipher
IDEA Block cipher
JH Hash function
Keccak-f Sponge function
KHAZAD Block cipher
MD5 Hash function
NOEKEON Block cipher
OFB Block cipher confidentiality mode of operation
OMAC Block cipher authenticity mode of operation
PRINCE Block cipher
RAKAPOSHI Stream cipher
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RC6 Block cipher
Salsa20 Stream cipher
Serpent Block cipher
SHA-x Hash function
SHARK Block cipher
Speck Block cipher
TEA Block cipher
Evolutionary Computation
λ Number of offspring in ES
µ Number of parents in ES
A Arbitrary evolutionary algorithm
dyM Objective value in a sample of a size M
Fq Front q in NSGA-II
k Tournament size
l Levels-back in CGP
M Number of iterations
N Population size in EC
nc Number of columns in CGP
nn Number of node input connections in CGP
no Number of program output connections in CGP
nr Number of rows in CGP
O Optimization problem
P (0) Initial population of EA
P (t) EA population at the moment t
Pt Population P at the moment t
Pc Crossover probability
Pm Mutation probability
Qt Children population at the moment t in NSGA-II
Rt Union of two populations in NSGA-II
y Value y in the objective space Y
Monte Carlo Algorithms
ACO Ant Colony Optimization
CGP Cartesian Genetic Programming
EP Evolutionary Programming
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ES Evolution Strategy
GA Genetic Algorithm
GP Genetic Programming
HC Hill Climbing
PSO Particle Swarm Optimization
SA Simulated Annealing
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Acronyms
ACO Ant Colony Optimization
AE Affine Equivalent
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AI Algebraic Immunity
ANF Algebraic Normal Form
ARX Add-Rotate-Xor
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining MAC
CFB Cipher Feedback
CGP Cartesian Genetic Programming
CI Correlation Immunity
CMAC Cipher-based MAC
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
CPA Correlation Power Analysis
CTR Counter
DC Differential Cryptanalysis
DDT Difference Distribution Table
DES Data Encryption Standard
DOM Difference of Means
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EA Evolutionary Algorithm
EAE Extended Affine Equivalent
EC Evolutionary Computation
ECB Electronic Codebook
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ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECF Evolutionary Computation Framework
EM Electromagnetic
EP Evolutionary Programming
ES Evolution Strategy
FF Flip Flop
FI Fault Injection
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
FSR Feedback Shift Register
GA Genetic Algorithm
GAC Global Avalanche Criterion
GAn Genetic Annealing
GCM Galois Countermode
GET Generate Evaluate Transform
GL General Linear Group
GP Genetic Programming
GUI Graphical User Interface
HC Hill Climbing
HD Hamming Distance
HW Hamming Weight
IC Integrated Circuit
IV Initialization Vector
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
LAT Linear Approximation Table
LC Linear Cryptanalysis
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
LS Local Search
LSB Least Significant Bit
LUT Lookup Table
MA Memetic Algorithm
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD4 Message Digest 4
MD5 Message Digest 5
MOEA Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithm
MSB Most Significant Bit
NAND NOT AND
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NFL No Free Lunch
NFSR Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register
NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology
NLFSR Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register
NSGA Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
NSGA-II Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II
OFB Output Feedback
OMAC One-key MAC
OS Operating System
PC Propagation Characteristic
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKC Public-key Cryptography
PRNG Pseudo-random Number Generator
PRP Pseudo-random Permutation
PSO Particle Swarm Optimization
PTT Polarity Truth Table
RC6 Rivest Cipher 6
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
RSBF Rotation Symmetric Boolean Function
RSSB Rotation Symmetric S-box
RW Roulette-wheel
SA Simulated Annealing
SAC Strict Avalanche Criterion
SASEBO Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board
SCA Side-channel Analysis
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNR (DPA) DPA Signal to Noise Ratio
SPN Substitution Permutation Network
SPMN Substitution Permutation Mixing Network
SST Steady State Tournament
TEA Tiny Encryption Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
TS Tabu Search
TT Truth Table
VCC Integrated Circuit Power Supply Pin
XOR Exclusive OR
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